Cited by

Rent– A–Car & Leasing, Inc., ¶ 16 (App. 2004) (“[W]e attempt to read statutes in a ‘common-sense and contextualized’ manner.”) ( ¶ 11 (App. 2001)); S. Point Energy Ctr.

¶ 13 (App. 2001) (“We have a duty to construe statutes to give them a ‘reasonable and constitutional meaning.’” (quoting Ariz. Downs v. Ariz. Horsemen’s Found., )).

¶ 10 (App. 2001) (interpreting, in a different context, “shall” and “should” “as indicating desirability, 4 BRADLEY v. HON YOST/STATE Decision of the Court preference, or permission, rather than mandatory direction if the co

¶ 10 , (acknowledging that “ ‘shall’ may be interpreted as indicating desirability, preference, or permission, rather than mandatory direction if the context and purpose of the legislation indicate that the term should be so construed”) (internal citations omitted).

-92 ¶¶ 14-20, -54 (App. 2001) (noting that the distinctive role recognized parties play in selecting candidates allows states to regulate 10 their internal structure and afford them advantages such as preferential access

We recognize there are cases that treat “shall” as indicating desirability, preference, or permission rather than mandatory direction, ¶ 10 , but this interpretation is not appropriate here given the use of “may” in subsections (A) and (C).

See, -55 , -58 (1981) ("Although the word `shall' usually indicates a mandatory provision, the word has also been construed to indicate desirability, preference, or permission.") (citations omitted); ¶ 10 , (acknowledging "that `shall' may be interpreted as indicating desirability, preference, or permission, rather than mandatory direction, .

¶ 13 , (appellate court must construe a statute to give it a reasonable and constitutional meaning, if possible).

See, n.4, n.4 (App. 2001) (not addressing free-speech issue when parties failed to develop argument in briefs).

¶ 10 , (“We acknowledge that ‘shall’ may be interpreted as indicating desirability, preference, or permission, rather than mandatory direction----”).

(“We must interpret the statute with common sense and, if possible, in a manner consistent with constitutional principle.”).

See, (noting one faction of ALP selected officers at annual convention).

an incidental burden on free speech do not violate the First Amendment “if they further ‘an important or substantial governmental interest; if the governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression of free expression; and if the incidental restriction on alleged First Amendment freedoms is no greater than is essential to the furtherance of that interest.’ ” , 490-91 n. 3, ¶ 13, , 952-53 n. 3 (App.2001) (quoting *114 -21, ¶ 98 , -07 (App.1999) 6 ).

110 , 548 N.E.2d 495, 503 (1989)); , 500 ¶ 10, (“ ‘Shall’ may be interpreted as indicating desirability, preference, or permission, rather than mandatory direction if the context and purpose of the legislation indicate that the term should be so construed.”); HCZ Const.