Williamson v. Williamson

NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.
UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL
AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE
ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS
DIVISION ONE

In re the Marriage of:

CELINA WILLIAMSON,
Petitioner/Appellee,

v.

THEODORE R. WILLIAMSON,
Respondent/Appellant.

No. 1 CA-CV 19-0325 FC
FILED 6-16-2020

Appeal from the Superior Court in Yuma County
No. S1400DO200901511
The Honorable John P. Plante, Judge Retired

AFFIRMED

COUNSEL

Vida A Florez-Warner Attorney at Law, Yuma
By Vida Z. Florez-Warner
Counsel for Petitioner/Appellee

Torok Law Office, PLLC, Yuma
By Gregory T. Torok
Counsel for Respondent/Appellant
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Decision of the Court

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Judge James B. Morse Jr. delivered the decision of the Court, in which
Presiding Judge David D. Weinzweig and Judge Jennifer M. Perkins joined.

M O R S E, Judge:

¶1 On June 7, 2011, the superior court dissolved the marriage of
Theodore R. Williamson ("Theodore") and Celina Williamson ("Celina")
pursuant to a decree of dissolution of marriage. Theodore appeals the
family court's denial of his motion to vacate that decree, arguing that the
family court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction because the marriage at issue
was void. For the reasons herein, we affirm.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

¶2 On November 12, 2009, Celina filed a petition for dissolution
of the marriage. Over a year later, in January 2011, Theodore moved to
dismiss Celina's petition, arguing that the marriage was void because
Celina was still married to her former husband and her marriage to
Theodore was bigamous. Subsequently, Theodore and Celina entered into
an agreement under Rule 69,1 Theodore withdrew his petition to dismiss,
and the court entered the decree of dissolution. Theodore's counsel
expressly informed the family court that counsel "explained to [Theodore]
that if he withdraws that petition that [the] matter will be moot and the
divorce will go forward."

¶3 In August 2011, shortly after the decree was entered, Celina
filed a petition to enforce the decree of dissolution, arguing that Theodore
was not complying with its terms. In response, Theodore filed a petition to
vacate the decree of dissolution, again arguing that his marriage to Celina
was void because she was already married to another person when she
married Theodore. Eventually the parties resolved their dispute with
another Rule 69 agreement, and the court dismissed "[a]ll post-decree
actions" with prejudice, including Theodore's post-decree petition to vacate
the decree of dissolution.

1 Throughout this decision, "Rule" refers to the Arizona Rules of
Family Law Procedure.

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Decision of the Court

¶4 The court resolved still more post-decree petitions to enforce
the dissolution decree and entered a judgment against Theodore on April
6, 2016. On October 6, 2016, Theodore moved to vacate the June 2011 decree
of dissolution, the April 6, 2016 judgment, and all other orders in the case.
Theodore repeated his earlier argument that the family court lacked
subject-matter jurisdiction to enter the decree of dissolution because his
putative marriage to Celina was bigamous.

¶5 The court held a hearing on the motion. Despite "considerable
evidence" supporting Theodore's claim that his marriage to Celina was
bigamous, the court ruled the argument had "been waived more than once,"
and found no good cause to set aside the decree of dissolution or the other
orders. Theodore timely appealed, and we have jurisdiction under A.R.S.
§ 12-2101(A)(1).

DISCUSSION

¶6 Theodore argues that the family court erred in denying his
motion to vacate the decree of dissolution because it lacked subject-matter
jurisdiction and subject-matter jurisdiction cannot be waived. Theodore
also argues that all post-decree orders, including the April 2016 judgment,
are void because the family court lacked authority to enter the decree. We
first address the threshold issue of subject-matter jurisdiction.

¶7 We review challenges to the family court's subject-matter
jurisdiction de novo. Duckstein v. Wolf, 230 Ariz. 227, 231, ¶ 8 (App. 2012).
Subject-matter jurisdiction is "the power to hear and determine cases of the
general class to which the particular proceedings belong[.]" Glover v. Glover, 231 Ariz. 1, 5, ¶ 18 (App. 2012) (citation omitted). Subject-matter
jurisdiction is "conferred by our constitution or statutes" and "cannot be
vested in a court solely by waiver or estoppel." Id. at 5-6, ¶ 18.

¶8 We may affirm the family court for any reason supported by
the record. Pettit v. Pettit, 218 Ariz. 529, 531, ¶ 4 (App. 2008). While subject-
matter jurisdiction cannot be waived, Glover, 231 Ariz. at 5-6, ¶ 18, the
family court had subject-matter jurisdiction over this case even if
Theodore's marriage to Celina was bigamous.

¶9 Theodore incorrectly argues that the family court lacks any
authority over a void marriage. Arizona law specifically vests superior
courts with the jurisdiction to "adjudge a marriage to be null and void when
the cause alleged constitutes an impediment rendering the marriage void."
A.R.S. § 25-301. "The jurisdictional requirements and procedure for
obtaining an annulment shall be the same as if the matter were one for

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Decision of the Court

dissolution of marriage." A.R.S. § 25-302(A). As outlined in these statutory
provisions, the family court has jurisdiction to dissolve or annul putative
marriages even assuming that the marriage is void ab initio. The family
court also has the authority to divide property between the parties and
establish rights regarding children even when annulling a void marriage.
A.R.S. § 25-302(B). Accordingly, even if Theodore's claim was proven, the
family court retained subject-matter jurisdiction over this case.

¶10 More substantively, Theodore argues that the decree of
dissolution was wrongly entered as a result of Celina's allegedly fraudulent
divorce documentation. Though Theodore cites no Rule in either his
motion or his briefing on appeal, we presume his motion to vacate the
decree was made under Rule 85(b)(3), which allows a party to move for
relief from a final judgment on the basis of fraud or misrepresentation.
Motions for relief from judgment due to a party's alleged fraud or
misrepresentation must be made "no more than 6 months after the entry of
the judgment[.]" Rule 85(c)(1). The family court properly denied
Theodore's motion to vacate the decree because it was filed nearly five years
after the entry of the divorce decree. See Quijada v. Quijada, 246 Ariz. 217,
220, ¶ 7 n.4 (App. 2019) (noting that Rule 85 motions based on mistake,
newly discovered evidence, or fraud are time-barred if brought more than
six months after judgment).

¶11 Finally, even if Theodore's motion were timely, his argument
has been waived. Theodore was informed by his counsel that the decision
to withdraw his original petition to dismiss would "moot" the argument he
now attempts to forward. Theodore later consented to a Rule 69 order
which dismissed this argument with prejudice. Theodore claims waiver
does not apply to challenges to subject-matter jurisdiction. But, as noted
above, the family court had subject-matter jurisdiction.

¶12 Theodore also appeals the family court's denial of his motion
to vacate certain post-decree orders, including the April 2016 judgment. He
argues these orders should be set aside because the decree of dissolution is
void. Because these arguments are contingent on Theodore's untimely
challenge to the underlying decree, we also reject them.

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Decision of the Court

CONCLUSION

¶13 We affirm the family court's orders in all respects. We deny
Celina's request for reasonable attorney fees because she cites no
supporting authority. See In re Marriage of Kassa, 231 Ariz. 592, 594, ¶ 7
(App. 2013).

AMY M. WOOD • Clerk of the Court
FILED: AA

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