Cited by

¶20 Finally, Ibarra’s is misplaced.

See State v. Womack , , 111, , 612 (App. 1992) ("[C]ourts will not read into a statute something that is not within the manifest intent of the Legislature as gathered from the statute itself."

Thus, Smith’s is unavailing, because the court in that case concluded that the defendant’s mere flight, unaccompanied by physical contact with the officers, did not constitute resisting arrest.

‘It requires only that the language of a statute convey a definite warning of the proscribed conduct.’” Burke, 238 Ariz. at 326, ¶ 6 , 360 P.3d at 122 (internal citations omitted); , (criminal statutes need not describe the prescribed criminal conduct to a degree of “mathematical certainty”) ( , ).

termining the meaning of “effecting an arrest”); ¶ 9, (finding that resisting arrest is not a victimless crime, but rather a crime against a person where a “[d]efendant must use or threaten to use physical force or any other means that creates a substantial risk of causing physical injury to the peace officer”); (finding that the statute did not apply to a defendant who led officers on a high speed chase because the statute prohibits threats or assaultive behavior directed toward an arresting of

§ 28-925(C)); (Lankford, J., dissenting) (“Defendant does not contest that the officer was entitled to stop defendant’s vehicle because of the missing or inoperable tail light.”), citing § 28-925.

§ 13-2508(A)(1) and (2) prohibit certain physical acts directed toward a peace officer, , (“As we read the [resisting arrest] statute, it prohibits assaultive behavior directed toward an arresting officer”); ¶ 16 , (“The purpose of the resisting arrest statute is to protect peace officers and citizens fr

(“additional elements” of resisting arrest found in subparagraphs of A.R.S.

¶ 11 Barker’s , is unavailing.

and *516 the legislative history of A.R.S.

¶ 13 , “regarding communication by officer of intent to arrest the juvenile.” The court in Womack , however, expressly declined to address the issue with which we are presently concerned, which is the element of the intent for the offense of resisting arrest: Did Jessi intentionally attempt to prev

for the proposition that, in enacting § 13-2508, the legislature did not intend to punish minor evasive acts and nonviolent noncooperation with an attempted arrest.

§§ 13-604(F); 13-901; , (in absence of other sentencing enhancements, defendant whose aggravated assault under § 13 — 1204(A)(11) resulted in temporary but substantial disfigurement, temporary but substantial loss or impairment of any body organ or part, or fracture of any body part may be *551 placed on probation); , (describing hazardous circumstances encompassed and prohibited by § 28-622.01, flight from a pursuing law enforcement vehicle).

If defendant prevented arrest without using or threatening to use physical force or other means creating substantial risk of physical injury, he “avoids arrest.” , (“Mere flight does not constitute resisting arrest____”).

¶ 7 To that end, Flynt argues that the resisting arrest statute contains language similar to the phrase at issue here and has been construed to require actual risk of harm to another

(interpreting a statute through a “common sense application of the ordinary meaning of the statutory language”).

§ 13-2508(A)(2); , (statutory intent is "to prohibit threats or any conduct that creates a substantial risk of injury to another”).

As we noted in Vo, “Arizona is a ‘code state,’ and this court is legislatively precluded from creating new crimes by expanding the common law through judicial decision.” Vo, 172 Ariz. at 204 , 836 P.2d at 417 ; , (“Defining criminal behavior and establishing penalties for violating criminal laws are functions of the legislature, not the judiciary.”).