Cited by

Opinions in Arizona that cite Marriage of MacMillan v. Schwartz, 250 P.3d 1213.

245 citing documents.

Valenzuela v. Luna Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2016
§ 25-324.” ¶ 10, ( ¶ 39, ).
Nick Hardy v. Nyberg Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2016
Nick Hardy v. Nyberg Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2016
See ARCAP 13(a)(6)–(7) (opening brief shall include “‘statement of the issues’ presented for review” and “contentions concerning each issue presented for review”); ¶ 33, (noting that the failure to argue a claim in the opening brief constitutes abandonment and waiver).
Davis v. Desert Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2015
Davis v. Desert Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2015
Guislan v. Helmus Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2015
Guislan v. Helmus Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2015
Although the family court did not have to make express findings of fact in support of its fee award, ¶ 39, the court cannot award fees without considering the statutory factors.
Jurgen M., Ashley C. v. Dcs Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2015
Jurgen M., Ashley C. v. Dcs Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2015
“Opening briefs must present significant arguments, supported by authority, setting forth the appellant’s position on the issues raised.” ¶ 33 (App. 2011); see also ARCAP 13(a)(7)(A).
Shacknai v. Shacknai Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2015
Shacknai v. Shacknai Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2015
Trainor v. Trainor Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2015
Trainor v. Trainor Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2015
Lynch v. Brakebill Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2015
Lynch v. Brakebill Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2015
Swett v. Brown Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2015
Chapa v. Barker Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2015
Chapa v. Barker Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2015
egan v. First Nat’l. Bank, (“courts [may] take judicial notice of other actions involving similar parties and issues[.]”) 5 CHAPA v. BARKER Decision of the Court court was in the best position to assess Chapa’s ability to proceed, ¶ 38, (“the trial court is in the best position to observe and assess the conduct of the parties before it”), we conclude the trial court did not err by dismissing Chapa’s amended complaint before appointing a GAL.
Swett v. Brown Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2015
¶ 38, (affirming award of fees and asserting that the trial court was in the best position to observe and assess the parties’ conduct).
Mothersed v. Greenen Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2014
Mothersed v. Greenen Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2014
Shano v. Shano Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2014
Shano v. Shano Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2014
Jacobson v. Jacobson-Boettcher Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2014
Jacobson v. Jacobson-Boettcher Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2014
“Because the trial court is in the best position to observe and assess the conduct of the parties before it,” ¶ 38, and given the broad discretion vested in the trial court, we cannot say from the record before us that the court erred in denying fees related to Father’s alleged noncompliance.
Robinson v. Hutchins Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2014
Robinson v. Hutchins Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2014
§ 25–324 is to assure a remedy for the party least able to pay, the trial court may also consider whether a party has adopted unreasonable positions.” ¶ 37
Myrick v. Maloney 333 P.3d 818 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2014
Myrick v. Maloney 333 P.3d 818 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2014
Manuel T. v. Dcs Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2014
Manuel T. v. Dcs Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2014
Gazeley v. Larsen-Gazeley Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2014
Gazeley v. Larsen-Gazeley Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2014
Cohen v. Cohen Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2014
Cohen v. Cohen Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2014
¶ 38, (affirming partial award of attorneys’ fees to husband under A.R.S.
Jaffe v. Capital One Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2014
Jaffe v. Capital One Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2014
MacLean v. Kappa Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2014
MacLean v. Kappa Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2014
Caruso v. Caruso Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2014
Caruso v. Caruso Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2014
Teamer v. Daniells Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2014
Teamer v. Daniells Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2014
Joseph M. Arpaio v. Jennifer Braillard Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2012
Joseph M. Arpaio v. Jennifer Braillard Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2012
P., provides that upon good cause shown, a court may make various protective orders that “justice requires to protect a party or person from annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden or expense.” ¶¶ 32-35, -21 (App. 2011) (discussing comparable Ariz. R. Fam.