Cited by

Opinions in Arizona that cite State v. Phillips, 873 P.2d 706.

28 citing documents.

State of Arizona v. Earl Jefferson Causbie 384 P.3d 1253 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2016
State of Arizona v. Earl Jefferson Causbie 384 P.3d 1253 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2016
Kaiser, 65 P.3d at 467; see McLamb, 188 Ariz. at 5, 932 P.2d at 270 (“If a statute gives notice of prohibited conduct, it is not void for vagueness ‘simply because it may be difficult to determine how far one can go before the statute is violated.’”)
State v. Burke 360 P.3d 118 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2015
State v. Burke 360 P.3d 118 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2015
Ultimately, “[i]f a statute gives notice of prohibited conduct, it is not void for vagueness ‘simply because it may be difficult to determine how far one can go before the statute is violated.’” ( ).
State of Arizona v. Angelica Marlene Werderman 350 P.3d 846 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2015
State of Arizona v. Angelica Marlene Werderman 350 P.3d 846 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2015
¶8 Werderman argues that our supreme court’s holding in Harris “broke new ground” P.2d 706 (App. 1994), that the predecessor statute to § 28-1381(A)(3), A.R.S.
State of Arizona Ex Rel. Montgomery v. Hrach Shilgevorkyan 322 P.3d 160 Ariz. 2014
State of Arizona Ex Rel. Montgomery v. Hrach Shilgevorkyan 322 P.3d 160 Ariz. 2014
State ex rel. Montgomery v. Harris 301 P.3d 580 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2013
State ex rel. Montgomery v. Harris 301 P.3d 580 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2013
Prior to appealing to the superior court, the State moved for reconsideration, citing, for the first time
State v. Bayardi 281 P.3d 1063 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2012
State v. Bayardi 281 P.3d 1063 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2012
Id,.; -32 , -05 (App.1998) (describing scope and purpose of statutory predecessor); -72 , -10 (App.1994) (same).
State v. Kaiser 65 P.3d 463 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2003
State v. Kaiser 65 P.3d 463 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2003
Singer, 190 Ariz. at 50 , 945 P.2d at 361 ( , ).
State v. Boyd 31 P.3d 140 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2001
State v. Boyd 31 P.3d 140 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2001
SAL Leasing, Inc. v. State Ex Rel. Napolitano 10 P.3d 1221 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2000
SAL Leasing, Inc. v. State Ex Rel. Napolitano 10 P.3d 1221 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2000
-71 , -09 (App.1994) (holding that because the terms of a statute prohibiting driving under the influence adequately provided people of ordinary intelligence with an opportunity to know what type of conduct is prohibited, they meet the constitutional standard).
State v. Lefevre 972 P.2d 1021 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1998
State v. Lefevre 972 P.2d 1021 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1998
“A statute that ‘gives fair notice of conduct to be avoided is not void for vagueness simply because it may be difficult to determine how far one can go before the statute is violated.’” , ( , ).
State v. Hammonds 968 P.2d 601 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1998
State v. Hammonds 968 P.2d 601 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1998
State v. Singer 945 P.2d 359 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1997
State v. Singer 945 P.2d 359 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1997
State v. McLamb 932 P.2d 266 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1996
State v. McLamb 932 P.2d 266 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1996
State v. Olea 897 P.2d 1371 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1995
State v. Olea 897 P.2d 1371 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1995
369-370 n. 1, , 707-708 n. 1 (App. 1994) (statute forbidding operation of motor vehicle “while there is any drug ...