Cited by

¶ 20 (App. 2010) (“[A] plaintiff may only obtain summary judgment if it submits undisputed admissible evidence that would compel any reasonable juror to find in its favor on every element of its claim”); cf. Sitton v. Deutsche Bank Nat.

¶ 13 (App. 2010).1 We consider “only the evidence presented to the trial court when it addressed the motion.” Brookover v. Roberts Enters., Inc., ¶ 8 (App. 2007).

Instead, they conceded that “[t]he debt here was run up by defendants’ daughter who did not pay for what she charged, apparently.” We thus conclude that CACH submitted “undisputed admissible evidence that would compel any reasonable juror to find in its favor on every element of its claim.”1 ¶ 20

If “the evidence or inferences would permit a jury to resolve a material issue in favor of either party, summary judgment is improper.” ¶ 19, (internal citation and quotation marks omitted).

Even where the facts are not disputed, as here, summary judgment is improper “if the evidence of record does not demonstrate that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” ¶ 12 (App. 2010).

293, ¶¶ 13, 21, 1035 (App. 2010).

To qualify for summary judgment, the party with the burden of proof on a claim or defense “must submit ‘undisputed admissible evidence that would compel any reasonable juror to find in its favor on every element of its claim.’” Allen, 231 Ariz. at 213, ¶ 18, 292 P.3d at 199 ( ¶ 20, ).

293, ¶¶ 13, 21, 1035 (App. 2010).

¶ 12, (stating that summary judgment is proper if a party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law); 1 In their briefs, the parties agree that the order finding the Separation Agreement to be valid and enforceable survived both the court’s grant of Mans’ motion for new t

(3) its materiality; (4) the speaker’s knowledge of its falsity or ignorance of its truth; (5) the speaker’s intent that it be acted upon by the recipient in the manner reasonably contemplated; (6) the hearer’s ignorance of its falsity, (7) the hearer’s reliance on its truth; (8) the hearer’s right to rely on it; [and] (9) the hearer’s consequent and proximate injury.” –92, ¶ 14, –34 (App. 2010).

Ctr., , 58 n. 5, ¶ 7, , 626 n.5 (App.2010) (same); , 291 n. 2, ¶ 11, , 1033 n. 2 (App.2010) (same).

¶ 18 , (emphasis added).