Cited by

(quoting United States v. Young, 470 U.S. 1, 11 (1985)).

(“Words offered to prove the effect on the hearer are admissible when they are offered to show their effect on one whose conduct is at issue.”); see also Ariz. R. Evid.

See Porter, 251 Ariz. at 298, ¶ 11 (noting that comparisons between stricken and non-stricken jurors may be relevant to the court’s credibility determination); (“It 4 STATE v. KASHKOOL Decision of the Court is appropriate to consider a prospective juror’s work history in exercising peremptory challenges.”).

rumitt’s testimony “was admissible through other means,” he argues that by introducing it through Brumitt, “the prosecutor used his witnesses to vouch for others and reinforced their credibility.” ¶47 The state asserts the trial court “expressly permitted the prosecutor to use Brumitt’s initial testimony to provide a brief overview of the case.” Further, the state appears to suggest Brumitt’s testimony did not constitute hearsay because it merely “showed how events unfolded” and was not offered

See State v. 7 (“Words offered to prove the effect on the hearer are admissible when they are offered to show their effect on one whose conduct is at issue.”).

See, (“Words offered to prove the effect on the hearer are admissible when they are offered to show their effect on one whose conduct is at issue.” (citation omitted)).

See State v. (Antonio G.) Hernandez, –06 (App. 1991) (“As long as it is not based upon race, perceived sympathy on the part of a prospective juror toward a defendant is a legitimate basis for a peremptory strike.” (internal citation omitted)); ¶¶ 41–43 (App. 2012) (affirming strike of drug counselor based on

(testimony allowed when the listener’s conduct “had been placed directly in issue”).

Moreover, “[a]s long as it is not based upon race, perceived sympathy on the part of a prospective juror toward a defendant is a legitimate basis for a peremptory strike.” –06 (App. 1991) (citation omitted).

Newell, 212 Ariz. at 400, ¶ 52; -05 (App. 1991) (collecting cases).

Here, although the prosecutor implicitly urged the jury to deter future law breaking and preserve civil order, the comments were not “pronounced and persistent,” Atwood, 171 Ariz. at 611, nor did they pervade the entirety of the trial so as to deprive Gorla “of a fair trial and render the resulting conviction a denial of due process,”

-06 (App. 1991) (“As long as it is not based upon race, perceived sympathy on the part of a prospective juror toward a defendant is a legitimate basis for a peremptory strike.”) (collecting cases); ¶ 12 (2010) (finding “criminal history” a race-neutral reason to strike a

-08 (App. 1991) (“[P]rosecutorial comments which are fair rebuttal to areas opened by the defense are acceptable.”).

¶34 Out-of-court statements are “admissible when they are offered to show their effect on one whose conduct is at issue.”

(noting that an objection on one ground does not preserve a claim of error on another ground) ( -07 (App. 1991)).

¶26 “[P]rosecutorial comments which are fair rebuttal to areas opened by the defense are acceptable.” -08 (App. 1991).

The prosecutor made no statement of his personal belief in Hassan’s guilt, see, nor did his identification of Hassan as simply “the defendant” improperly suggest to the jury that Hassan was the actual perpetrator of the crime alleged.

-06, -14 (App. 1991); Ariz. R. Crim.

“Words offered to prove the effect on the hearer are admissible when they are offered to show their effect on one whose conduct is at issue.”

“Words offered to prove the effect on the hearer” are not hearsay, and “are admissible when they are offered to show their effect on one whose conduct is at issue.” (citing Rivera, 139 Ariz. at 409, 414).

(“It is permissible to rely on a prospective juror’s mode of answering questions as a basis for preemptory selections.”) Moreover, potential jurors who have family and friends with “signifigant criminal involvement”

“We consider arguments made in closing together with the jury instructions to determine ‘whether the prosecutor’s statements constituted fundamental error.’” ¶ 6, ( ).