Cited by

¶ 24 , , the City argues that this language is sufficient to satisfy its burden of demonstrating that the Ordinance limits owners’ rights for the protection of the public’s health or safety.

See, e.g., Kenyon, 142 Ariz. at 84 , 688 P.2d at 976 (state may have interest in encouraging provision of quality medical care); , (proper governmental goal is to safeguard health, safety, and welfare).

See, ¶ 4 , (arguments not presented until the reply brief will not be considered); ¶ 9 , (same).

Review for a rational basis “involves significant deference to the judgment of the legislative body regarding both the propriety of governmental involvement in the area covered by the legislation and the reasonableness of the means chosen to achieve the legislative goals.” , 51 ¶ 7

¶ 4 , ¶ 15 , (citation omitted).

¶ 4 , (the court does not address arguments raised for the first time in the reply brief).

by imposing design criteria that invade the exercise of personal, private, and aesthetic choices for personal private living spaces.” ¶24 Homeowners do not have “a right to be completely free from governmental regulation of the use and occupancy of [their] real property.”

2258 , 138 L.Ed.2d 772 (1997) (noting substantive due process forbids government infringement on fundamental liberty interest “unless the infringement is narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest”) *280 (citation omitted); 51, ¶¶ 4, 7 , 755 (App.2000) (acknowledging same test for implicated fundamental rights secured by substantive due process provision of Arizona Constitution).

1278, 1297 , 36 L.Ed.2d 16, 43 (1973); , (right “fundamental” if firmly rooted in country’s history and tradition).

More recently, we recognized that privacy rights implicate concerns “ ‘of the most fundamental sort’ to the individual, concerns that implicate ‘autonomy with respect to the most personal of life choices’ and ‘the intimate aspects of identity.’ ” ¶ 8 , (quoting Laurence H. Tribe, American Constitutional Law § 15-1 (2d ed.1988)).