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¶21 Contrary to Geri’s contention, reckless disregard does not require “clearly distinct actions like sexual gratification or gratuitous draws of attention.” We have expressly rejected the view that the State must present evidence under indecent exposure statute that the defendant acted with a “sexual interest” or was “sexually motivated.”

–29, ¶¶ 18–19 (App. 2007) (holding that the statute governing child molestation did not require the state to prove the act was motivated by sexual intent); (holding that the statute governing indecent exposure did not require a showing that defendant was motivated by sexual intent).

Abuse of discretion occurs when the superior court’s action is “manifestly unreasonable, or exercised on untenable grounds or for untenable reasons.”

This court will presume that a trial court considered the relevant interests unless its decision is “manifestly unreasonable or exercised on untenable grounds or for untenable reasons.” Id.

See Getz, 189 Ariz. at 563-66 , 944 P.2d at 505-08 ; -47 , -99 (App. 1993) (stating that trial court erred in dismissing charges against defendant for indecent exposure because defendant’s actions had to be motivated by sexual interest where language of statute defining crime was unambiguous and did not include that as an element); see also State v.

See Getz, 189 Ariz. at 563–66, 944 P.2d at 505–08; –47, –99 (App. 1993) (stating that trial court erred in dismissing charges against defendant for indecent exposure because defendant’s actions had to be motivated by sexual interest where language of statute defining crime was unambiguous and did not include that as an element); see also State v.

(“The fact that the [two witnesses] were scared by defendant’s conduct itself provides some evidence that a reasonable person would be alarmed by such conduct.”).

“An ‘abuse of discretion’ is discretion manifestly unreasonable, or exercised on untenable grounds or for untenable reasons.” ( ).

See Chavez, 96 P.3d at 1094; (abuse of discretion is “discretion manifestly unreasonable or exercised on untenable grounds or for untenable reasons”).

§ 13-1404 is “plain on its face,” it must be applied “as written” and any affirmative defense under § 13-1407 should not be “inject[ed]” into elements of the crime); -47 , -99 (App.1993) (trial court erred in dismissing charges against defendant for indecent exposure on ground that defendant’s actions had to be motivated by sexual interest where language of statute defining crime was unambiguous and did not include this as an element).

¶ 9 , on which Norgord relies, does not alter our conclusion.

Although we generally review the trial court’s granting of a motion to dismiss for an abuse of discretion, , we review the trial court’s decision de novo, because it involved the interpretation of § 13-2512.

An abuse of discretion is “discretion manifestly unreasonable, or exercised on untenable grounds or for untenable reasons.” , ( , ).