Cited by

Opinions in Arizona that cite Higginbottom v. State, 51 P.3d 972.

34 citing documents.

Satamian v. Great Divide Ariz. 2024
Satamian v. Great Divide Ariz. 2024
Ansley v. Banner Health 419 P.3d 552 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2018
Ansley v. Banner Health 419 P.3d 552 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2018
Co., ¶ 15 (App. 2007) ( ¶ 11 (App. 2002)).
Oxford v. Landmarc Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2016
Oxford v. Landmarc Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2016
Desert Gardens v. Town of Quartzsite Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2015
Desert Gardens v. Town of Quartzsite Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2015
¶ 18, (holding that a party can only recover under the theory of promissory estoppel if he or she had a “justifiable right to rely” on the alleged promise).
DBT Yuma, L.L.C. v. Yuma County Airport Authority 340 P.3d 1080 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2014
DBT Yuma, L.L.C. v. Yuma County Airport Authority 340 P.3d 1080 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2014
“We must read the statute as a whole and give meaningful operation to all of its provisions.” ¶ 13
State of Arizona v. Brady Whitman Jr. 301 P.3d 226 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2013
State of Arizona v. Brady Whitman Jr. 301 P.3d 226 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2013
P. ¶ 24 To the extent our dissenting colleague disagrees with our basic proposition that “ Veil-informed persons may reasonably disagree as to [the] meaning 1 ” of the rules of criminal procedure on the question of the time for taking an appeal, , quoting 2A Norman J. Singer, Statutes and Statutory Construction § 45.02, at 17 (6th ed. rev. 2000), we believe it necessary to further discuss some of the dissent’s reasoning concerning Form 23, the supreme court’s rule changes in 1973, and Rule 26.16
Assyia v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance 273 P.3d 668 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2012
Assyia v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance 273 P.3d 668 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2012
¶ 11 , (citations omitted) (“It has long been the rale in Arizona that a valid statute is automatically part of any contract affected by it, even if the statute is not specifically mentioned in the contract.”).
CYPRESS ON SUNLAND HOMEOWNERS, ASS'N. v. Orlandini 257 P.3d 1168 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2011
CYPRESS ON SUNLAND HOMEOWNERS, ASS'N. v. Orlandini 257 P.3d 1168 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2011
Douglas v. Governing Board of Window Rock Consolidated School District No. 8 210 P.3d 1275 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2009
Douglas v. Governing Board of Window Rock Consolidated School District No. 8 210 P.3d 1275 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2009
¶ 11 , (“It has long been the rule in Arizona that a valid statute is automatically part of any contract affected by it, even if the statute is not specifically mentioned in the contract.”); see also Holland v. Roeser, 37 F.3d 501, 504 (9th Cir.1994) (interpreting an offer of judgment
Banner Health v. Medical Savings Insurance 163 P.3d 1096 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2007
Banner Health v. Medical Savings Insurance 163 P.3d 1096 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2007
¶ 15 “It has long been the rule in Arizona that a valid statute is automatically part of any contract affected by it, even if the statute is not specifically mentioned in the contract.” ¶ 11 , ( , , and Havasu Heights Ranch & Dev.
Stonecreek Bldg. Co., Inc. v. Shure 162 P.3d 675 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2007
Stonecreek Bldg. Co., Inc. v. Shure 162 P.3d 675 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2007
¶ 13 , ( ¶ 35 , (stating that when construing a statute, “we must read the statute as a whole and give meaningful operation to each of its provisions”)).
Arizona Department of Revenue v. Salt River Project Agricultural Improvement & Power District 126 P.3d 1063 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2006
Arizona Department of Revenue v. Salt River Project Agricultural Improvement & Power District 126 P.3d 1063 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2006
¶ 15 Further, “we must read the statute as a whole and give meaningful operation to each of its provisions.” ¶ 13 , ( ¶35 , ).
Double AA Builders, Ltd. v. Grand State Construction L.L.C. 114 P.3d 835 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2005
Double AA Builders, Ltd. v. Grand State Construction L.L.C. 114 P.3d 835 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2005
SFPP, L.P. v. Arizona Department of Revenue 108 P.3d 930 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2005
SFPP, L.P. v. Arizona Department of Revenue 108 P.3d 930 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2005
The term "original cost” is ambiguous because “well-informed persons may reasonably disagree as to its meaning.” ¶ 13 , (citing 2A Norman J. Singer, Statutes and Statutory Construction § 45.02, at 17 (6th ed. rev.2000)).
Ry-Tan Construction, Inc. v. Washington Elementary School District No. 6 93 P.3d 1095 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2004
Ry-Tan Construction, Inc. v. Washington Elementary School District No. 6 93 P.3d 1095 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2004
Further, even if, as the School District suggests, § 40-360.22 must nonetheless be integrated into the contract, ¶ 11 , it appears that the School District, in its response to Ry-Tan’s motion for partial summary judgment, did not dispute (and still does not dispute) Ry-Tan’s claims that Ry-Tan previously installed the existing utility lines, and thus knew the location of the lines and that no u
State v. Nelson 90 P.3d 206 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2004
State v. Nelson 90 P.3d 206 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2004
¶ 10 Because well-informed individuals would not reasonably disagree as to the statute’s meaning, ¶ 13 , we find no ambiguity.
State Ex Rel. Romley v. Gaines 67 P.3d 734 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2003
State Ex Rel. Romley v. Gaines 67 P.3d 734 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2003
¶ 11 , (“It has long been the rule in Arizona that a valid statute is automatically part of any contract affected by it, even if the statute is not specifically mentioned in the contract.”); see also Havasu Heights Ranch & Dev.