Cited by

In fact, “the purchaser is presumed to have deducted the amount of the senior liens from the amount he bids for the land.” Id.; (at trustee sale, “[t]he purchaser is expected and presumed to take into account existing senior liens in calculating an appropriate bid for the property”); (“The purchaser [at an execution sale] is not entitled to an offset because of a lien on the property purc

Co., (determining tort of bad faith could not be committed without an insurance contract and a breach thereof, and thus, was “so intrinsically related to the contract” that the action arose out of contract); ¶¶ 17-18 (App. 2003) (explaining fee statute applies if a contract is an “essential basis” of the action and not merely a “factual predicate”); Ramsey Air Meds, L.L.C. v. Cutter Aviation, Inc., ¶ 27 (App. 2000) (stating “the court should look to the fundamental nature of the action rather th

Moreover, when a legal proceeding is based on a statute rather than a contract, like the case before us, “the peripheral involvement of a contract does not support the application of [§ 12-341.01(A)].” ¶ 17 (App. 2003).

Section 12-341.01 “does not apply to purely statutory causes of action.” ¶ 17 (App. 2003).

§ 12–341.01(A) if it could not exist ‘but for’ the contract.” ¶ 17 (App. 2003) (citing Sparks v. Republic Nat’l Life Ins., ).

The Restatement (Third) of Property also supports this analysis: “[L]iens and other interests terminated by the foreclosure attach to the surplus in order of the priority they enjoyed prior to the foreclosure.” Restatement (Third) of Property (Mortgages) § 7.4 (1997) (emphasis added); ¶ 10 (App. 2003) (citing Restatement (Third) of Property (Mortgages) § 7.4 in construing Arizona statutes regarding proceeds from foreclosure).

The Restatement (Third) of Property also supports this analysis: “[L]iens and other interests terminated by the foreclosure attach to the surplus in order of the priority they enjoyed prior to the foreclosure.” Restatement (Third) of Property (Mortgages) § 7.4 (1997) (emphasis added); ¶10 (App. 2003) (citing Restatement (Third) of Property (Mortgages) § 7.4 in construing Arizona statutes regarding proceeds from foreclosure).

§ 12-341.01(A), which provides that “[i]n any contested action arising out of a contract, express or implied, the court may award the successful party reasonable attorney fees.” The contract fee statute “does not apply to purely statutory causes of action” or “if the contract is a factual predicate to the action but not the essential basis of it.” ¶ 17 (App. 2003).

§ 12-341.01(A), but if a contract forms only a “factual predicate to the action” and is not its “essential basis,” the action does not arise out of a contract, ¶ 17 (App. 2003).

¶ 5 (App. 2003) (citation omitted).

¶ 57 (App. 2012) ( ¶ 17 (App. 2003)).

Lewin v. Miller Wagner & Co., ¶ 17, (a 5 KAMELA v. ONE WEST BANK Decision of the Court contract cannot merely be a factual predicate to the action, but must be the essential basis of it).

See Bradshaw v. Jasso-Barajas, 7 BENNETT BLUM, M.D., INC. v. COWAN Opinion of the Court not apply to “‘purely statutory causes of action.’” Keystone Floor & More, Kennedy v. Linda Brock Auto.

¶ 17 , (citing Sparks v. Republic Nat’l Life Ins.

¶¶ 17-18 , (essential dispute involved trustee's obligations to apply proceeds of trustee's sale under A.R.S.

¶ 11 The fee statute does not apply, however, to “purely statutory causes of action.” ¶ 17