Britton v. Norman

NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.
UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL
AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE
ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS
DIVISION ONE

MIDGE BRITTON, Plaintiff/Appellant,

v.

MARY NORMAN, et al., et ux., Defendant/Appellee.

No. 1 CA-CV 19-0311
FILED 4-28-2020

Appeal from the Superior Court in Mohave County
No. S8015CV201800693
The Honorable Steven C. Moss, Judge

AFFIRMED

COUNSEL

Midge Britton, Dolan Springs
Plaintiff/Appellant

Mary Norman, Henderson, Nevada
Defendant/Appellee

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Presiding Judge Lawrence F. Winthrop delivered the decision of the Court,
in which Judge Maria Elena Cruz and Judge David B. Gass joined.
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Decision of the Court

W I N T H R O P, Judge:

¶1 Midge Britton (“Britton”) appeals from the superior court’s
dismissal of her claim against Mary Norman (“Norman”) and the
Farmanity Project. For the following reasons, we affirm the dismissal with
prejudice.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶2 Britton operates Road Apple Acres (“RAA”), a nonprofit
corporation, from a parcel of property near Dolan Springs, Arizona. At the
property, Britton kept a mixture of personal and corporate assets, including
eight horses, four goats, and various items of ranch equipment such as
custom gates, barrels, troughs, and feeders.

¶3 In 2016, Britton sustained an injury and had to seek medical
care. Britton spent a significant amount of time in Phoenix having surgery
and completing post-op rehabilitation. While Britton was away, her
roommate, W. Singleton, was supposed to care for the animals and the
property. Britton testified that, to cover these anticipated expenses, she
gave Singleton a debit card, which had approximately $800 per month from
social security payments deposited to such account.

¶4 Singleton later told police that after Britton had been gone
several months, he was “starting to go broke” and “got fed up with the
animals eating better than him.” At some point, an animal rescue group,
the Farmanity Project, was contacted about the animals. 1 Norman, as the
CEO of the Farmanity Project, went to the RAA property and spoke with
Singleton, who asked Norman to take and care for the animals. Norman
initially told Singleton that her company could not accept the animals
because it did not have adequate equipment to house or care for them.
Singleton offered to donate corrals and other equipment if Norman would
accept surrender of the animals.

¶5 Norman researched Singleton’s ability to give away the
animals and equipment: she found in the Mohave County recorder’s office
records that Singleton was an owner of the property and determined from
Corporation Commission records that Singleton was a co-incorporator of
RAA and was listed as an officer on the company’s annual reports. Based

1 Singleton indicated to police that he was the person who contacted
the rescue group. However, Norman represented that a neighbor first
contacted the Farmanity Project about rescue of the animals.

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on such research, and believing Singleton had the authority to transfer
title—as Singleton himself represented—Norman prepared bills of sale,
which Singleton signed first electronically and later signed physical copies.2
Norman took possession of the animals and equipment.

¶6 About a month later, Britton returned to her property and
discovered Singleton’s arrangement with Norman. Britton filed a report
with the Mohave County Sheriff’s Office seeking return of her property.
After talking to the parties involved and confirming the bills of sale, the
Sheriff’s Office advised Britton that her matter was a civil issue and she
should contact a lawyer.

¶7 In June 2018, Britton filed a civil complaint against Norman
and the Farmanity Project seeking an emergency order for a “writ of
replevin” to secure the return of her animals and equipment. The parties
eventually met for a settlement conference in March 2019. The parties
reached an agreement by the end of the day, and the court adopted the
settlement agreement.

¶8 After the settlement was reached, however, Britton filed
additional documents with the court, and both parties appeared at the court
for a previously-scheduled trial setting conference. The court advised the
parties that the matter had been removed from the active calendar once the
settlement hearing had concluded, but upon leaving the court, Britton
commented to court staff that she had not settled the case. The court then
issued a minute entry clarifying that “once a settlement is placed on the
record, and there is verification of acceptance of the terms of the settlement,
then the same is binding upon the parties.” The court then reinvested
jurisdiction in the settlement judge “to resolve any and all issues with
respect to the settlement of this case.”

¶9 On April 22, 2019, the settlement judge again met with the
parties. After testimony by both Britton and Norman, the court found that
“all previous conditions of this settlement agreement have been met” and
“each party has complied with the terms of the settlement agreement[,]

2 Britton disputed the authenticity of the signatures; however, the
superior court noted that electronic signatures “are not as precise as
handwritten signatures.” In addition, the court stated that it reviewed
Singleton’s physical signatures in comparison with Singleton’s driver’s
license and found “[t]he signatures of the [hard copy] Bills of Sale are very
much those of Mr. Singleton.”

