Cited by

The evidence required to establish future lost wages depends “on the individual circumstances of each case and, although absolute certainty is not required, the [fact finder] must be guided by some rational standard.” ¶ 38 (App. 2007) (); see also Lewis, 170 Ariz. at 397 (“Once the right to damages is established, uncertainty as to the amount of damages does not preclude recovery.”); Howard, 168 Ariz. at 460 (stating that even if a victim’s loss is not “easily measurable,”

our courts have not been as strict about the amount.” ¶ 47 (App. 2007); see also Earle M. Jorgensen Co. v. Tesmer 6 See SDR, 170 Ariz. at 3; Shah v. Skillz Inc., 320 Cal.

(holding that jury could consider lost profits where restauranteur plaintiff had significant industry experience and had previously operated the at-issue restaurant); ¶¶ 41–43 (App. 2007) (holding that fact of damages was proved because personal-injury plaintiff had an active career in professional baseball, albeit as a minor-leaguer).3 The chief consideration appears to be probable market success, as shown by general market conditions or by evidence of realistic third-party

LITMATH v. US FIRE Decision of the Court JMOL if “the facts produced in support of the claim or defense have so little probative value, given the quantum of evidence required, that reasonable people could not agree with the conclusion advanced by the proponent of the claim or defense.” Jones, 240 Ariz. at 72 ¶ 28 ( ¶ 36 (App. 2007)).

¶ 55 (App. 2007) (reviewing evidentiary ruling predicated on a question of law de novo (citing Yauch v. S. Pac.

–64, ¶ 44 (App. 2007) (allowing recovery of lost wages in personal injury cases).

-68, ¶¶ 66-70 (App. 2007) (trial court ruling about “one expert per issue” rule is reviewed for an abuse of discretion).

Uncertainty as to amount does not preclude recovery, so long as plaintiff’s evidence provides a basis for “an approximately accurate estimate.” ¶ 38 (App. 2007) (citation omitted).

¶ 54 (App. 2007) (plaintiff could recover for anxiety over his less than 1% chance of loss of vision).

See, ¶ 17 (App. 2009) (“It is the jury’s function to determine accuracy, weight, or credibility.”) (citation omitted); ¶ 47 (App. 2007) (same) (citation omitted).

We will uphold the ruling unless “the facts produced in support of the claim or defense have so little probative value, given the quantum of evidence required, that reasonable people could not agree with the conclusion advanced by the proponent of the claim or defense.” , 162 ¶ 36

Unless the striking party’s explanation reveals an inherent discriminatory intent, “the reason offered will be deemed race-neutral.” Felder v. Physiotherapy Assocs., 215 Ariz 154, 168, ¶ 74, (internal citation and quotation omitted).

See Sanchez v. Old Pueblo Anesthesia, P.C., ¶ 18, (recognizing the rule is intended to limit the presentation of cumulative evidence); - 68, ¶ 65-70, -91 (App. 2007) (discussing Rule 26(b)(4)(D) in the context of whether expert opinion was “duplicative”).

¶ 74, (App. 2 STATE v. WHITE Decision of the Court 2007) (alteration in original) (applying rule in context of race-based Batson challenge).

¶ 46 , (distinguishing between evidence to support the fact of lost profits and evidence to support the amount of lost profits).

¶ 10 “Generally, we review challenges to the court’s admission or exclusion of evidence for an abuse of discretion.” ¶ 55

In other words, the trial court properly grants the motion ‘if the facts produced in support of the claim or defense have so little probative value, given the quantum of evidence required, that reasonable people could not agree with the conclusion advanced by the proponent of the claim or defense.’” ¶ 36 , (quoting Orme Sch.

See Felder v. Physiotherapy, Associates, ¶ 39