Cited by

Opinions in Arizona that cite State v. Barr, 904 P.2d 1258.

34 citing documents.

State v. Nimer Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2020
State v. Nimer Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2020
Failure to give a requested instruction “is not reversible error unless it is prejudicial to the rights of a defendant and such prejudice appears on the record.”
State v. Williams Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2019
State v. Williams Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2019
State v. Marks Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2018
State v. Marks Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2018
The superior court’s failure to “give an instruction is not reversible error unless it is prejudicial to the rights of a defendant and such prejudice appears on the record.” (citation omitted).
State v. Yazzie Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2017
State v. Yazzie Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2017
-33 (1969); ¶ 10 (App. 2013)
State v. Derienzo Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2015
State v. Derienzo Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2015
State v. Alonso Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2015
State v. Alonso Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2015
Allen v. Sanders 346 P.3d 30 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2015
Allen v. Sanders 346 P.3d 30 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2015
§ 1-213 (2002) (“Technical words and phrases and those which have acquired a peculiar and appropriate meaning in the law shall be construed according to such peculiar and appropriate meaning.”); McCulloch v. W. Land & Cattle Co., , 231 P. 618, 619 (1924)
State v. Pledger 341 P.3d 511 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2015
State v. Pledger 341 P.3d 511 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2015
State v. Coulter 339 P.3d 653 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2014
State v. Coulter 339 P.3d 653 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2014
Because the Legislature did not define “emotional or financial harm,” the court “give[s] effect to the words and phrases in accordance with their commonly accepted meaning.” accord A.R.S.
State v. Garcia Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2014
State v. Garcia Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2014
However, “there is no requirement that a jury’s verdicts on different counts be consistent.”
State v. Cagle 266 P.3d 1070 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2011
State v. Cagle 266 P.3d 1070 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2011
Cagle does not argue that the "intent” requirement of § 13-2508(A) applies to the phrase "using any other means.” , (explaining that the jury instructions given "required a finding that Appellant intentionally used some means to prevent, or to attempt to prevent, his arrest”) (emphasis added).
State v. Starr 213 P.3d 214 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2009
State v. Starr 213 P.3d 214 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2009
Stein v. Sonus USA, Inc. Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2007
Stein v. Sonus USA, Inc. Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2007
The use of the word “any” suggests a broad interpretation for the term “device.” (the term “‘any’” is “‘broadly inclusive’”)
State v. Price 145 P.3d 647 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2006
State v. Price 145 P.3d 647 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2006
(the trial court is not required to provide additional instructions that merely reiterate or enlarge the instructions in a defendant’s language) (citations omitted).
State v. Martinez 47 P.3d 1145 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2002
Followed State v. Martinez 47 P.3d 1145 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2002
¶ 15 We give the words of a statute their commonly accepted meaning “unless the legislature has offered its own definitions or a special meaning is apparent from the context.” , (citations omitted).
State v. Rosas-Hernandez 42 P.3d 1177 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2002
State v. Rosas-Hernandez 42 P.3d 1177 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2002
State v. Terrazas 930 P.2d 464 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1996
State v. Terrazas 930 P.2d 464 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1996
Similarly, in State v. Barr, without explicitly disavowing Hughes , this court cited Huddleston for the proposition that prior-acts evidence could be admitted against a defendant if “the jury reasonably could conclude that the prior acts occurred and that [the defendant] was the actor.”