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specifically the Defendant has returned the property agreed upon.” The
court then dismissed the matter with prejudice.

¶10 Britton filed a timely notice of appeal3 and we have
jurisdiction under Arizona Revised Statutes (“A.R.S.”) section 12-
2101(A)(1).

ANALYSIS4

I. Settlement Agreement

¶11 On appeal, Britton asks this court to remand her case so that
“an agency of competent jurisdiction” can ensure retrieval of her “stolen”
property and animals. She seeks compensation for the animals that died
while out of her care, extraction (at Norman’s expense) of any of her
animals that were adopted to third parties before the settlement agreement
was made, and a criminal “conviction . . . incarceration & fines” against
Norman. Britton’s arguments on appeal largely mirror her arguments
before the superior court, contending that Singleton did not have authority

3 We temporarily stayed this appeal to allow the superior court to
issue a signed order with a certification of finality pursuant to Arizona Rule
of Civil Procedure (“Rule”) 54(c). In response, the superior court issued an
order clarifying and amending its April 22 order to include the necessary
finality language, following which, we reinstated the appeal.

4 Although it appears Britton made some effort to comply with the
Rules of Civil Appellate Procedure as mandated by the Arizona Supreme
Court concerning the organization and content of briefs by including some
of the necessary headings, we note that her opening brief does not contain
a statement of the facts of her case, nor does it contain clearly delineated
arguments supported by citations of legal authority or references to the
record. See Ariz. R. Civ. App. P. (“ARCAP”) 13(a). Britton’s reply brief,
which “must be strictly confined to rebuttal of points made in the appellee’s
answering brief,” is similarly noncompliant. See ARCAP 13(c). In addition,
although generally compliant and much more readable, we note that
Norman’s answering brief also lacks any citations to the record. See ARCAP
13(a)-(b). Based on the lack of compliance with ARCAP 13, we could
dismiss the matter outright; however, in our discretion, we address the
arguments presented by the parties to the extent we understand them. See
ARCAP 25.

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to dispense with her property, that Singleton’s signatures were invalid, and
that there were no legally binding bills of sale.

¶12 In response, Norman argues that the parties entered a valid
settlement agreement, which fully and fairly resolved all issues. Norman
further contends that she has fully complied with the settlement agreement.

¶13 Interpretation of a settlement agreement is a question of law
that we review de novo. Burke v. Ariz. State Ret. Sys., 206 Ariz. 269, 272, ¶ 6
(App. 2003). An agreement between parties is binding if “it is made orally
in open court and entered in the minutes.” Ariz. R. Civ. P. 80(a)(2). As our
supreme court has made clear, “[t]he settlement of a controversy is valid
and binding, not because it is the settlement of a valid claim, but because it
is the settlement of a controversy.” Abbott v. Banner Health Network, 239
Ariz. 409, 413, ¶ 12 (2016) (quoting Brecht v. Hammons, 35 Ariz. 383, 389
(1929), disapproved on other grounds by Ariz. Pub. Serv. Co. v. S. Union Gas Co.,
76 Ariz. 373 (1954)). The court further clarified that as long as a “settlement
is characterized by good faith, the court will not look into the question of
law or fact in dispute between the parties, and determine what is right.” Id.

¶14 Here, the superior court found there was a valid settlement
agreement between the parties, entered into in good faith, and Britton does
not challenge the settlement agreement on appeal.5 The agreement is
binding on the parties, as the settlement judge read the terms of the
agreement in open court before both parties and adopted the agreement in
a minute entry following the settlement conference. In assuring the parties
understood the agreement, the following exchange took place:

[Settlement Judge]: Did the Court accurately
state your agreement for this record?

[Britton]: Yes, sir.

[Settlement Judge]: And upon this agreement
being complied with, have you agreed that this
matter will be dismissed with prejudice?

[Britton]: Yes, sir.

5 Aside from three references to the settlement conference, neither
Britton’s opening brief nor her reply brief address the settlement agreement
at all.

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[Settlement Judge]: Are you entering into that
agreement of your own free-will?

[Britton]: Yes, sir.

[Settlement Judge]: Has anyone used any force
or threats of force against you to have you enter
into that agreement?

[Britton]: No.

[Settlement Judge]: Are you willing to accept
that agreement in complete and total
satisfaction of all claims currently pending
before this court?

[Britton]: Complete, but not satisfied totally,
but yes.

[Settlement Judge]: I’ll ask it again. Are you
willing to accept this agreement in complete
satisfaction of all claims currently pending
before this court?

[Britton]: Yes.

