Cited by

Opinions in Arizona that cite Long v. Napolitano, 53 P.3d 172.

40 citing documents.

Saban v. Ador 418 P.3d 1066 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2018
Saban v. Ador 418 P.3d 1066 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2018
-53, ¶¶ 2-9 (App. 2002), we ruled that § 5-839 did not violate provisions of the Arizona Constitution unrelated to the provision at issue in this case.
State v. Panos 366 P.3d 1006 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2016
State v. Panos 366 P.3d 1006 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2016
r application in the future, no matter how imminent the application might be, and allows ‘persons, places, or things attaining the requisite characteristics’ to enter and those that ‘no longer have those characteristics’ to leave the class.” Gallardo, 236 Ariz. at 93, ¶ 35 (quoting Republic Inv., 166 Ariz. at 150, ¶ 38 (App. 2002)).
Arner v. Ryan Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2015
Arner v. Ryan Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2015
¶ 36, (stating that a classification meets the third prong of the test if it is sufficiently elastic to admit the entry of additional members and to enable the exit of others).
Steve Gallardo v. State of Arizona 336 P.3d 717 Ariz. 2014
Steve Gallardo v. State of Arizona 336 P.3d 717 Ariz. 2014
–56 ¶ 25, –81 (App. 2002) (approving use of county population to identify counties having a large airport and a sufficient number of hotels to support tourism related to a stadium).
Anderson v. Prescott Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2014
Anderson v. Prescott Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2014
“Legislation does not violate the special law prohibition if (1) the classification is rationally related to a legitimate governmental objective, (2) the classification is legitimate, encompassing all members of the relevant class, and (3) the class is elastic, allowing members to move in and out of it.” ¶ 14, (citing Republic Inv.
Gallardo v. State of Arizona 335 P.3d 523 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2014
Gallardo v. State of Arizona 335 P.3d 523 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2014
Wagner v. Bank of America Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2014
Wagner v. Bank of America Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2014
¶ 12, (holding appellate court may affirm lower court ruling if it is correct on any ground).
Hamm v. Ryan 318 P.3d 868 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2013
Hamm v. Ryan 318 P.3d 868 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2013
ny of the following requirements: “(1) the classification is rationally related to a legitimate governmental objective, (2) the classification is legitimate, encompassing all members of the relevant class, and (3) the class is elastic, allowing members to move in and out of it.” ¶ 14 , ( ¶ 14 , ).
Bonito Partners, LLC v. City of Flagstaff 270 P.3d 902 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2012
Bonito Partners, LLC v. City of Flagstaff 270 P.3d 902 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2012
A law is general, not special, when: “(1) the classification is rationally related to a legitimate governmental objective, (2) the classification is legitimate, encompassing all members of the relevant class, and (3) the class is elastic, allowing members to move in and out of it.” ¶ 14
Governale v. Lieberman 250 P.3d 220 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2011
Governale v. Lieberman 250 P.3d 220 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2011
-54, ¶ 15 , -79 (App.2002).
ARIZONA FARM BUREAU FEDERATION v. Brewer 243 P.3d 619 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2010
ARIZONA FARM BUREAU FEDERATION v. Brewer 243 P.3d 619 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2010
Our Future, ¶ 11 , (grant of summary judgment and statutory interpretation); -54, ¶ 15 , -79 (App.2002) (constitutionality of legislation).
Turken v. Gordon 207 P.3d 709 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2009
Turken v. Gordon 207 P.3d 709 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2009
-66 , -91 (App.2002), the Arizona Constitution significantly limits the state from incurring debts that become general obligations of the government.
Catherine E. Warner v. Southwest Desert Images, LLC Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2008
Catherine E. Warner v. Southwest Desert Images, LLC Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2008
“[W]hat a [court rule] necessarily implies is as much a part of the [rule] as what is explicitly stated.”
Karbal v. Arizona Department of Revenue 158 P.3d 243 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2007
Karbal v. Arizona Department of Revenue 158 P.3d 243 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2007
See, ¶7 , (discussing taxes collected to fund construction of a professional football stadium).
Lincoln v. Holt 156 P.3d 438 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2007
Lincoln v. Holt 156 P.3d 438 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2007
Ct, , ¶ 15 , (“We will declare ...
Town of Gilbert v. Maricopa County 141 P.3d 416 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2006
Town of Gilbert v. Maricopa County 141 P.3d 416 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2006
¶ 14 A law is general, as opposed to special, if: “(1) the classification is rationally related to a legitimate governmental objective, (2) the classification is legitimate, encompassing all members of the relevant class, and (3) the class is elastic, allowing members to move in and out of it.” ¶ 14
LaWALL v. PIMA COUNTY MERIT COMMISSION And SCAMMON 134 P.3d 394 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2006
LaWALL v. PIMA COUNTY MERIT COMMISSION And SCAMMON 134 P.3d 394 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2006
has only limited powers and it can exercise no powers which are not expressly or impliedly granted.”) (emphasis added); (“[W]hat a statute necessarily implies is as much a part of the statute as what is explicitly stated.”).
Grand Canyon Trust v. Arizona Corp. Commission 107 P.3d 356 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2005
Grand Canyon Trust v. Arizona Corp. Commission 107 P.3d 356 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2005
¶ 37 , (citations omitted).
Phelps Dodge Corp. v. Arizona Elec. Power Co-Op., Inc. 83 P.3d 573 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2004
Phelps Dodge Corp. v. Arizona Elec. Power Co-Op., Inc. 83 P.3d 573 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2004
Estate of McGill Ex Rel. McGill v. Albrecht 57 P.3d 384 Ariz. 2002
Estate of McGill Ex Rel. McGill v. Albrecht 57 P.3d 384 Ariz. 2002
See Long v. Napolitano, ___ Ariz. ____, ____ ¶ 43, ¶ 43 (App. 2002) (legislature’s use of singular “any county” does not require us to apply statute to only one county simply because A.R.S.