Cited by

Opinions in Arizona that cite Arizona Libertarian Party v. Schmeral, 28 P.3d 948.

25 citing documents.

Ken Martin v. Steve Simon, Minnesota Secretary of State, The Legal Marijuana Now Party, ... 6 N.W.3d 443 Minn. 2024
Bradley v. Hon yost/state Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2022
Bradley v. Hon yost/state Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2022
¶ 10 (App. 2001) (interpreting, in a different context, “shall” and “should” “as indicating desirability, 4 BRADLEY v. HON YOST/STATE Decision of the Court preference, or permission, rather than mandatory direction if the co
Blankenbaker v. Marks 299 P.3d 747 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2013
Blankenbaker v. Marks 299 P.3d 747 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2013
¶ 10 , (acknowledging that “ ‘shall’ may be interpreted as indicating desirability, preference, or permission, rather than mandatory direction if the context and purpose of the legislation indicate that the term should be so construed”) (internal citations omitted).
Save Our Vote v. bennett/open Government Committee Supporting C-03-2012 291 P.3d 342 Ariz. 2013
Save Our Vote v. bennett/open Government Committee Supporting C-03-2012 291 P.3d 342 Ariz. 2013
-92 ¶¶ 14-20, -54 (App. 2001) (noting that the distinctive role recognized parties play in selecting candidates allows states to regulate 10 their internal structure and afford them advantages such as preferential access
Simpson v. Simpson 229 P.3d 236 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2010
Simpson v. Simpson 229 P.3d 236 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2010
We recognize there are cases that treat “shall” as indicating desirability, preference, or permission rather than mandatory direction, ¶ 10 , but this interpretation is not appropriate here given the use of “may” in subsections (A) and (C).
STATE EX REL. AZ. REG. OF CONT. v. Johnston 214 P.3d 441 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2009
STATE EX REL. AZ. REG. OF CONT. v. Johnston 214 P.3d 441 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2009
See, -55 , -58 (1981) ("Although the word `shall' usually indicates a mandatory provision, the word has also been construed to indicate desirability, preference, or permission.") (citations omitted); ¶ 10 , (acknowledging "that `shall' may be interpreted as indicating desirability, preference, or permission, rather than mandatory direction, .
Seisinger v. Siebel 195 P.3d 200 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2008
Seisinger v. Siebel 195 P.3d 200 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2008
¶ 13 , (appellate court must construe a statute to give it a reasonable and constitutional meaning, if possible).
Manuel M. v. Ades, Leila M., Alayena M. Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2008
Manuel M. v. Ades, Leila M., Alayena M. Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2008
See, n.4, n.4 (App. 2001) (not addressing free-speech issue when parties failed to develop argument in briefs).
Arizona Minority Coalition for Fair Redistricting v. Arizona Independent Redistricting Commission 121 P.3d 843 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2005
Arizona Minority Coalition for Fair Redistricting v. Arizona Independent Redistricting Commission 121 P.3d 843 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2005
¶ 10 , (“We acknowledge that ‘shall’ may be interpreted as indicating desirability, preference, or permission, rather than mandatory direction----”).
Bridgestone Firestone North America Tire v. A.P.S. Rent a Car & Leasing Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2004
Bridgestone Firestone North America Tire v. A.P.S. Rent a Car & Leasing Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2004
(“We must interpret the statute with common sense and, if possible, in a manner consistent with constitutional principle.”).
Arizona Libertarian Party, Inc. v. Board of Supervisors 70 P.3d 1146 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2003
Arizona Libertarian Party, Inc. v. Board of Supervisors 70 P.3d 1146 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2003
See, (noting one faction of ALP selected officers at annual convention).
State Ex Rel. Napolitano v. Gravano 60 P.3d 246 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2002
State Ex Rel. Napolitano v. Gravano 60 P.3d 246 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2002
an incidental burden on free speech do not violate the First Amendment “if they further ‘an important or substantial governmental interest; if the governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression of free expression; and if the incidental restriction on alleged First Amendment freedoms is no greater than is essential to the furtherance of that interest.’ ” , 490-91 n. 3, ¶ 13, , 952-53 n. 3 (App.2001) (quoting *114 -21, ¶ 98 , -07 (App.1999) 6 ).
Lake Havasu City v. Arizona Department of Health Services 48 P.3d 499 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2002
Lake Havasu City v. Arizona Department of Health Services 48 P.3d 499 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2002
110 , 548 N.E.2d 495, 503 (1989)); , 500 ¶ 10, (“ ‘Shall’ may be interpreted as indicating desirability, preference, or permission, rather than mandatory direction if the context and purpose of the legislation indicate that the term should be so construed.”); HCZ Const.