¶15 “An agreement of compromise, like any other contract, may
be avoided or set aside for fraud, deceit, or mistake.” Phillips v. Musgrave, 23 Ariz. 591, 594 (1922); see also Pac. W. Constr. Co. v. Indus. Comm’n, 166
Ariz. 16, 19 (App. 1990) (stating a claimant may seek to set aside a
settlement agreement by proving “duress, mental incompetency, fraud,
misrepresentations or mutual mistake of fact”). Although Britton appears
to argue fraud and deceit in connection with Singleton’s original agreement
with Norman, and perhaps with regard to Norman’s business practices,
Britton fails to argue—let alone reference any facts—showing any fraud or
mistake in connection with the terms of the agreement or her decision to
enter into the settlement agreement. As the settlement conference
transcript makes clear, Britton accepted the terms of the settlement “of [her]
own free-will” and “in complete satisfaction of all claims currently
pending” before the court.

¶16 According to the terms of the agreement, Norman was to
return to Britton the three horses still in Norman’s possession, along with
the remaining ranching equipment. “[I]n consideration for these promises,

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[Britton] has agreed to give up her personal claims to five Mustangs, the
four goats, and the balance of the equipment not specifically identified.”
The parties also agreed that they would not reach out to or initiate contact
with any law enforcement or other investigatory agencies in connection
with the settled matter. When Britton later stated to superior court staff
that there was no settlement, the court met again with the parties and
confirmed that Norman had “complied with the terms of the settlement
agreement” and “returned the property agreed upon.” After receiving full
performance and the benefit of the settlement agreement, Britton cannot
now seek additional compensation from Norman in excess of the
agreement. The confirmed settlement agreement between the parties
disposed of all claims currently pending before the superior court;
accordingly, we affirm the superior court’s dismissal of the action with
prejudice.

II. Notice of Change of Judge

¶17 Britton also appears to challenge an order from the superior
court denying her notice of change of judge for cause.6 Britton argues the
judges were biased against her and, based on comments regarding the
unreadability of her court filings, that they insinuated she had diminished
mental capacity.

¶18 A denial of notice of change of judge may only be challenged
by special action relief. Taliaferro v. Taliaferro, 186 Ariz. 221, 223-24 (1996).
As such, Britton may not now challenge the subject order. Moreover, even
if we were able to review such an order, we discern no bias. Our review of
the record leads us to agree with the conclusions of the subject order: first,
that the trial judge “patiently and repeatedly [told Britton] to prepare her
pleadings pursuant to the rules so that they are legible and
understandable,” and “[d]espite [Britton’s] failure to significantly change
her approach to the pleadings,” the judge continued to read pleadings and

6 On April 8, 2020, Britton submitted an additional motion asking this
court to take action against the superior court judges who handled her case,
alleging misconduct, suppression of evidence, obstruction of justice, and
various other claims. Britton requests this court “audit” the judges’
experience in cases involving “livestock law” and also requests this court
remand to “an agency of competent jurisdiction” to pursue “dis-bar
proceedings” against the judges. Putting aside the fact that we see nothing
in this record to support such allegations, we do not have jurisdiction to
conduct either requested action. See A.R.S. § 12-2101; see also Ariz. Const.
art. 6.1, § 3. Accordingly, we deny Britton’s April 8 motion.

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make decisions on what he did understand; and second, that the settlement
judge “treated the parties fairly.”

¶19 Further, to the extent that Britton argues the judges were
biased based on their denial to admit certain evidence or based on rulings
not in her favor, we again discern no bias. “The trial court is granted
discretion in deciding to admit or exclude evidence.” Maxwell v. Aetna Life
Ins. Co., 143 Ariz. 205, 213 (App. 1984). “A judge’s legitimate exercise of
judicial discretion cannot be the basis of the bias and prejudice required for
a change of judge for cause.” Mervyn’s v. Superior Court, 179 Ariz. 359, 362
(App. 1994).

III. Waiver

¶20 Finally, Britton makes a variety of other undeveloped
arguments throughout her brief, which arguments are raised for the first
time on appeal. She also asserts she has “newly discovered evidence which
would alter [the] outcome” of the case “if [it] went to trial.”

¶21 In general, this court will “not consider issues, even
constitutional issues, raised for the first time on appeal.” Englert v.
Carondelet Health Network, 199 Ariz. 21, 26, ¶ 13 (App. 2000). In addition,
“[t]his court is not the appropriate forum for resolving factual disputes,”
and so we will not consider new evidence on appeal. Kessen v. Stewart, 195
Ariz. 488, 495, ¶ 26 (App. 1999). Moreover, we reiterate that this case could
not go “to trial” based on “newly discovered evidence” because the parties
have already entered a valid settlement agreement. See supra ¶¶ 13-16.

CONCLUSION

¶22 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the superior court’s
dismissal of the matter with prejudice.

AMY M. WOOD • Clerk of the Court
FILED: AA

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