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Appellate counsel is afforded wide discretion in judging which issues are appealable and need not “raise every possible or even meritorious issue on appeal.”

(A colorable claim is “one which, if true, might have changed the outcome.” (cleaned up)).

To prevail on an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, a defendant must demonstrate “a reasonable probability that but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the outcome of the appeal would have been different.”

§ 13-4232(A)(3); (“[A]ppellate counsel’s waiver of other possible issues binds the defendant, and those waived issues cannot be resurrected in post-conviction proceedings.”).

Appellate counsel must evaluate the record and select “the most promising issues to present.”

P. 33.4(b)(3)(A) (“A defendant must file the notice for a claim under Rule 33.1(a) within 90 days after the oral 2 STATE v. BRACKEEN Decision of the Court pronouncement of sentence.”); (holding that an IAC claim “is encompassed within Rule 3[3].1 as a claim that a defendant’s conviction or .

We defer to the court’s assessment of “the factual disputes that frequently underlie assertions of ineffective assistance of counsel,” as well as the court’s determination of witness credibility, ¶ 21 (App. 2021).

To prevail on an ineffective assistance of appellate counsel claim, a defendant must demonstrate “a reasonable probability that but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the outcome of the appeal would have been different.”

(“A petition for post-conviction relief is addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court.”); (determination of the credibility of witnesses at an evidentiary hearing in a post-conviction relief proceeding rests solely with the trial judge).

We defer to a superior court's factual findings absent clear error, considering only the facts presented at the suppression hearing

¶4 “A petition for post-conviction relief is addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court,” and this court reviews “a trial court’s factual findings for clear error.” –48 (App. 1995) ( ).

We review the trial court's conclusions of law de novo, Sholes v. Fernando , , 458, ¶ 6, while reviewing its factual findings for clear error, State v. Herrera , , 648

(quotation omitted); ¶ 18 (App. 2005) ("A colorable claim of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel is a claim which, if true, might have changed the outcome."); ("petitioner must offer evidence of a reasonable probability that but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the outcome .

¶ 9 There is "[a] strong presumption" that counsel "provided effective assistance," State v. Febles , , ¶ 20, , 636 (App. 2005), which Smith must overcome by providing evidence that counsel's conduct did not comport with prevailing professional norms, see State v. Herrera , , 647, , 1382 (App. 1995).

¶5 “A petition for post-conviction relief is addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court,” and this Court reviews “a trial court’s factual findings for clear error,” id.

But a petitioner “must offer evidence of a reasonable probability that but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the outcome of the appeal would have been 4 STATE v. JEFFERSON Decision of the Court different.”

P. 32.1(a); –46 (App. 1995) (allegation of IAC falls under 32.1(a)).