Cited by
Opinions in Arizona that cite State v. McLamb, 932 P.2d 266.
- State v. Meeds 421 P.3d 653 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2018
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State v. Meeds
421 P.3d 653
Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2018
¶ 5 (App. 2010); (“When the language is clear, [a] statute is not rendered unconstitutionally vague because there is a theoretical potential for arbitrary enforcement or the 10 STATE v. MEEDS Opinion of the Court exercise o
- State of Arizona v. Earl Jefferson Causbie 384 P.3d 1253 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2016
- State v. Burke 360 P.3d 118 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2015
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State v. Burke
360 P.3d 118
Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2015
Ultimately, “[i]f a statute gives notice of prohibited conduct, it is not void for vagueness ‘simply because it may be difficult to determine how far one can go before the statute is violated.’” ( ).
- State v. Bagdonas Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2014
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State v. Bagdonas
Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2014
“‘A legislative enactment is unconstitutionally vague if it does not give persons of ordinary intelligence a reasonable opportunity to learn what it prohibits and does not provide explicit standards for those who will apply it.’” (citing cases).
- State of Arizona v. Manuel Alejandro Delgado 303 P.3d 76 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2013
- State of Arizona v. Manuel Alejandro Delgado 303 P.3d 76 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2013
- State v. PUTZI 225 P.3d 1154 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2010
- State v. PUTZI 225 P.3d 1154 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2010
- State v. McDermott 93 P.3d 532 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2004
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State v. McDermott
93 P.3d 532
Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2004
¶ 15 The language also is sufficiently clear that there is no more than a “theoretical potential for arbitrary enforcement.”
- State v. Kaiser 65 P.3d 463 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2003
- State v. Mutschler 65 P.3d 469 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2003
- State v. Kaiser 65 P.3d 463 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2003
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State v. Mutschler
65 P.3d 469
Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2003
includes within its scope activities which are protected by the First Amendment.” , (citations omitted).
- Empress Adult Video & Bookstore v. City of Tucson 59 P.3d 814 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2002
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Empress Adult Video & Bookstore v. City of Tucson
59 P.3d 814
Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2002
Arizona’s courts have applied O’Brien in determining whether the First Amendment protects such forms of allegedly expressive conduct as wearing a peace officer's insignia, , , (App.1996); wagering on elections, , and committing prostitution by performing a sex show with another person for compensation.
- State v. McMahon 38 P.3d 1213 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2002
- State v. McMahon 38 P.3d 1213 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2002
- State v. Evenson 33 P.3d 780 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2001
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State v. Evenson
33 P.3d 780
Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2001
“ ‘An overbroad statute is one designed to burden or punish activities which are not constitutionally protected, but the statute includes withiii its scope activities which are protected by the First Amendment.’ ” , (quoting John E. Nowak et al., Constitutional Law ch. 18, § III, at 868 (2d ed.1983); , ).
- State v. Seyrafi 32 P.3d 430 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2001
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State v. Seyrafi
32 P.3d 430
Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2001
Additionally, our review “does not include an examination of whether those provisions were constitutionally applied in [defendant’s] case.” -33 , -07 (App.1997)(emphasis added)
- State v. Boyd 31 P.3d 140 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2001
- State v. Boyd 31 P.3d 140 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2001
- City of Tucson v. Grezaffi 23 P.3d 675 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2001
- City of Tucson v. Grezaffi 23 P.3d 675 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2001
- State v. Kessler 13 P.3d 1200 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2000
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State v. Kessler
13 P.3d 1200
Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2000
826 , 63 L.Ed.2d 73 (1980); , cert.
- State v. Alawy 9 P.3d 1102 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2000
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State v. Alawy
9 P.3d 1102
Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2000
§ 22-375; -333 , -907 (App. 1997); 4 , 269 (App.1996).
- State v. Watson 6 P.3d 752 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2000
- State v. Watson 6 P.3d 752 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2000
- State v. Trachtman 947 P.2d 905 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1997
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State v. Trachtman
947 P.2d 905
Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1997
3348, 3359-60 , 73 L.Ed.2d 1113 (1982) (“The traditional rule is that a person to whom a statute may constitutionally be applied may not challenge that statute on the ground that it may conceivably be applied unconstitutionally to others in situations not before the court.”); , (“ ‘A defendant whose conduct is clearly proscribed by the core of the statute has no standing to attack the statute.’ ”) (-20 , -78 (1988)); , (“Unless the