Cited by

Opinions in Arizona that cite State v. Curry, 931 P.2d 1133.

55 citing documents.

State of Arizona v. Sergio Fierro Jr 517 P.3d 635 Ariz. 2022
State of Arizona v. Sergio Fierro Jr 517 P.3d 635 Ariz. 2022
Our court of appeals recognized over a quarter-century ago that “in Arizona there is no offense of attempted reckless second degree murder.”
State v. Redondo Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2021
State v. Redondo Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2021
While patience is a virtue, trial judges are human, and we recognize the difference between irritation and favoritism.”); (“At best, defendant can show only that some antagonism existed between his counsel and the trial judge.
State v. Gray Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2020
State v. Gray Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2020
.”); (“Disagreements over rulings are insufficient to support recusal [on basis of purported judicial bias].”).
State v. Derrico Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2019
State v. Derrico Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2019
“[I]n order to commit an ‘attempt’ a defendant must have an intent to perform acts and to achieve a result which, if accomplished, would constitute the crime.” (emphasis omitted); see also A.R.S.
State v. White Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2019
State v. Rogers Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2019
State v. White Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2019
State v. Rogers Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2019
State v. Smith Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2018
State v. Smith Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2018
¶ 19 (2005); (fundamental error review when defendant failed to challenge aggravating factor at sentencing).
State v. Candler Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2017
State v. Candler Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2017
State v. Montgomery Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2016
State v. Montgomery Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2016
State v. Durazo Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2016
State v. Durazo Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2016
(noting a defendant who fails to submit written motion and affidavit asserting cause for recusal, as required by Arizona Rule of Criminal Procedure 10.1(b), waives all but fundamental error review).
State v. Wells Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2014
State v. Wells Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2014
In denying the motion to preclude, the trial court cited to this court’s P.2d 1133 (App. 1996), P.3d 543 (App. 2013), as supporting the admission of Dutton’s testimony.
State v. Delgado Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2014
State v. Delgado Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2014
3 STATE v. DELGADO Decision of the Court counsel argued, that Arizona does not recognize an offense of “attempted reckless second degree murder” as the State had charged.
State of Arizona v. Martin David Salazar-Mercado 325 P.3d 996 Ariz. 2014
State of Arizona v. Martin David Salazar-Mercado 325 P.3d 996 Ariz. 2014
See Lujan, 192 Ariz. at 451–52 ¶¶ 9–12, 967 P.2d at 126– 27; Lindsey, 149 Ariz. at 473–74, 720 P.2d at 74–75; Moran, 151 Ariz. at 381, 728 P.2d at 251; –29, –39 (App. 1996) (holding, under Frye standard, that Dutton’s CSAAS testimony was helpful to the jury and admissible).
State v. Jones 306 P.3d 105 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2013
State v. Jones 306 P.3d 105 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2013
(holding that “when an appellate court notes the possibility of fundamental error in a criminal proceeding, it may raise the issue on its own motion and order the parties to submit supplemental briefs addressing the issue”).
State of Arizona v. Martin David Salazar-Mercado 304 P.3d 543 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2013
State of Arizona v. Martin David Salazar-Mercado 304 P.3d 543 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2013
In THE ESTATE OF MARY A. RILEY, AKA MARY AGNES RILEY, AKA MARY AGNES REILLY 266 P.3d 1078 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2011
In THE ESTATE OF MARY A. RILEY, AKA MARY AGNES RILEY, AKA MARY AGNES REILLY 266 P.3d 1078 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2011
-27, -37 (App. 1996) (deciding issue raised sua sponte without benefit of supplemental briefing implicates due process concerns).
State v. Guillen 213 P.3d 230 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2009
State v. Moore 189 P.3d 1107 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2008
State v. Moore 189 P.3d 1107 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2008
§ 13-1001 (defining the offense of attempt); , (“[A]ttempt is a specific intent crime and by definition involves intentional conduct.”); , (“[I] n order to commit an ‘attempt’ a defendant must have an intent to perform acts and to achieve a result which, if accomplished, would constitute the crime.”); , (“In order to sustain a conviction for attempt
State v. Leenhouts 185 P.3d 132 Ariz. 2008
State v. Leenhouts 185 P.3d 132 Ariz. 2008
(“[T]here is no prejudice if the defendant had full and fair notice of the crime charged, is not surprised, confused or prejudiced in his defense, and is afforded a full
State v. Henderson 115 P.3d 601 Ariz. 2005
State v. Secord 88 P.3d 587 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2004
State v. Secord 88 P.3d 587 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2004
State v. Ontiveros 81 P.3d 330 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2003
State v. Ontiveros 81 P.3d 330 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2003
¶ 13 More recently, , reiterated the principle that “in order to commit an ‘attempt’ a defendant must have an intent to perform acts and to achieve a result which, if accomplished, would constitute the crime.” The court in Curry held that in Arizona “there is no offense of attempted reckless second de
Jimenez v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. 79 P.3d 673 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2003
Jimenez v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. 79 P.3d 673 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2003
State v. Smyers 73 P.3d 610 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2003
State v. Smyers 73 P.3d 610 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2003
(holding that an appellate court that notices the possibility of fundamental error in a criminal case may raise the issue on its own and order the parties to submit supplemental briefs addressing the issue).
State of Arizona v. Jose Uzarraga Alvarez Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2003
State of Arizona v. Jose Uzarraga Alvarez Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2003
State v. Cañez, P.3d 564 (2002); P.2d 1133 (App. 1996).
State v. Schackart 947 P.2d 315 Ariz. 1997
State v. Schackart 947 P.2d 315 Ariz. 1997
at 546 , 944 P.2d at 61 ( , ).