Yokois v. Ryan
Authorities cited
Identified automatically; this list may not be exhaustive.
- Al Carranza v. madrigal/investigation Services, Inc. 354 P.3d 389
- Blankenbaker v. Marks 299 P.3d 747
- Tripati v. State 16 P.3d 783
- MacCollum v. Perkinson 913 P.2d 1097
- Fidelity Security Life Insurance v. State 954 P.2d 580
Opinion text
NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.
UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL
AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.
IN THE
ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS
DIVISION ONE
DOUGLAS D. YOKOIS, Plaintiff/Appellant,
v.
CHARLES L. RYAN, et al., Defendants/Appellees.
No. 1 CA-CV 18-0199, 1 CA-CV 18-0568
(Consolidated)
FILED 5-26-2020
Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County
No. CV2017-094513
The Honorable David King Udall, Judge
The Honorable Janice Crawford, Judge
AFFIRMED
COUNSEL
Douglas D. Yokois, Florence
Plaintiff/Appellant
Arizona Attorney General’s Office, Phoenix
By Joseph E. Dylo
Counsel for Defendants/Appellees
YOKOIS v. RYAN, et al.
Decision of the Court
MEMORANDUM DECISION
Presiding Judge Samuel A. Thumma delivered the decision of the Court, in
which Judge Randall M. Howe and Chief Judge Peter B. Swann joined.
T H U M M A, Judge:
¶1 In this consolidated appeal, plaintiff Douglas Yokois appeals
from the superior court’s denial of his application for a preliminary
injunction and from the court’s grant of the defendants’ — six Arizona
Department of Corrections (ADC) officials — motions to dismiss. Because
the superior court did not err, the rulings are affirmed.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
¶2 In October 2017, Yokois filed a complaint against the
defendants seeking various forms of declaratory, injunctive and
compensatory relief based on claims about his treatment as a prisoner at
ADC. Yokois alleged that defendant Arnold Walker, an ADC Lieutenant,
“shouted” and “yelled” at him so that “spittle hit [Yokois] in his face and
glasses,” threatened to move him to a different unit because Yokois uses a
wheelchair, snatched Yokois’ identification card from him and “threw
[Yokois’] I.D. card striking [him] in the face.” Yokois alleged that he “was
and is being discriminated against by being treated differently than other
prisoners because he is ‘non-ambulatory[,’] a wheelchair-dependent
prisoner.” Yokois further alleged that these “repeated acts of aggravated
harassment, assault, and batter[y],” and the way in which the five other
defendants handled the situation, violated his Arizona constitutional and
statutory rights.
¶3 Over the next six months, Yokois filed numerous motions
including for preliminary injunction in which he sought to enjoin the
defendants from engaging in “harassment, retaliation, assault, battery,
abuse, and discriminatory behaviors against Yokois, including moving him
to another unit.” The superior court denied these motions, Yokois appealed,
and this court first stayed the appeal given a jurisdictional issue.
2
YOKOIS v. RYAN, et al.
Decision of the Court
¶4 In the meantime, the defendants, in two motions to dismiss,
argued Yokois’ complaint failed to state a claim upon which relief could be
granted under Ariz. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) because the complaint was barred by
A.R.S. § 31-201.01(L) (2020).1 The superior court granted the first motion,
filed by five defendants, as unopposed. At a hearing on the second motion,
filed by Walker, after denying Yokois’ oral motion to amend his complaint,
the court granted Walker’s motion to dismiss and entered final judgment
in favor of all defendants. Yokois timely appealed and this court
consolidated his appeals from the denial of his motion for a preliminary
injunction and the final judgment. This court has jurisdiction over the
consolidated appeal pursuant to Article 6, Section 9, of the Arizona
Constitution and A.R.S. §§ 12-120.21(A)(1), -2101(A)(1) and -2101(A)(5)(b).
DISCUSSION
I. The Superior Court Properly Dismissed Yokois’ Complaint for
Failure to State a Claim.
¶5 Yokois argues the superior court erred when it found that
A.R.S. § 31-201.01(L) barred his claims, an issue this court reviews de novo.
