Cited by

¶ 19 (App. 2000) (requiring the state to establish the defendant “could have used the weapon to further the felony drug offense” such as by “the spatial proximity and accessibility of the weapon to the defendant and to the site of the drug offense.”).

the trial court may cure the error by instructing the jurors that they must unanimously agree regarding which offense was committed or that the defendant committed both (or all) of the offenses.” ¶ 28 (App. 2000).

17 See State v. Petrak , , ¶ 28, (citing State v. Kelly , , 117, , 1054 (App. 1986) ) ("where two ...

State v. Petrak , , 264 ¶ 10

In addition to proving possession of the weapon, “[t]he state must prove that the defendant intended to use or could have used the weapon to further the felony drug offense underlying the weapons misconduct charge.” ¶ 19 (App. 2000) (emphasis added).

es of the cannabis sativa plant, the majority’s reliance upon a common understanding of the term is misplaced because the AMMA specifically defines “marijuana.” A statutory definition trumps any meaning “generally and ordinarily given to such words.” (citing Sisk v. Ariz. Ice & Cold Storage Co., ); ¶ 10 (App. 2000) (“If statutory terms 6 A registered qualifying patient is presumed to be using marijuana for medicinal purposes if he does not possess more than the allowable amount.

to support his argument that he adequately presented a duplicity claim to the trial court.

And, “[i]f statutory terms are defined, we apply that definition; otherwise, we interpret statutory terms ‘in accordance with their commonly accepted meanings.’”

In support, he relies on State v. Petrak, which required a nexus between weapons misconduct and the underlying felony and held “[t]he state must prove that the defendant intended to use or could have used the weapon to further the felony drug offense underlying the weapons misconduct charge.”

State v. Petrak, 198 Ariz. 260, ¶ 11, see A.R.S.

¶ 14 ¶¶ 28-29 , in which this court determined a duplicitous indictment “inadequately defined the charge, fail[ing] to notify [the defendant] of what evidence would be presented against him.” However, Alvarez makes no claim that he was unaware of the charges against him, none of which change

And we cannot presume the legislature intended to criminalize a woman’s failure to report a miscarriage to the authorities in the very early stages of pregnancy.5 (in construing statute, we avoid reaching absurd result).

¶ 10 , (“In interpreting a statute, we look first to its language and apply the language unless the result is ‘absurd or impossible.’ ” (quoting Lowing v. Allstate Ins.

¶ 10 , (“[W]e look first to [the statute’s] language and apply the language unless the result is ‘absurd or impossible.’” (citation omitted)).

See Rutledge, , 66 P.3d at 56 ; , (issue properly preserved where counsel’s “comments provided the trial judge with an opportunity to provide a remedy”).

267 ¶ 27, (citing Ariz. R.Crim.

¶7 We review a trial court’s refusal to give a jury instruction for an abuse of the court’s discretion “and will reverse only if the instructions, taken as a whole, misled the 4 jurors.” 4 On review we consider jury instructions in their entirety and will not find error if the trial court has “refuse[d] to give a requested instruction that is covered adequately by the given instructions.” Haynes v. Syntek Fin.

¶ 7 We review a trial court’s refusal to give a jury instruction for an abuse of the court’s discretion “and will reverse only if the instructions, taken as a whole, misled the jurors.”