Cited by

¶15 The common definitions of “engage,” as applied here, include: “to begin and carry on an enterprise or activity.” Engage, Merriam- Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary (11th ed. 2014); –98 (App. 1991) (noting we may look to dictionary definitions to determine a term’s meaning).

ollow the plain and natural meaning of the language of the statute to discover what the legislature intended.” ¶ 12 (App. 1999) (“Unless the legislature clearly expresses an intent to give a term a special meaning, we give the words used in statutes their plain and ordinary meaning.”); (“A statute is not unconstitutionally vague because one of its terms is not explicitly defined.”).

(explaining a statute is not unconstitutionally vague “simply because it is susceptible to more than one interpretation” or “could have been written with greater precision”).

10, 1996) (finding we strive to give statutes a constitutional construction, and thus, shall give a limiting construction, where appropriate, to cure a statute of any “constitutional infirmity”) ().

of the language of the statute to discover what the legislature intended.” ¶ 12, (“Unless the legislature clearly expresses an intent to give a term a special meaning, we give the words used in statutes their plain and ordinary meaning.”); (“A statute is not unconstitutionally vague because one of its terms is not explicitly defined.”).

(reviewing court “should give statutes a constitutional construction whenever possible”).

¶ 19 “Our primary task in construing a statute is to identify and give effect to legislative intent.”

And due process does not require us to strike down an ordinance that was not “drafted with absolute precision’ ” or one that omits an “explicit definition” or is “susceptible to different interpretations.” Id., , , (due process does not require “specific definitions of each term which would no doubt necessitate further definitions of the definitions, ad infinitum — so that each section of the criminal code would be a th

¶35 A statute is “unconstitutionally vague if it does not give persons of ordinary intelligence a reasonable opportunity to learn what it prohibits and does not provide explicit standards for those who will apply it.”

that a different meaning is intended.” , ( , ).

“‘Legislative intent often can be discovered by examining the development of a particular statute.’” Paul M., 7 P.3d at 133, quoting Carrow Co. v. Lusby, 167 Ariz. 18, 20

“Words and phrases in a statute are [ ] given their ordinary meaning unless it appears from the context of the statute or from that of the act of which the statute is a part that a different meaning is intended.”

¶ 9 “A legislative enactment is unconstitutionally vague if it does not give persons of ordinary intelligence a reasonable opportunity to learn what it prohibits and does not provide explicit standards for those who will apply it.” McLamb, 188 Ariz. at 5 , 932 P.2d at 270 ( , ).

¶ 18 Finally, in construing a statute, we also “look to the policy behind [it] and to the evil that it was designed to remedy.”

2294 , 33 L.Ed.2d 222 (1972); McLamb, 188 Ariz. at 5 , 932 P.2d at 270

can [also] be discovered by examining the development of a particular statute.”

A statute is unconstitutionally vague when “it does not give persons of ordinary intelligence a reasonable opportunity to learn what it prohibits and does not provide explicit standards for those who will apply it.”

“Legislative intent often can be discovered by examining the development of a particular statute.”

A statute is unconstitutionally vague when “it does not give persons of ordinary intelligence a reasonable opportunity to learn what it prohibits and does not provide explicit standards for those who will apply it.”

“However, due process does not require that a statute be drafted with absolute precision.” , ( , ).