Cited by

Opinions in Arizona that cite State v. Walker, 891 P.2d 942.

32 citing documents.

State v. Karaba Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2026
State v. Karaba Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2026
State v. Lohmeier Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2023
State v. Lohmeier Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2023
State v. Sernas Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2020
State v. Sernas Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2020
State v. Escalante 396 P.3d 611 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2017
State v. Escalante 396 P.3d 611 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2017
The use of this evidence as substantive proof of guilt has been condemned, id, at 646, ¶ 12, 969 P.2d at 802 ( , 481, ), even though it may be “offered in the context of suppression and probable cause hearings, where law enforcement’s justifications for a stop, arrest, or confiscation is at issue,” id.
State v. MacIas Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2017
State v. MacIas Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2017
(citing Henderson, 210 Ariz. at 567, ¶ 19, ).
State v. Leary Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2016
State v. Leary Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2016
State of Arizona v. Knute Eckhard Kolmann 367 P.3d 61 Ariz. 2016
State of Arizona v. Knute Eckhard Kolmann 367 P.3d 61 Ariz. 2016
Conceivably, such improper communications could be grounds for a new trial under Rule 24.1(c)(5) if “the defendant has not received a fair and impartial trial.” Although Rule 24.1(d) prohibits inquiry into the “subjective motives or mental processes which led a juror to assent or dissent from the verdict,” we assume for present purposes that this rule would not apply to either L.M.’s communications, since she did not participate in the verdict, or the second juror’s advice to L.M., insofar as it
State v. Cahill Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2015
State v. Cahill Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2015
e v. Herrera, –97, –10 (1993) (concluding that “prosecutor’s statements about justice and protecting society” were not improper); (“[A]rguments referring to the prevalence of crime, the duty of the jury, and the efforts of the police in combatting crime are not improper.”)
State v. Swope Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2015
State v. Swope Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2015
This court has repeatedly held that police officers may testify as expert witnesses regarding the meaning of drug code and language, noting that “[c]ourts frequently permit expert testimony on such matters and even allow experts to interpret writings or conversations.” (and cases cited therein); (holding expert testimony interpreting drug language in recorded calls was properly admitted because it assisted the jury in understanding the evidence).
State v. Gonzalez 278 P.3d 328 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2012
State v. Gonzalez 278 P.3d 328 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2012
creates too high a risk that a defendant will be convicted not for what he did but for what others are doing”); , (citing cases from several jurisdictions that have “condemned” the use of drug courier profile evidence as substantive proof of guilt).
State v. Lopez 175 P.3d 682 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2008
State v. Lopez 175 P.3d 682 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2008
State v. Lee 959 P.2d 799 Ariz. 1998
State v. Lee 959 P.2d 799 Ariz. 1998
(citing cases from the Fourth, Fifth, Eighth, Ninth, and Eleventh federal circuits, as well as various state courts).
State v. Schwartz 935 P.2d 891 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1996
State v. Schwartz 935 P.2d 891 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1996
State v. Curry 931 P.2d 1133 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1996
State v. Curry 931 P.2d 1133 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1996
(prosecutor’s avowal that fingerprint card was a business record of police department was insufficient to support admission of document as a public record or business record).
In re the Appeal in Maricopa County, Juvenile Action No. JV-133607 920 P.2d 320 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1996
In re the Appeal in Maricopa County, Juvenile Action No. JV-133607 920 P.2d 320 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1996
State v. Jones 917 P.2d 200 Ariz. 1996
State v. Jones 917 P.2d 200 Ariz. 1996