Charles v. Carnegie

NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.
UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL
AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE
ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS
DIVISION ONE

ROBIN MICHAEL CHARLES, Plaintiff/Appellant,

v.

CARNEGIE FOUNDATION, et al., Defendants/Appellees.

No. 1 CA-CV 19-0289
FILED 5-19-2020

Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County
No. CV2018-054761
The Honorable Theodore Campagnolo, Judge

AFFIRMED

APPEARANCES

Robin Michael Charles, Glendale
Plaintiff/Appellant

Snell & Wilmer LLP, Phoenix
By Jason Ebe, Edward J. Hermes, Amanda Z. Weaver
Counsel for Defendant/Appellee Carnegie Institution for Science

Grasso Law Firm PC, Chandler
By Robert Grasso, Jr., N. Patrick Hall
Counsel for Defendant/Appellee Carnegie Foundation for the Advancement
of Teaching
Jaburg & Wilk PC, Phoenix
By Alejandro Perez
Counsel for Defendant/Appellee NRG Energy, Inc.

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Presiding Judge Michael J. Brown delivered the decision of the Court, in
which Judge Kenton D. Jones and Judge D. Steven Williams joined.

B R O W N, Judge:

¶1 Robin Charles appeals the superior court’s order dismissing
his lawsuit for lack of personal jurisdiction, failure to state a claim upon
which relief can be granted, and failure to file within the statute of
limitations. For the following reasons, we affirm.

BACKGROUND

¶2 In July 2018, Charles filed a complaint in superior court
against the “Carnegie Foundation” and related entities,1 alleging various
claims arising from an “illegal technology” used to experiment on him,
including abuse of power, invasion of privacy, illegal surveillance,
obstruction of justice, assault, hate crime, and defamation of character. He
also sought more than $300,000 in damages. Although he amended his
complaint three times, the claims essentially remained the same in each
version.

¶3 Carnegie Foundation filed a motion to dismiss Charles’
claims, asserting they were barred by the statute of limitations. Carnegie
Foundation also requested that the superior court deem Charles a vexatious
litigant. CIS moved to dismiss for failure to state a claim and lack of
personal jurisdiction. NRG then sought dismissal on the same grounds.

¶4 The superior court granted all three motions on the grounds
asserted and also designated Charles a vexatious litigant, stating he could

1 During the course of the litigation, it was ultimately determined
there were three entities who separately defended against the complaint:
NRG Energy, Inc. (“NRG”), Carnegie Institution for Science (“CIS”), and
Carnegie Foundation for the Advancement of Teaching (“Carnegie
Foundation”).

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not file a new pleading, motion, or other document without prior leave of
the court. Finding his claims frivolous, the court awarded reasonable
attorneys’ fees to CIS and Carnegie Foundation as a sanction, and noted
that NRG did not file a timely application for fees. Charles timely appealed.

DISCUSSION

¶5 NRG and Carnegie Foundation request that we dismiss the
appeal given Charles’ failure to make appropriate references to the record
or provide any authority regarding the issues he apparently attempted to
present in his opening brief as required. See ARCAP 13(a)(7)(A) (The
appellant’s brief must include “citations of legal authorities and
appropriate references to the portions of the record on which the appellant
relies.”). We agree that the opening brief does not satisfy ARCAP 13.
Liberally construed, however, Charles arguably challenges the superior
court’s dismissal of (1) his claims against Carnegie Foundation, (2) the
vexatious litigant finding, and (3) the award of attorneys’ fees. Thus, in our
discretion, we decline to dismiss the appeal and will decide each issue
based on our own review of the record and what we are ultimately able to
glean from Charles’ briefing. See Clemens v. Clark, 101 Ariz. 413, 414 (1966).

A. Dismissal of Claims Against CIS and NRG

¶6 Although Charles fails to raise any meaningful arguments
challenging the merits of the superior court’s order dismissing his case as
to CIS and NRG, out of an abundance of caution we address whether
dismissal was proper.

