Cited by

¶ 34 (App. 2017) (party waives an issue on appeal if he does not develop and support it); see also ARCAP 13(a)(7)(A) (requiring an opening brief to contain “contentions concerning each issue presented for review, with supporting reasons for each contention .

¶25 “A plaintiff must generally prove the elements of his medical malpractice claim by a preponderance of the evidence.” ¶ 9 (App. 2017); see also Aileen H. Char Life Int.

§ 12-572; ¶ 2 (App. 2007) (“[T]he heightened standard of proof for claims against a health professional set forth in A.R.S.

to 1991 amendment)); Ariz. Dep’t (finding no violation of former version of One-Expert Rule where employee’s “opinion as to valuation was formed in the course and scope of his regular duties as an appraiser and not in anticipation of testifying at trial”); –82 ¶¶ 25–27 (App. 2017) (concluding that alleged hypothetical questions concerning methadone ingestion and overdose “provided both an illustration of the extent of [defendant treating physician’s] knowledge of the relevant area of medical pra

¶17 Even assuming Tasa-Bennett has not waived this argument, ¶ 34 (App. 2017), the argument would fail.

contentions concerning each issue presented for review, with supporting reasons for each contention, and with citations of legal authorities and appropriate references to the portions of the record on which the [party] relies."); ¶ 34 (App. 2017) (finding appellant's failure to develop an argument in a meaningful way constituted waiver).

See ARCAP 13(a)(7); ¶ 34 (App. 2017) (the failure to develop an argument in a meaningful way constitutes waiver).

contentions concerning each issue presented for review, with supporting reasons for each contention, and with citations of legal authorities and appropriate references to the portions of the record on which the [party] relies.”); ¶ 34 (App. 2017) (the failure to develop an argument in a meaningful way constitutes a waiver).

ction, and 3) the defamation instruction—contending all three were “directly contrary to the rule of law and were harmful to [them,] requiring a new trial.” ¶26 Although we review a superior court’s denial of a motion for new trial based on giving a jury instruction for an abuse of discretion, “we review de novo whether jury instructions accurately state the law.” ¶ 10 (App. 2017) (citation omitted).

¶ 34 (App. 2017) (citing Polanco v. Indus.