Cited by

¶ 27; Valencia Energy Co., 191 Ariz. at 576–77 ¶ 35.

“[I]f a party neglects to take either action, ‘a trial court does not err in proceeding to rule on a motion for summary judgment.’” ¶ 30 (App. 2008) ().

¶ 28 n.7 (App. 2008) (issues not raised in an opening brief are waived).

On appeal, Designee abandons its claim that Arizona law governs this issue, n.7, ¶ 28 (App. 2008) (issues not raised in opening brief are waived), and argues for the first time that North Carolina law permits an affirmative cause of action predicated on the theory of promissory estoppel.

We will not consider Mother’s exhibits on appeal as “[n]ew exhibits cannot be introduced on appeal to secure reversal.” n.1, ¶ 3 (App. 2008) (citations omitted); (appellate court considers “only those matters in the record before us”).

¶ 30 (App. 2008) ( and Heuisler v. Phx.

n.7, ¶ 28 (App. 2008) (citing Menendez v. Paddock Pool Constr.

(no error when party fails to request opportunity for additional discovery on motion for summary judgment); see also Ariz. R. Civ.

–02 ¶¶ 18–19, –700 (App. 2008) (holding that when an original agreement needs to be in writing, any material modification to the original agreement also needs to be in writing to be legally enforceable).

Silver Point Cannot Raise New Policy Interpretations in its Reply Brief ¶42 Finally, Silver Point argues for the first time in its reply brief on appeal that Section 8(b) of the Federal Side A Policy created an ambiguity as to when the Silver Point Action claim was “first made.” An issue raised for the first time in the reply brief typically is waived, n.7, ¶ 28 (App. 2008), but we may address the issue if it was argued by both sides below and raises an important point of law, n.6, ¶ 14 (App. 20

Although the Arizona Legislature 6 WILSON v. PNC Decision of the Court ¶22 Although the parties agree modification of the Original Loan Agreement was subject to the statute of frauds, ¶ 10, (modification of material term in agreement subject to statute of frauds must also be in writing); Snyder v. HSBC Bank, USA, N.A., 873 F. Supp. 2d 1139, 1150 (D. Ariz. 2012) (modification of material terms of mortgage loan or loan secured by deed of trust also subject to statu

-02, ¶¶ 18-19, -700 (App. 2008) (holding that when an original agreement falls within the statute of frauds, any material modification of the original agreement is also subject to the statute of frauds); see Exec.

n.7, ¶ 28, n.7 (App. 2008) (noting that failure to argue a claim in the opening brief on appeal constitutes waiver of that claim).

App. P. 13(a)(6) (appellant’s opening brief must set forth “[a]n argument which shall contain the contentions of the appellant with respect to the issues presented, and the reasons therefor, with citations to the authorities, statutes and parts of the record relied on”); & n.7, & n.7 (App. 2008) (appellant’s failure to address alternative grounds for trial court order in opening brief may constitute 16 waiver of argument).

of that claim.”); , 504 n. 7, ¶28, , 702 n. 7 (App.2008) (a party cannot raise an issue for first time in a reply brief).

“We, therefore, do not consider this issue on appeal.” 6 , (App. *229 sion from a proven fact o[r] facts.’ ”