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We will not, however, construe § 13-804(E) in a narrow or hypertechnical manner, ¶ 16 (App. 1998) (“Courts will apply constructions that make practical sense rather than hypertechnical constructions that frustrate legislative intent.”), nor in a manner that “raise[s] form over substance,” ¶ 12 (1999).

§ 13-116, the probation grants were ordered to run concurrently.”); ¶ 19 (App. 1998) (considering A.R.S.

Attempt is a preparatory offense that is “separate and distinct from substantive offenses.” ¶ 10 (App. 1998) (citation omitted).

§ 1-211 (2002); ¶ 16, (“Courts will apply constructions that make practical sense rather than hypertechnical constructions that frustrate legislative intent.”); (“In construing a statute, courts should give the statute a sensible co

§ 1-211 (Supp.2014); ¶ 16

Applying a “practical sense” construction to the interpretation of the Code, ¶ 16, under Code § 8-3, a person subjects animals to “cruel neglect” by failing to provide shelter that is free from filth and disease.

See Calvert, 144 Ariz. at 294 , 697 P.2d at 687 (noting “[t]he cardinal rule of statutory interpretation is to determine and give effect to the legislative intent behind the statute”); ¶ 16 , (“Courts will apply constructions that make practical sense rather than hyperteehnical constructions that frustrate legislative intent.”).

However, *81 when a statute is ambiguous or absurd consequences would result from the ordinary meaning, we “will apply constructions that make practical sense rather than hypertech-nical constructions that frustrate legislative intent.” , 537, ¶ 16

¶8 Although, as the state points out, we will avoid “hypertechnical constructions [of a statute] that frustrate legislative intent,” “[w]hen we interpret a statute, our analysis begins and ends with its plain language if it is unambiguous.” State v. Streck, 544 Ariz. Adv.

¶18 P.2d 606 (App. 1998), support the State’s position.

Also we “will apply constructions that make practical sense rather than hypertechnical constructions that frustrate legislative intent.” ¶ 16

¶ 10 ¶ 19 , as establishing that “burglary is factually separate from a crime of violence that is committed within the residence after a forced entry.” But Cornish is distinguishable.

Our constructions should “make practical sense.” ¶ 16

¶ 16 , (holding courts should apply statutory constructions that make practical sense and do not frustrate legislative intent).

¶ 16 , (when analyzing statutes, we apply practical common sense constructions, not hyper-technical ones that would tend to frustrate legislative intent).

¶ 16 , (in construing statutes, courts apply practical, common-sense construction); , (in construing statutes, courts consider consequences and effects of decisions).

Voters specifically rejected the legislature’s proposed changes ¶20 Courts should avoid “hyper-technical constructions that frustrate legislative intent.” , ( , ).