Cited by

¶ 23 (App. 2010) (rejecting argument that information would have been disclosed at deposition “if opposing counsel had simply asked the correct questions”); Norwest Bank (Minnesota) v. Symington, ¶ 18 (App. 2000) (rejecting argument that opponent would have found nondisclosed evidence “if [he] h

Newspapers, Inc. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Corr., -44 (App. 1997), we have affirmed the award of sanctions under subsection (A)(3) under circumstances similar to those presented here, ¶¶ 31-32 (App. 2010) (affirming sanctions under § 12-349(A)(3) when failure to disclose expert witness resulted in mistrial and required new trial, wasting judicial resources).

Solimeno 5 FINCHEM, ¶ 30 (App. 2010).

and the practical effect of any non-disclosure," ¶ 9 (App. 2010), we review "whether a judicial mind, in view of the law and circumstances, could have made the ruling without exceeding the bounds of reason," ¶ 14 (App. 2013) (quoting Associated Indem.

.”) (citation omitted);1 -82, ¶ 32 (App. 2010) (affirming imposition of sanctions under A.R.S.

In general, “[t]rial judges are better able than appellate courts to decide if a disclosure violation has occurred in the context of a given case and the practical effect of any non-disclosure.” ¶ 9 (App. 2010).

This court reviews an award of attorneys’ fees for an abuse of discretion, addressing whether the court could have made the ruling “without exceeding the bounds of reason.” ¶ 36 (App. 2010).

¶ 1 (App. 2010) (stating that “a medical malpractice defendant who also testifies as a standard of care expert is subject to expert disclosure requirements regarding that issue”).

We cannot substitute our discretion for that of the trial judge.” ¶ 36 (App. 2010).

The “trial court has broad discretion in determining whether evidence has been properly disclosed and whether it should be admitted at trial,” and that decision “will not be disturbed on appeal absent an abuse of discretion.” ¶ 9 (App. 2010).

¶ 9 (App. 2010); ¶ 3 (App. 2006).

Without question, Rule 26.1(d) does not require “scripting” of an expert’s testimony, ¶ 14 (App. 2010), but the superior court did not impose such a 10 ACOSTA v. STATE, et al. Decision of the Court standard here.

¶ 9 (App. 2010); Jimenez v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., ¶ 5 (App. 2003).

Ins., ¶ 12 (App. 2011) ().

Ins., ¶ 12 (App. 2011) ().

“We review application of a statute de novo.” ¶ 30 (App. 2010) (citation omitted).

in its opinion, the direct damages should be a “relatively simple calculation” of the difference between $2.25 million and “the actual sales price, plus interest and any incidental costs.” ¶15 The superior court is better able than we are “to decide if a disclosure violation has occurred in the context of a given case and the practical effect of any non-disclosure.” ¶ 9 (App. 2010).

¶ 33 (App. 2010) (Court of Appeals may affirm a sanctions award on any basis supported by the record.).