Cited by

Opinions in Arizona that cite Long v. City of Glendale, 93 P.3d 519.

68 citing documents.

Beynon v. TREZZA 211 P.3d 1203 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2009
Beynon v. TREZZA 211 P.3d 1203 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2009
To establish his equitable estoppel claim, Beynon had to show that Peck’s statements or conduct bore “ ‘some considerable degree of formalism under the circumstances’” and were “ ‘taken by or ha[d] the approval of a person authorized to act in the area under consideration.’ ” , quoting Valencia Energy, , 959 P.2d at 1268 .
Mayer Unified School and Gadsen Elementary School v. Winkleman, Az State Land Dept... Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2008
Mayer Unified School and Gadsen Elementary School v. Winkleman, Az State Land Dept... Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2008
Cullen v. Koty-Leavitt Insurance Agency, Inc. Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2007
Cullen v. Koty-Leavitt Insurance Agency, Inc. Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2007
gral to complaint “even if it is not formally incorporated by reference,” and court need not rely on plaintiff’s description of contract terms and “may look to the agreement itself”); Stahl v. U. S. Dep’t of Agric., 327 F.3d 697, 700 (8th Cir. 2003) (“In a case involving a contract, the court may examine the contract documents in deciding a motion to dismiss.”); ¶¶ 31-32, -29 (App. 2004) (in context of motion to dismiss, trial court may consider whether contract language “reasonably susceptible
Arizona Department of Revenue v. Ormond Builders, Inc. 166 P.3d 934 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2007
Arizona Department of Revenue v. Ormond Builders, Inc. 166 P.3d 934 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2007
329 n. 6, V 34, , 529 n. 6 (App.2004).
Owens v. M.E. Schepp Ltd. Partnership 165 P.3d 674 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2007
Owens v. M.E. Schepp Ltd. Partnership 165 P.3d 674 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2007
(“A parol gift of land may be said to be upon the same footing as a parol sale of land.”); , (“Parol gifts of land are within the Statute of Frauds____”); ¶ 35 , (holding oral donation of land within statute of frauds as “[t]he statute of frauds precludes a party from bringing a court action to enforce an unwritten agreement for the transfer of an interest in real property.”).
State v. MABERY RANCH, CO., LLC 165 P.3d 211 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2007
State v. MABERY RANCH, CO., LLC 165 P.3d 211 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2007
Co., -59 , -45 (1993); -29, ¶¶ 26-34 , -29 (App.2004) (applying Taylor to interpretation of a deed).
Dube v. Likins Powell Hixon Board of Regents Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2007
Dube v. Likins Powell Hixon Board of Regents Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2007
§ 12-821.01(B); Relying on Lawhon v. L.B.J.
Lennar Corp. v. Auto-Owners Insurance 151 P.3d 538 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2007
Lennar Corp. v. Auto-Owners Insurance 151 P.3d 538 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2007
¶¶ 28-29, (extrinsic evidence must be precluded if written language not reasonably susceptible to interpretation asserted by proponent of extrinsic evidence).
In Re Estate of Lamparella 109 P.3d 959 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2005
In Re Estate of Lamparella 109 P.3d 959 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2005
See Taylor, 175 Ariz. at 153 , 854 P.2d at 1139 (court may properly decide not to consider extrinsic evidence because the “asserted meaning of the contract language is so unreasonable or extraordinary that it is improbable that the parties actually subscribed to the interpretation asserted by the proponent of the extrinsic evidence”); ¶ 34 , (“As Taylor recognizes, however, one cannot claim that one is ‘interpreting’ a written clause with extrinsic evidence if the resulting ‘interpretation’ unav