¶7 We review dismissal for lack of personal jurisdiction de novo.
Hoag v. French, 238 Ariz. 118, 122, ¶ 17 (App. 2017). “Arizona courts may
exercise personal jurisdiction to the maximum extent allowed by the United
States Constitution.” Planning Grp. of Scottsdale, L.L.C. v. Lake Mathews
Mineral Props., Ltd., 226 Ariz. 262, 265, ¶ 12 (2011). To establish personal
jurisdiction, a defendant must have “sufficient minimum contacts with the
forum state such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend traditional
notions of fair play and substantial justice.” Williams v. Lakeview Co., 199
Ariz. 1, 3, ¶ 6 (2000); see Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 320 (1945).
Personal jurisdiction may be general or specific. Williams, 199 Ariz. at 3,
¶ 6. Under both general and specific jurisdiction “the constitutional
touchstone remains whether the defendant purposefully established
‘minimum contacts’ in the forum [s]tate.” Id. (quoting Burger King Corp. v.
Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 474 (1985)).

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¶8 General personal jurisdiction may exist over a nonresident
who “has ‘substantial’ or ‘continuous and systematic’ contacts with
Arizona.” Austin v. CrystalTech Web Hosting, 211 Ariz. 569, 574, ¶ 17 (App.
2005) (quoting Batton v. Tenn. Farmers Mut. Ins. Co., 153 Ariz. 268, 270
(1987)). Charles has not shown that any of the defendants have
“substantial” or “continuous and systematic” contacts with Arizona. See id.
In responding to the motions to dismiss, Charles merely reasserted the
allegation made in his complaint—that appellants are using “technology”
on him. Charles asked the court to “look[] only to the pleading itself,” citing
Coleman v. City of Mesa, 230 Ariz. 353, 356, ¶ 9 (2012), and provided no new
information through which he asserts Carnegie Foundations’ connections
to Arizona. He did attach exhibits to his response to NRG’s motion to
dismiss purporting to show that various subsidiaries of NRG have a
physical presence in Arizona but provided no additional evidence other
than a screenshot of a Google search. NRG explained in response that the
location was from a former wholly-owned subsidiary of NRG. The court
accepted NRG’s explanation.

¶9 Specific personal jurisdiction may be exercised over non-
resident defendants as permitted by the Due Process Clause of the United
States Constitution. In re Marriage of Peck, 242 Ariz. 345, 348–49, ¶ 9 (App.
2017). Due process permits the exercise of specific jurisdiction if: “(1) the
defendants performed some act or consummated some transaction with
Arizona by which they purposefully availed themselves of the privilege of
conducting activities in this state; (2) the claim arises out of or results from
the defendants’ activities related to Arizona; and (3) the exercise of
jurisdiction would be reasonable.” In re Consol. Zicam Prod. Liab. Cases, 212
Ariz. 85, 90, ¶ 10 (App. 2006). The focus of the analysis of specific
jurisdiction is “the relationship between the defendant, the forum, and the
litigation.” Williams, 199 Ariz. at 4, ¶ 11. Charles presented no evidence to
show that any of the defendants “performed some act or consummated
some transaction with Arizona.” In re Consol. Zicam Prod. Liab. Cases, 212
Ariz. at 90, ¶ 10. He also failed to show any “minimum contacts that are
related to the cause of action.” In re Marriage of Peck, 242 Ariz. at 348–49,
¶ 9; see Planning Grp., 226 Ariz. at 266, ¶¶ 15–16 (“[C]ontacts by a defendant
with the forum state . . . not directly related to the asserted cause of action
. . . cannot sustain the exercise of specific jurisdiction.”). We therefore agree
with the superior court’s dismissal of Charles’ claims for lack of personal
jurisdiction.

