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DISCUSSION ¶49 To prevail on her WICP claim, Stephens must establish that DCS: “(1) instituted a civil action which was (2) motivated by malice, (3) begun [or maintained] without probable cause, (4) terminated in plaintiff’s favor and (5) damaged plaintiff.” –09 ¶ 23 (App. 2003) (quoting Bradshaw v. State Farm Mut.

¶16 A claim for WICP has “five elements: that the defendant (1) instituted a civil action which was (2) motivated by malice, (3) begun or maintained without probable cause, (4) terminated in [the] plaintiff’s favor, and (5) damaged [the] plaintiff.” -09, ¶ 23 (App. 2003) (cleaned up).

at (c), “when: (1) there was no reasonable inquiry into the basis for a pleading or motion; (2) there was no chance of success under existing precedent; and (3) there was no reasonable argument to extend, modify or reverse the controlling law.” Villa De Jardines Ass’n v. Flagstar Bank, FSB, ¶ 13 (App. 2011) ( ¶ 29 (App. 2003)).

Co., –17 (1988); –09, ¶ 23 (App. 2003).

The determination of whether probable cause exists is a “two-fold inquiry requiring consideration of both objective and subjective factors.” ¶ 26

¶13 “Whether a given set of facts constitutes probable cause is always a question of law to be determined by the court.” Chalpin, 220 Ariz. at 419, ¶ 20, 207 P.3d at 672 ( ¶ 25, see also Bradshaw, 157 Ariz. at 419, 758 P.2d at 1321) (“If the operative facts are undisputed, the existence of probable cause is a question of law to be determined solely by the court.”).

ed in violation of this rule, the court is required to impose sanctions “upon the person who signed it, a represented party, or both,” id., “when: (1) there was no reasonable inquiry into the basis for a pleading or motion; (2) there was no chance of success under existing precedent; and (3) there was no reasonable argument to extend, modify or reverse the controlling law,’ ”

The trial coui’t found probable cause based on the fact that the court in the undei'lying litigation “not only denied a motion for surnmary judgment, but pexmitted the case to go to the jury after hearing evidence and a Rule 50 motion.” The trial court i’ , stated that denial of a motion for summaxy judgmeixt was not conclusive as to pi’obable cause, but found a Rule 50 ruling to be distinct.

( “We may affirm a trial judge for a different reason if we conclude that although the 11 Because we conclude that Lassen II may not be applied retroactively to require compensation for the 09 easements, we need not address the argument of Peoria and Scottsdale

Co., (holding that inquiry into an individual’s subjective belief in the merits of a claim is one of two prongs testing whether a suit was brought “without probable cause” for purposes of a claim of wrongful institution of civil proceedings); -10 ¶¶ 26-27, -89 (App. 2003) (applying modified Bradshaw test in light of First Amendment concerns).