Cited by

Opinions in Arizona that cite HCZ Construction Inc. v. First Franklin Financial Corp., 18 P.3d 155.

52 citing documents.

State v. foothills/hanke Ariz. 2025
State v. foothills/hanke Ariz. 2025
Corp., ¶ 15 (App. 2001) (“When the Legislature has used both ‘may’ and ‘shall’ in the same paragraph of a statute, we infer that the Legislature acknowledged the difference and intended each word to carry its ordinary meaning.”).
Anthony Garcia v. Hon. butler/state 487 P.3d 256 Ariz. 2021
Anthony Garcia v. Hon. butler/state 487 P.3d 256 Ariz. 2021
Corp., ¶ 15 (App. 2001))).
Dcs v. Hon. stocking-tate/p.R. Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2021
Dcs v. Hon. stocking-tate/p.R. Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2021
Corp., ¶ 10 (App. 2001).
In Re Mh2014-002674 358 P.3d 609 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2015
In Re Mh2014-002674 358 P.3d 609 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2015
Corp., ¶ 10, (“Words are given their ordinary meaning unless the context of the statute requires otherwise.”) (citation omitted).
Gries v. Plaza Del Rio Management Corp. 335 P.3d 530 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2014
Gries v. Plaza Del Rio Management Corp. 335 P.3d 530 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2014
Steven Lane Fuller v. State of Arizona 314 P.3d 814 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2013
Steven Lane Fuller v. State of Arizona 314 P.3d 814 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2013
Corp., n.1, ¶¶ 19-20, n.1, 160 (App. 2001) (“The essential difference between a mandatory and a directory provision is that failure to comply with a directory provision does not invalidate the proceeding to which it relates, while failure to follow a mandatory provision does.”).
Joshua J. v. Arizona Department of Economic Security 286 P.3d 166 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2012
Joshua J. v. Arizona Department of Economic Security 286 P.3d 166 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2012
ARIZONA DEPT. OF ECONOMIC SEC. v. Lee 264 P.3d 34 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2011
ARIZONA DEPT. OF ECONOMIC SEC. v. Lee 264 P.3d 34 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2011
Yavapai-Apache Nation v. Fabritz-Whitney 260 P.3d 299 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2011
Yavapai-Apache Nation v. Fabritz-Whitney 260 P.3d 299 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2011
Corp., ¶ 10 , (citations omitted).
Continental Lighting & Contracting, Inc. v. Premier Grading & Utilities, LLC 258 P.3d 200 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2011
Continental Lighting & Contracting, Inc. v. Premier Grading & Utilities, LLC 258 P.3d 200 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2011
¶¶ 8-9 , -58 (App. 2001).
Fagerlie v. MARKHAM CONTRACTING CO., INC. 258 P.3d 185 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2011
Fagerlie v. MARKHAM CONTRACTING CO., INC. 258 P.3d 185 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2011
SEMPRE LTD. PARTNERSHIP v. Maricopa County 235 P.3d 259 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2010
SEMPRE LTD. PARTNERSHIP v. Maricopa County 235 P.3d 259 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2010
VERMA v. Stuhr 221 P.3d 23 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2009
VERMA v. Stuhr 221 P.3d 23 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2009
State v. Botkin 200 P.3d 323 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2009
State v. Botkin 200 P.3d 323 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2009
City of Chandler v. Arizona Department of Transportation 167 P.3d 122 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2007
City of Chandler v. Arizona Department of Transportation 167 P.3d 122 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2007
Corp., ¶ 10 , (holding that words are given their ordinary meaning unless the context of the statute requires otherwise).
State v. Jackson 113 P.3d 112 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2005
State v. Jackson 113 P.3d 112 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2005
JOHN C. v. Sargeant 90 P.3d 781 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2004
JOHN C. v. Sargeant 90 P.3d 781 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2004
Corp., ¶ 11 , (“The ordinary meaning of ‘shall’ in a statute is to impose a mandatory provision.” (citations omitted)).
Simpson v. Owens 85 P.3d 478 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2004
Simpson v. Owens 85 P.3d 478 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2004
In Re Maricopa County Superior Court No. Mh2003-000240 78 P.3d 1088 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2003
In Re Maricopa County Superior Court No. Mh2003-000240 78 P.3d 1088 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2003
“[W]e infer that the Legislature acknowledged the difference and intended each word to carry its ordinary meaning.” HCZ Const., ¶ 15
TANQUE VERDE UNIFIED SCHOOL v. Bernini 76 P.3d 874 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2003
TANQUE VERDE UNIFIED SCHOOL v. Bernini 76 P.3d 874 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2003
Corp., , ("When the Legislature has used both `may' and `shall' in the same paragraph of a statute, we infer that the Legislature acknowledged the difference and intended each word to carry its ordinary meaning."); , ("shall"
Blankenbaker v. Jonovich 71 P.3d 910 Ariz. 2003
Blankenbaker v. Jonovich 71 P.3d 910 Ariz. 2003
Corp., P.3d 155 (App. 2001) (mechanics’ lien statutes, which create a right not existing at common law, must be strictly complied with).
Way v. State 67 P.3d 1232 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2003
Way v. State 67 P.3d 1232 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2003
“Language that is mandatory in form may be deemed directory when such construction best serves the legislative purpose.” Id.; see also HCZ Constr.
Ugalde v. Burke 65 P.3d 103 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2003
Ugalde v. Burke 65 P.3d 103 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2003
¶ 8 The difference between these two meanings of “shall” was explained in HCZ Construction, , 364 n. 1, ¶ 9, , 158 n. 1 (App.2001): When “shall” is used in' the directory sense, it may indicate desirability, preference, or permission.
Higginbottom v. State 51 P.3d 972 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2002
Higginbottom v. State 51 P.3d 972 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2002
Lake Havasu City v. Arizona Department of Health Services 48 P.3d 499 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2002
Lake Havasu City v. Arizona Department of Health Services 48 P.3d 499 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2002
110 , 548 N.E.2d 495, 503 (1989)); , 500 ¶ 10, (“ ‘Shall’ may be interpreted as indicating desirability, preference, or permission, rather than mandatory direction if the context and purpose of the legislation indicate that the term should be so construed.”); HCZ Const., , 364 ¶ 9, (“Shall” “may be deemed directory when the legislative purpose can best be earned out by such construction.”).