Cited by

¶¶ 13–15 (App. 2000) (finding that even an offer to engage in sexual conduct was sufficient to sustain a conviction of attempted sexual conduct with a minor); (finding a defendant’s request for minors to perform sexual acts with him was substantial evidence of attem

¶4 The State responded that Escalante’s and that notwithstanding Regenold and Villegas, Carlisle was still controlling authority.

¶19 The court of appeals reached a which upheld a DCAC enhanced sentence for a defendant convicted of attempted sexual conduct with a minor, even though the “minor” was an adult posing as a young boy.

If we accept Wright’s interpretation, the sections of the statute that reference preparatory offenses would be meaningless.”); ¶ 17 (App. 2000) (“The legislature specifically classified preparatory offenses such as attempt, other than attempted first degree murder, as dangerous crimes against children in the second degree provided the completed offense would have been a dangerous crime against children in the first degree.”).

¶ 14 , we considered the identical issue under the prior, but essentially identical, version of the DCAC statute.

§ 13-1006.B; ¶ 17 (App. 2000) (“The absence of an actual victim under the age of fifteen does not preclude an attempted crime from being a dangerous crime against children.”); (holding that factual impossibility is not a defense to an attempt crime).

On appeal, we do not consider whether we would reach the same outcome as the trial court; rather, we consider “only if there is a complete absence of probative facts to support its conclusion.” (internal punctuation and citation omitted).

“We do not consider if we would reach the same conclusion as the trier-of-fact, but only if there is a complete absence of probative facts to support its conclusion.” (internal punctuation and citation omitted).

“We do not consider if we would reach the same conclusion as the trier-of- fact, but only if there is a complete absence of probative facts to support its conclusion.” ¶ 11

[whether] we would reach the same conclusion as the trier-of-fact, but only if there is a complete absence of probative facts to support its conclusion.” ¶ 11, (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

Based on the record before us, “‘there is a complete absence of probative facts to support [the jury’s] conclusion.’” Kasic, 265 P.3d at 416, (alteration in Kasic).

We will reverse a conviction “only if there is a complete absence of probative facts to support [the jury’s] conclusion.” ¶ 11, (internal quotation marks omitted).

We will reverse a conviction “only if ‘there is a complete absence of probative facts to support [the jury’s] 3 STATE v. MOORE Decision of the Court conclusion.’” ¶ 11

We will reverse a defendant’s convictions “only if ‘there is a complete absence of probative facts to support [the jury’s] conclusion.’”

And we will reverse a conviction “only if „there is a complete absence of probative facts to support [the jury‟s] conclusion.‟” 13

(approving without comment jury instruction that “crime of sexual conduct with a minor under age fifteen requires proof of the following two things: (1) The defendant knowingly penetrated the anus of another person with a part of his body; and (2) the other person had not reached her fifteenth birthday”), -95 (App. 2000) (sexual conduct with minor under age of fifteen “involves two elements: (1) the defendant intentionally or knowingly engaged in sexual intercourse or oral sexual contact with an

¶ 4 We recognize that, ¶¶ 17-18 , -96 (App.2000), Division One of this court determined that DCAC sentence enhancement applied to attempted sexual conduct with a minor under the age of fifteen where the defendant “intentionally took steps to lure his intended victim into prohibited sexual conduct,” even though the intended v

We will reverse a conviction “only if „there is a complete absence of probative facts to support [the jury‟s] conclusion.‟”

We will reverse a conviction “only if ‘there is a complete absence of probative facts to support [the jury’s] conclusion.’”

¶23 -95 (App. 2000), Division One of this court stated, “The crime of sexual conduct with a minor under the age of fifteen involves two elements: (1) the defendant intentionally or knowingly engaged in sexual intercourse or oral sexual contact with another person; and (2) the other person ha[d] n

See, ¶¶ 13, 22-24, 40-41 (App. 2004) (applying Williams analysis to defendant charged with second-degree murder, alleged as dangerous crime against children); ¶¶ 16-18, -96 (App. 2000) (applying Williams to charge of sexual conduct with minor under age of fifteen).

¶12 Similarly, the trial court’s P.3d 391 (App. 2000), for the proposition that attempted sexual conduct with a minor under the age of fifteen is a dangerous crime against children is misplaced.

We will not reverse a conviction for insufficient evidence unless “there is a complete absence of probative facts to support [the jury’s] conclusion.”