Cited by

¶ 19 (App. 2001) (“[T]he [underlying tortious] conduct giving rise to punitive damages must be a proximate cause of the harm inflicted.”).

(“To recover punitive damages, a plaintiff must prove something more than the underlying tort.”); cf. Quintero, (speeding alone insufficient for punitive damages).

P.3d 1274 (App. 2001) to support his argument that punitive damages are not warranted in this case because Rochon could not establish that Dr. Grant’s failure to keep accurate records was the cause of her injury.

–86 ¶ 21, –81 (App. 2001) (holding that the claimant could not recover punitive damages in the absence of recovery of actual damages).

–86, ¶ 21 (App. 2001) (“[C]ommon law mandates that a plaintiff suffer actual damages as a result of the underlying tort before a claim of punitive damages can be entertained.”).

¶ 19, (recognizing “the conduct giving rise to punitive damages must be a proximate cause of the harm inflicted”); see also Shaner v. Tucson Airport Auth., Inc., (stating that the evidence must establish a “reasonable probability” t

-82, ¶ 9 , -77 (App.2001).

-83, 1113 , -78 (App.2001).

¶11 , (“Although the element of a tortfeasor's intent may be inferred, a plaintiff must always prove 'outwardly aggravated, outrageous, malicious, or fraudulent conduct.’ ” (quoting Linthicum, 150 Ariz. at 331 , 723 P.2d at 680 )).

In support of their argument, P.2d 1064 (1974), P.3d 1274 (App. 2001).

Sinaloa v. 11 Salvation Army

(“[Ojur common law mandates that a plaintiff suffer actual damages as a result of the underlying tort before a claim of punitive damages can be entertained.”); see also State Farm Mut.