Cited by

¶ 13 (App. 2009) (quoting Luckette v. Lewis, 883 F.Supp.

Ariz. Ass’n ¶ 16 (App. 2009) (citations omitted).

The exhaustion doctrine is not applied, however, when “invoking the available administrative procedures would be futile or useless.” –86 (App. 1989); see also Ariz. Ass’n ¶ 21 (App. 2009).

¶ 12 (App. 2009) (quotation omitted).

Husband argues that Wife did not prove she was liable on an obligation attached to the Property such that his failure to refinance (and thereby satisfy the Deed of Trust) caused her “a distinct and palpable injury.” ¶ 16 (1998); Ariz. Ass’n ¶ 17 (App. 2009).

See Ariz. Ass'n of Providers for Persons with Disabilities v. State , , ¶ 14, , 222-23 (App. 2009).

But to establish standing, a party must allege a distinct and palpable injury particular to herself, ¶ 17 (App. 2009), which Mother has failed to do.

For the proposition that a provider may challenge the reduction of services to individual DDD enrollees, Appellants cite Ariz. Ass’n P.3d 216 (App. 2009).

Ariz. Assoc’n ¶ 23 (App. 2009) (stating that exhaustion is not required when “the individual facts of [a plaintiff’s] particular grievances would not aid judicial economy or sharpen the legal issues”).

The court may apply these requirements on a “sliding scale.” Ariz. Ass’n ¶ 12

See Ariz. Ass’n , see also White v. Greater Ariz. Bicycling Ass’n, , -88 (App.2007) (we consider decisions of coordinate courts highly persuasive and binding).

-11, ¶ 4 , -21 (App.2009).