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¶31 With Balderas’s testimony and the officer’s testimony, the jury could or could not “rationally sustain the defense.” –88 (App. 1995).

When a defendant challenges the voluntariness of a confession, the State “bears the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that [the] confession [was] voluntary and freely given.”

Viewed from that lens, Teran presented sufficient evidence “upon which the jury could rationally sustain his defense.” –78 (App. 1995).

Under this standard, we do “not weigh the evidence or resolve conflicts in it,” but rather we merely “decide[] whether the record provides evidence ‘upon which the jury could rationally sustain the defense.’” Almeida, ().

He argues the use of a single photo was unduly suggestive because it “created a substantial likelihood of misidentification by unfairly focusing attention on the person that the police believed committed the crime,” and that a more appropriate procedure would have been for the State to conduct a police line-up or photo array before trial.

State v. Rutledge , , ¶ 15, quoting State v. Strayhand , , 587, , 593 (App. 1995).

There must be an act, a showing of evidence “upon which the jury could rationally sustain the defense.” -88, –94 (App. 1995).

te for the slightest evidence, and a justification instruction must rest upon something more than “speculation.” Vassell, , 359 P.3d at 1028 ; , (justification instruction required only if “record provides evidence ‘upon which the jury could rationally sustain the defense’ ”), -88 , -94 (App. 1995); , (“An inference is a fact which may be presumed from the proof of the existence or non-existence of other facts.”).

¶ 33 (App. 2003) (“We will not reverse a conviction, based on a claim of error with respect to jury instructions, ‘unless we can reasonably find that the instructions, when taken as a whole, would mislead the jurors.’”) ().

However, the instruction should not be given “unless it is reasonably and clearly supported by the evidence.” -65, ¶ 10 (App. 2005) (); –88 (App. 1995) (holding instruction required if there is “evidence upon which the jury could rationally sustain the defense”).

¶ 10, -88, -94 (App. 1995) (instruction required if there is “evidence upon which the jury could rationally sustain the defense”).

idence or resolve conflicts in it, see Plew, 150 Ariz. at 78, 722 P.2d at 246; Nottingham, 289 P.3d at 954; the court merely decides whether the record provides evidence “upon which the jury could rationally sustain the 4 STATE v. ALMEIDA Opinion of the Court defense.” -88, - 94 (App. 1995).

(statement “I have nothing to say” invoked right to remain silent); Szpyrka, , 202 P.3d at 526-27 (statement “I ain’t got nothin’ to say” unambiguous invocation of Fifth Amendment rights); , (statement “Well, I don’t want [to] answer anymore” clear invocation of Fifth Amendment rights); , (suggesting statement “I ain’t going to say any more” unambiguously invoked Fifth Amendment).

(applying standard of what “reasonable police officer in the circumstances” would understand to be invocation); see also Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452, 458-59 (1994) (setting forth objective test for invoking analogous right to counsel).

1988); (McGregor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).

quoting Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 447, 94 S. Ct. 2357, 2365 (1974) (“By refusing to admit evidence gained as a result of .

We will not reverse a conviction, based on a claim of error with respect to jury instructions, “unless we can reasonably find that the instructions, when taken as a whole, would mislead the jurors.”

We will not reverse a conviction “unless we can reasonably find that the instructions, when taken as a whole, would mislead the jurors.”

We will not reverse a conviction based on the trial court’s ruling on a jury instruction “unless we can reasonably find that the instructions, when taken as a whole, would mislead the jurors.” , see also Gallegos, 178 Ariz. at 10 , 870 P.2d at 1106 .