Cited by

(if legislature “had intended to prohibit probable harm rather than possible harm, it would have clearly said so,” as it did in another statute).

–69 ¶¶ 13–15, 569 ¶ 15 n.4 (App. 1999).

See Bush, 244 Ariz. at 595, ¶ 90; ¶ 18 (App. 1999) 5 STATE v. KORYOR Decision of the Court (defining “endanger” in child abuse statute to mean “subject to potential harm”).

¶ 12 (App. 1999) (noting in the absence of an express legislative intent to give a term a special meaning, we refer to established dictionaries to determine a term's plain and ordinary meaning).

Because the term “preparing for” is not statutorily defined, “we must follow the plain and natural meaning of the language of the statute to discover what the legislature intended.” ¶ 12 (App. 1999) (“Unless the legislature clearly expresses an intent to give a term a special meaning, we give the words used in statutes their plain and ordinary meaning.”); (“A statute is not unconstitutionally vague because one of its terms is not explicitly de

¶ 12 (App. 1999) (noting we refer to a widely used and established dictionary to determine a term’s plain and ordinary meaning) ( n.3 (1983)).

“In determining the ordinary meaning of a word, we may refer to an established and widely used dictionary.” ¶ 12 (App. 1999).

¶12 Because the term “lawful order” is not statutorily defined, “we must follow the plain and natural meaning of the language of the statute to discover what the legislature intended.” ¶ 12, (“Unless the legislature clearly expresses an intent to give a term a special meaning, we give the words used in statutes their plain and ordinary meaning.”); (“A statute is not unconstitutionally vague because

P., allowing appointment of special master in non-jury proceedings, applicable to class actions; concluding had supreme court intended special-master rule to apply to class actions, “it could have so provided”); (if legislature intended statute to have particular meaning “it would have clearly said so”).

See Cannon v. Hirsch Law Office, P.C., ¶ 19 , (relying on Black’s Law Dictionary, reasoning, “In determining the ordinary meaning of a word [set forth in Arizona case law], we may refer to an established and widely used dictionary.”) ( ¶ 12 , ).

(if legislature intended particular meaning “it would have clearly said so”).

b. Definitions of Litigation ¶ 19 Because the Arizona cases discussing accrual do not define the term “litigation,” ¶ 12 , (“In determining the ordinary meaning of a word, we may refer to an established and widely used dictionary.”).

The second definition of “neglect” given in Merriam-Webster’s Online Dictionary is “to leave undone or unattended to especially through carelessness.” http://mw.com/dictionary/negleet; ¶ 12 , (“In determining the ordinary meaning of a word, we may refer to an established and widely used dictionary.”); Black’s Law Dictionary 930 (5th ed. 1979) (“May mean to omit, fail, or forbear to do a thing that can be done, or that is required to be done ...

“In determining the ordinary meaning of a word, we may refer to an established and widely used dictionary.” ¶ 12

“In determining the ordinary meaning of a word, we may refer to an established and widely used dictionary.”

Like this court, which “may refer to an established and widely used dictionary,” , 568 ¶ 12, the Florida court utilized a dictionary and found that “[t]he word ‘evident’ is defined by Webster as ‘clear to the understanding and satisfactory to the judgment.’ Synonyms: ‘Manifest, plain, clear, obvious, conclusive.’ The word ‘manifest’ is defined as follows: ‘To put beyo

470 n. 3, , 911 n. 3 (1983) (Random House Dictionary of the English Language-used in statutory construction context); -25, ¶ 7 , -34 (App.2000) (Webster’s Third New International Dictionary); ¶¶ 12-13 , (Webster’s College Dictionary).

“Unless the legislature clearly expresses an intent to give a statutory term a special meaning, we give the words used in statutes their plain and ordinary meaning.” ¶ 12 , (citation omitted).