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These requirements exist “not only to aid an appellant and the reviewing court, but also for a more compelling reason—that of aiding all parties and the family court in determining the best interests of the child or children both currently and in the future.” ¶ 18 (App. 2009).

These requirements exist “not only to aid an appellant and the reviewing court, but also for a more compelling reason—that of aiding all parties and the family court in determining the best interests of the child or children both currently and in the future.” ¶ 18 (App. 2009).

§ 25-403(B) (“[T]he court shall make specific findings on the record about all relevant factors and the reasons for which the decision is in the best interests of the child.”); ¶ 18 (App. 2009) (specific findings requirement exists “not only to aid an appellant and the reviewing court, but also .

210, ¶¶ 12, 20 (App. 2009) (concluding the failure to make findings required by A.R.S.

¶18 Similarly, Mother’s is misplaced.

See, ("Imposition of sanctions for nondisclosure pursuant to the discovery rules is a matter to be resolved in the sound discretion of the trial court and that decision should not be disturbed absent a clear abuse of discretion."); ¶ 8 (App. 2009) ("The trial court has broad discretion in ruling on discovery and disclosure matters .

270, 272-73, ¶¶ 7-10 (App. 2013) (declining to find waiver when family court’s custody order made no 4 LOGAN B. v. DCS, et al. Opinion of the Court written factual findings regarding the statutorily mandated best interests findings; best interests of child trumps waiver doctrine); -08, ¶¶ 11, 14-20 (App. 2009) (declining to find waiver; omission of statutorily required best interests findings in custody order demonstrated omission was not “mere oversight”; order merely stated court’s custody det

¶7 The requirement for specific findings “exists not only to aid an appellant and the reviewing court, but also for a more compelling reason — that of aiding all parties and the family court in determining the best interests of the child or children both currently and in the future.” ¶ 18 (App. 2009) (citations omitted).

-68, ¶ 34 (App. 2017) (stating that § 25-403’s requirement of specific best interest findings exists to aid appellate review and the parties and the family court in determining the best interest of a child “both currently and in the future” ( ¶ 18 (App. 2009))).

See Reid v. Reid , , 209, ¶ 18, , 358 (App. 2009) (holding that requirement for specific findings under § 25-403 not only aids appellate review but also "provide[s] the family court with a necessary 'baseline' against which to measure any future petitions by either party based on 'changed circumstances' ").

Although we review a parenting time order for an abuse of discretion, ¶ 11 (App. 2013), a parenting time order without the required best interests findings is deficient as a matter of law, ¶ 20 (App. 2009).

This requirement “exists not only to aid an appellant and the reviewing court, but also for a more compelling reason—that of aiding all parties and the family court in determining the best interests of the child or children both currently and in the future.” ¶ 18 (App. 2009) (citation omitted).

§ 25–403(A) (2017); ¶ 20 (App. 2009) (“[T]he most important issue in custody disputes is the best interests of the child[.]”).

to support her argument that the court’s findings here were inadequate.

§ 8–533(B)(8)(c) (describing as a partial ground for termination that “the parent has been unable to remedy the circumstances that cause the child to be in an out-of-home placement”); ¶ 18 (App. 2009) (“The rationale for this requirement is not simply to aid appellate review .

¶ 8, (“The trial court has broad discretion in ruling on discovery and disclosure matters, and we will not disturb its ruling absent an abuse of discretion.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).

¶ 19 (App. 2009) (“[W]e agree that Father should have raised this issue before the lower court, and doing so would have provided that court with a simpler, more expedient opportunity to remedy its lack of findings and perhaps reconsider its decision .

uating the adequacy of the family court’s findings of fact, the key issue is whether findings allow the appellate court to 4 PESETSKY v. PESETSKY Decision of the Court “ascertain from the court’s orders and ruling how the court weighed the statutory factors and [arrived] at its conclusion.” ¶ 13

Nold, 232 Ariz. at 272, ¶ 9, 304 P.3d at 1095 (declining to “apply the doctrine of waiver when the family court makes no findings on the record because to do so ‘would inappropriately deprive the family court and all parties of the baseline information required for future petitions involving a child's or children's best interests’”) ( ¶ 19, ).

¶10 ¶ 13, for the proposition that a court abuses its discretion when it rejects the opinion of a custody evaluator without explaining the basis for its own conclusion.

-10, ¶ 20, -59 (App. 2009).

-10, ¶ 20, -359 (App. 2009) (declining to find waiver because the most important issue in custody disputes is a child’s best interests).