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¶ 6 (App. 2014) (“[T]he right to a trial by jury does not depend on whether the conduct [was] a crime prior to statehood, but ‘whether a statutory offense is sufficiently linked to a common law offense for which a jury trial was granted prior to statehood.’”) (citation omitted); ¶ 14 n. 6 (App. 2005) (citing to the Arizona Territory’s 1901 Penal Code was insufficient because “the test .

“The only historical factor of current relevance is whether an analog to the offense existed at common law that afforded the defendant a right to trial.” n.6, ¶ 14, n.6 (App. 2005); ¶ 11, (“There is a significant distinction between a common law offense and a statutory offense, both 3 MACK v. DELLAS/PHOENIX

¶ 16 After the superior court has accepted jurisdiction and determined the merits of a special action petition, “we review whether the court abused its discretion by its grant or denial of relief.” ¶ 5 , ( ¶ 2 , ).

¶7 After the superior court has accepted jurisdiction and determined the merits of a special action petition, “we review whether the court abused its discretion by its grant or denial of relief.” ¶ 5

¶ 5 , (citations omitted).

“[T]his element of the Derendal analysis is concerned with only those consequences that would apply to all defendants based on the statute’s language.” ¶ 16

¶ 12 , see also Phoenix City Prosecutor’s ¶ 10 , (“[J]ury trial rights provided by the territorial penal code prior to statehood were not preserved by the Arizona Constitution.”); , 494 n. 6, ¶ 14, 113 P.3d *515 1247 , 1251 n. 6 (App.2005) (finding that appellant’s citation to a territorial statute in support of his claim that a jury trial was required was “inapposite” and failed to satisfy the common law Derendal prong, which “focuses on the right to trial for the offense at common law.”).

¶ 14 n. 6, , 1251 n. 6 (App.2005).