¶10 Dismissal was also appropriate because Charles’ complaint
did not include “a short and plain statement of the grounds for the court’s
jurisdiction.” Ariz. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(1). Charles alleged that the defendants

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used mind control technology to experiment on him: “psychotronic
weapons that [a]ffect the whole person—[b]ody, soul, & spirit . . . [and]
cause trauma and [a]ffect mind and heart.” The purpose of the notice
pleading standard is to give the opponent fair notice of the nature and basis
of the claim and to indicate the type of litigation involved. Cullen v. Auto-
Owners Ins. Co., 218 Ariz. 417, 419, ¶ 6 (2008). Neither Charles’ original
complaint nor any of the amended versions provided the defendants with
fair notice of what his claims were based upon. Because he did not include
any factual support establishing how his claims were related to conduct
attributable to any of the defendants, the superior court properly concluded
he had failed to state any claim upon which relief could be granted.

B. Dismissal of Claims Against Carnegie Foundation

¶11 We review questions of law concerning statutes of limitations
de novo. Cook v. Town of Pinetop-Lakeside, 232 Ariz. 173, 175, ¶ 10 (App.
2013). Claims for libel or slander, or “liability created by statute,” are
subject to a one-year statute of limitation. A.R.S. § 12-541. Claims involving
a personal injury must be filed within two years of when the claims accrue.
A.R.S. § 12-542. Charles’ complaint asserts that the defendants have been
performing experiments on him for over 20 years. He also filed similar
claims in December 2013, which demonstrates that the claims filed in this
case are well beyond their statutes of limitation. The superior court
therefore correctly found Charles’ claims against Carnegie Foundation
were time-barred.

C. Vexatious Litigant

¶12 Charles vaguely suggests the superior court erred in
declaring him a vexatious litigant. We treat the court’s order as granting
injunctive relief, Madison v. Groseth, 230 Ariz. 8, 13, ¶ 16 n.8 (App. 2012), and
review for an abuse of discretion, Ahwatukee Custom Estates Mgmt. Ass’n v.
Turner, 196 Ariz. 631, 634, ¶ 5 (App. 2000). In its motion, Carnegie
Foundation asserted that Charles has filed “over 200 pleadings and other
motions” against it since December 19, 2013. The superior court repeatedly
issued minute entries advising Charles that it did not have jurisdiction to
rule on his motions and warned that if he continued filing them he would
be deemed a vexatious litigant and precluded from filing additional
motions. In granting the motion, the court found that under A.R.S. § 12-
3201(a)–(d), Charles filed court actions for the purpose of harassment,
unreasonably delayed or expanding court proceedings, brought court
actions without substantial justification, and continued to file and re-file
documents that were the subject of previous rulings by the court in the same

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litigation. Charles disputes none of those findings, and they are supported
by the record. We find no abuse of discretion.

D. Attorneys’ Fees

¶13 Pursuant to Arizona Rule of Civil Procedure 11, which
authorizes awarding attorneys’ fees as a sanction for frivolous filings, the
superior court awarded attorneys’ fees to CIS in the amount of $3,310.50,
and to the Carnegie Foundation in the amount of $3,760.87. We review
those awards for an abuse of discretion, Maleki v. Desert Palms Prof’l
Properties, L.L.C., 222 Ariz. 327, 333–34, ¶ 32 (App. 2009), and will uphold
them if there is any reasonable supporting basis. Id. The court found
Charles violated Rule 11(b)(1), (2), and (3) by filing his complaint and
amended complaint. The court also found the amounts requested by CIS
and Carnegie Foundation were “reasonable and necessary” in defending
Charles’ claims. Nothing in the record reveals an abuse of discretion.

¶14 Carnegie Foundation and CIS request attorneys’ fees on
appeal as a sanction against Charles pursuant to ARCAP 25, which in
relevant part permits us to impose sanctions if we determine the appeal is
frivolous. See Johnson v. Brimlow, 164 Ariz. 218, 221–22 (App. 1990). We
consider sanctions with great caution and only award them when the
appeal is wholly frivolous. See Price v. Price, 134 Ariz. 112, 114 (App. 1982).
In our discretion, we deny the requests made here. Because all three
defendants are successful parties on appeal, we award them taxable costs
subject to compliance with ARCAP 21.

CONCLUSION

¶15 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the
superior court.

AMY M. WOOD • Clerk of the Court
FILED: AA

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