Cited by

(“Because the entry of default in this case was improper, [] any resulting default judgment would be void.”); ¶¶ 21, 23 (App. 2010) (affirming superior court’s order vacating a default judgment because the entry of default was ineffective, rendering the default judgment void).

Moreover, the court noted that a person’s known “whereabouts” are not “limited to a defendant’s residence.” ¶12 Searle appealed.

For these reasons, this is not like Ruiz v. Lopez, relied on by the Velascos, where the court affirmed a superior court’s finding that alternative service by mailing a summons to the street address for “a huge complex without an apartment number was not sufficient.” -20 ¶ 6 (App. 2010).

¶ 14 (App. 2010) (noting that the United States Postal Service considers a complete address as including, when applicable, a unit number).

¶11 MacLean contends she substantially complied with Rule 55

" Ruiz v. Lopez , , 222 n.3, , 449 (App. 2010).

of Maricopa, -48 (App. 1990); ¶¶ 21, 23 (App. 2010) (affirming superior court’s order vacating entry of default and default judgment because entry of default was ineffective, resulting in a void judgment).

¶ 12, (“We interpret procedural rules according to their plain meaning.”).

“Without such notice, the ten-day grace period does not begin to run, the entry of default is ineffective, and the default judgment is void.” ¶ 21 (App. 2010) (construing Arizona Rule of Civil Procedure 55(a)(1)).

¶ 14 In terminating the spousal maintenance obligation based on Mother’s failure to give Father proper notice of the Application of Default

And Rule 55(a)(4) specifies that this prior notice provision uniquely applies to “a default sought and entered pursuant to this rule.” In effect, Rule 55(a) “allow[s] entry of default only upon adequate notice to the 19 defaulting party.”

¶ 12 , (finding that the same rules of construction apply to both statutes and rules).