Cited by

Opinions in Arizona that cite Valder Law Offices v. Keenan Law Firm, 129 P.3d 966.

40 citing documents.

Brady v. Tempe life/brady/mckee/hospice Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2022
Brady v. Tempe life/brady/mckee/hospice Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2022
¶ 21 (App. 2006) (“Injuries, obviously, are unique to the particular beneficiary and not necessarily tied to the liability issues that the statutory plaintiff has the sole duty of prosecuting.”).
Lattimer v. Brisbon Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2020
Lattimer v. Brisbon Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2020
“The doctrine serves the twofold purpose of compensating counsel for producing benefits for a class and preventing the unjust enrichment of the class members who receive them.” ¶ 15 (App. 2006) (internal quotations omitted).
Humphrey v. State Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2019
Humphrey v. State Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2019
–51, ¶ 21 (App. 2006) (stating that “a statutory plaintiff [is] the only party entitled to litigate liability,” but beneficiaries have a right to participate in establishing damages because “[i]njuries, obviously, are unique to the particular beneficiary and not necessarily tied to the liability issues that the st
Gonzalez v. Mat Const Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2017
Gonzalez v. Mat Const Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2017
In doing so, we determine “whether any genuine issues of material fact exist.” Brookover v. Roberts Enter., Inc., ¶ 8 (App. 2007); ¶ 14 (App. 2006).
Sandoval v. Tempe Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2015
Sandoval v. Tempe Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2015
¶9 We review a summary judgment de novo, “determin[ing] independently whether there are any genuine issues of material fact and whether the trial court erred in its application of the law.” ¶ 14
Marco Crane & Rigging Co. v. Masaryk 341 P.3d 490 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2014
Marco Crane & Rigging Co. v. Masaryk 341 P.3d 490 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2014
We review a grant of summary judgment de novo to “determine independently whether there are any genuine issues of material fact and whether the trial court erred in its application of the law.” ¶ 14
Cohen v. Lovitt & Touche, Inc. 308 P.3d 1196 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2013
Cohen v. Lovitt & Touche, Inc. 308 P.3d 1196 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2013
Summary Judgment in Favor of Lovitt ¶6 We review a trial court’s grant of summary judgment de novo, determining independently “whether there are any genuine issues of material fact and whether the trial court erred in its application of the law.”
Gilbert Tuscany Lender, LLC v. Wells Fargo Bank 307 P.3d 1025 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2013
Gilbert Tuscany Lender, LLC v. Wells Fargo Bank 307 P.3d 1025 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2013
Delo v. Gmac Mortgage, LLC, U.S. Bank, N.A. 302 P.3d 658 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2013
Delo v. Gmac Mortgage, LLC, U.S. Bank, N.A. 302 P.3d 658 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2013
he court’s judgment quieting title in Delo is void and “should be reversed because it fails to recognize MERS’s prior record interest in the property.” We review the court’s summary judgment ruling de novo, “determin[ing] independently whether there are any genuine issues of material fact and whether the trial court erred in its application of the law.”
In Re the Estate of Fred N. Kirkes Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2012
In Re the Estate of Fred N. Kirkes Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2012
Jackson v. Nationwide Mutual Insurance Co. Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2011
Jackson v. Nationwide Mutual Insurance Co. Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2011
Chavez v. Arizona School Risk Retention Trust, Inc. 258 P.3d 145 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2011
Chavez v. Arizona School Risk Retention Trust, Inc. 258 P.3d 145 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2011
City of Tucson v. State 250 P.3d 251 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2011
City of Tucson v. State 250 P.3d 251 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2011
Zimmerman v. Allen 250 P.3d 558 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2011
In Re Estate of Waterloo 250 P.3d 558 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2011
Zimmerman v. Allen 250 P.3d 558 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2011
In Re Estate of Waterloo 250 P.3d 558 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2011
Strawberry Water Co. v. Paulsen 207 P.3d 654 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2008
Strawberry Water Co. v. Paulsen 207 P.3d 654 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2008
§ 40-491(4)(d) (utility tampering); Valder Laru Of *410 , 253 n. 13, ¶ 30, , 975 n. 13 (App.2006) (conversion).
Burkhamer v. State of Arizona Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2007
Burkhamer v. State of Arizona Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2007
Ledvina v. Cerasani Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2006
Ledvina v. Cerasani Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2006
Charles I. Friedman, P.C. v. Microsoft Corp. 141 P.3d 824 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2006
Charles I. Friedman, P.C. v. Microsoft Corp. 141 P.3d 824 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2006
¶ 16 , (common fund doctrine applies when the classes of persons benefiting from the lawsuit were small and easily identifiable, the benefits could be traced accurately and the costs could be shifted to those benefiting from the recovery with some precision).
Short v. Petty 139 P.3d 621 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2006
Short v. Petty 139 P.3d 621 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2006
¶ 23 As we have held, “the policy of this State is to avoid, rather than promote, litigation.” ¶ 29 , , (stating that Arizona law favors arbitration as a matter of public policy); , (same); A.R.S.