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And under both, “the superior court may consider a challenge to confirmation of an arbitration award only on statutorily enumerated grounds.” Ball, 254 Ariz. at 147–148 ¶ 9 (cleaned up) ( ¶ 13 (App. 2011)).

Generally, “a party is bound to arbitrate only those disputes which it has contractually agreed to arbitrate.”

¶ 25 (App. 2011) (quoting MCI Telecomms.

¶ 7 (App. 2011) ( ¶ 16 (App. 2002)).

See also Arthur Andersen LLP v. Carlisle, 556 U.S. 624, 631 (2009) (citation omitted) (noting that “‘traditional principles’ of state law allow a contract to be enforced by or against nonparties to the contract through ‘assumption, piercing the corporate veil, alter ego, incorporation by reference, third- party beneficiary theories, waiver and estoppel’”); ¶ 23 (App. 2011) (stating that “[n]onsignatories, however, can be required to arbitrate under certain circumstances” and citing to cases espo

Co., ); ¶ 22 (App. 2011) (“[A] party is bound to arbitrate only those disputes which it has contractually agreed to arbitrate.”).

See, ¶ 23, (citations omitted) (noting that non-signatories, can be required to arbitrate, i.e, completely forego a judicial forum, under certain circumstances—such as estoppel, contract theories, and agency theories); see Duenas v. Life Care Ctrs.

¶19 Appellants argue the Siblings’ signatures on the Management Agreement were not required to enforce the arbitration provision contained therein, ¶ 23 (App. 2011) (“Nonsignatories .

-74, ¶¶ 8-9 , -13 (App.2011).

-78, ¶¶ 23-25 , -17 (App. 2011).

see, -13 (App. 2011) (applicability of substantial compliance doctrine to statute makes contract based on its terms voidable not 4 state’s public policy as reflected in statutes “void as against public policy”); cf. W. Corr.