Zubia v. Shapiro, 243 Ariz. 412, 414 ¶ 13 (2018); Blankenbaker v. Marks, 231
Ariz. 575, 577 ¶ 6 (App. 2013). This court assumes as true the complaint’s
well-pleaded facts and will affirm a dismissal only if, “as a matter of law,”
the “plaintiff[] would not be entitled to relief under any interpretation of
the facts susceptible of proof.” Fid. Sec. Life Ins. Co. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Ins., 191
Ariz. 222, 224 ¶ 4 (1998).
¶6 An incarcerated person “may not bring a cause of action
seeking damages or equitable relief from” the State or its employees for
“injuries suffered while in custody . . . unless the complaint alleges specific
facts from which the court may conclude that the plaintiff suffered serious
physical injury or the claim is authorized by a federal statute.” A.R.S. § 31–
201.01(L). Section 31-201.01(L) limits “inmates’ tort claims . . . to those
involving serious physical injury or ones authorized by federal statute.”
Tripati v. State, Ariz. Dept. of Corr., 199 Ariz. 222, 225 ¶¶ 7 & 9 (App. 2000)
(holding an inmate’s cause of action for loss of property was barred by §
31–201.01(L)). A “[s]erious physical injury” is “an impairment of physical
condition that creates a substantial risk of death or that causes serious
1 Absent material revisions after the relevant dates, statutes and rules cited
refer to the current version unless otherwise indicated.
3
YOKOIS v. RYAN, et al.
Decision of the Court
disfigurement, prolonged impairment of health or prolonged loss or
impairment of the function of any bodily organ.” A.R.S. § 31-201.01(N)(2).
¶7 Yokois’ complaint did not allege “specific facts” that he had
suffered a “serious physical injury” or that his claim “is authorized by a
federal statute.” Yokois alleged an ADC official yelled at him so that spittle
hit him in the face and threw his ID card at him, striking him in the face.
Other than summarily claiming that he was seriously injured as a result,
Yokois’ complaint failed to show these actions, or any others, amount to
serious physical injury under Sections 31–201.01(L) and -201.01(N)(2).
Moreover, his complaint did not assert any claim authorized by federal
statute. Because the allegations in Yokois’ complaint did not satisfy the
requirements of Section 31-201.01(L), the superior court properly dismissed
his complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted.
For this same reason, and because Section 31-201.01(L) applies to claims for
“equitable relief,” Yokois has shown no abuse of discretion in the court
denying his motion for a preliminary injunction.
II. The Superior Court Did Not Err in Denying Yokois’ Motion to
Amend.
¶8 Yokois argues the superior court abused its discretion when
it denied his oral motion to amend his complaint at the hearing on Walker’s
motion to dismiss, a ruling reviewed for an abuse of discretion. Carranza v.
Madrigal, 237 Ariz. 512, 515 ¶ 13 (2015). While “[l]eave to amend must be
freely granted when justice requires,” Ariz. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2), denial of
leave to amend is proper if “the court finds undue delay in the request, bad
faith, undue prejudice, or futility in the amendment,” MacCollum v.
Perkinson, 185 Ariz. 179, 185 (App. 1996).
¶9 Yokois did not request leave to amend in response to the first
motion to dismiss (which resulted in dismissal of five defendants). In his
written response to Walker’s motion to dismiss, he referenced a right to
amend, but did not include a request to do so, nor did he submit a proposed
amendment. His oral motion to amend at the hearing on Walker’s motion
did not comply with the procedural rules. See Ariz. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(4) (“A
party moving for leave to amend a pleading must attach a copy of the
proposed amended pleading as an exhibit to the motion.”); Ariz. R. Civ. P.
7.1 (listing requirements for motions). Far more importantly, however,
Yokois failed to specify how an amendment would remedy the defects in
his original complaint or what his amendment would contain. Nor does he
do so on appeal. For these reasons, Yokois has shown no abuse of discretion
4
YOKOIS v. RYAN, et al.
Decision of the Court
by the superior court in denying his oral motion to amend. See Carranza, 237
Ariz. at 515 ¶ 12; MacCollum, 185 Ariz. at 185.
CONCLUSION
¶10 The judgment and the denial of the motion for preliminary
injunction are affirmed.
AMY M. WOOD • Clerk of the Court
FILED: AA
5