Enterprise Life v. Adoi

IN THE
ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS
DIVISION ONE

ENTERPRISE LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY, et al.,
Plaintiffs/Appellants,

v.

STATE OF ARIZONA DEPARTMENT OF INSURANCE,
Defendant/Appellee.

No. 1 CA-CV 19-0359
FILED 3-26-2020

Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County
No. LC2018-000254-001
The Honorable Patricia A. Starr, Judge

VACATED

COUNSEL

Kutak Rock, LLP, Scottsdale
By S. David Childers, Tasha N. Cycholl, Jennifer L. Kraham,
Paul S. Gerding, Jr.
Counsel for Plaintiffs/Appellants

Arizona Attorney General's Office, Phoenix
By Lynette J. Evans
Counsel for Defendant/Appellee
 ENTERPRISE LIFE, et al. v. ADOI
Opinion of the Court

OPINION

Judge James B. Morse Jr. delivered the opinion of the Court, in which
Presiding Judge David D. Weinzweig and Judge Jennifer M. Perkins joined.

M O R S E, Judge:

¶1 The Arizona Department of Insurance ("ADOI") found that
Enterprise Life Insurance Company ("Enterprise") and National
Foundation Life Insurance Company ("National") (collectively, "the
companies") exited the Arizona individual health insurance market and
were therefore prohibited from transacting business in the Arizona market
for five years. The companies unsuccessfully challenged the ADOI's
decision in the superior court and now appeal. Because A.R.S. § 20-1380
does not provide the ADOI with the authority to force the companies to exit
the market, we vacate the ADOI's order.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

¶2 Currently, the companies provide in-force health insurance
policies that are labeled as "grandfathered" and "transitional" by the Patient
Protection and Affordable Care Act ("ACA"). 42 U.S.C. § 18011; 45 CFR §
147.140(a)(1)(i). "Grandfathered" policies are those that were sold prior to
the signing of the ACA in March of 2010. "Transitional" policies are those
that were sold after the ACA was passed, but before its provisions went
into effect on January 1, 2014. Both types of policies are somewhat unusual
because they are exempt from the substantive and procedural requirements
of the ACA. 45 CFR § 147.140(c)(1); 29 CFR § 2590.715-1251(c). So long as
these policies continue to be offered for renewal by the insurer, existing
customers can renew and continue this coverage. Important for our
purposes, this renewal process takes place outside of the regulatory
framework and ACA individual market ("ACA market").

¶3 While "grandfathered" policies may continue to be offered for
renewal in perpetuity without ACA compliance, "transitional" policies
must eventually comply with the ACA. The ACA first mandated that all
"transitional" policies must be replaced with ACA-compliant essential
health benefit policies ("EHB policies") by January 1, 2014. The Centers for
Medicare and Medicaid Services ("CMS") have extended that deadline
multiple times, most recently to January 1, 2020.

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 ENTERPRISE LIFE, et al. v. ADOI
Opinion of the Court

¶4 The ever-changing deadline led the companies to believe the
ACA required them to make new EHB policies available to their
"grandfathered" and "transitional" customers. Accordingly, the companies
filed rates with the ADOI to offer new EHB policies from 2015 to 2017, but
no one purchased the EHB policies. The companies continued to renew the
"grandfathered" and "transitional" policies for existing customers, relying
on the extensions granted by the CMS.

¶5 After the CMS extended the deadline to January 2019, the
companies chose to discontinue offering new EHB policies, and instead
only renewed their existing "grandfathered" and "transitional" policies.
Accordingly, the companies did not file EHB policy rates with the ADOI by
the June 1, 2017, deadline.

¶6 In October of 2017 the ADOI sent the companies a letter
explaining that by "failing to file plan year 2018 rates," the companies had
provided the ADOI "with constructive notice of their intent to exit the
individual market." The letter then directed the companies to terminate all
in-force "grandfathered" and "transitional" policies by December 31, 2017,
and take further steps to properly exit the market.

¶7 The companies appealed to the Office of Administrative
Hearings. At the evidentiary hearing, an ADOI assistant director, testified
that when an insurer files EHB rates with the ADOI, it is then required by
federal regulations to offer ACA compliant policies in the ACA market for
that year. Thus, according to the ADOI, when the companies filed EHB
rates between 2015 and 2017, they effectively entered "the ACA individual
health insurance marketplace" and became subject to what the agency
describes as the market exit provision of A.R.S. § 20-1380(D). That statute
provides as follows:

D. If a health care insurer elects to discontinue offering all
health insurance coverage in the individual market in this
state, the health care insurer may discontinue that coverage
only if all of the following occur:

1. The health care insurer gives notice to the director at least
five business days before the health care insurer gives notice
to each individual of the intention to discontinue offering
health insurance coverage in the individual market in this
state.

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 ENTERPRISE LIFE, et al. v. ADOI
Opinion of the Court

2. The health care insurer provides notice to each individual
of that discontinuation at least one hundred eighty days
before the date of the expiration of that coverage.

3. The health care insurer discontinues all individual
insurance or coverage that was issued or delivered for
issuance in this state and does not renew any coverage that
was offered or sold in this state.

¶8 According to the ADOI, when the companies failed to file
EHB rates they, "elect[ed] to discontinue offering all health care insurance
in the individual market," and A.R.S. § 20-1380(D) allows the ADOI to force
them from Arizona's individual insurance market entirely. The companies
challenged the ADOI's interpretation of the statute, and argued that
because the companies were still offering to renew their "grandfathered"
and "transitional" policies to existing customers, they had not
"discontinue[d] offering all health insurance coverage in the individual
market." A.R.S. § 20-1380(D) (emphasis added).

¶9 The ADOI responded that renewed policies are distinguished
from new policies and "grandfathered" and "transitional" policies are
"closed blocks of business," not offered or available for purchase in the
individual marketplace. The Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ") disagreed
and reasoned that the term "offering all" includes both "the offering of the
sale of new policies and the offer to renew existing policies." As such, the
ALJ found the ADOI failed to establish: (1) that the companies exited the
market pursuant to the statute and (2) that grounds existed to suspend or
revoke their certificate to transact business in the state.

¶10 The ADOI rejected the ALJ's reasoning and decision. The
ADOI found that the ALJ's decision "overemphasizes the importance of the
word 'all' in the statute" and should have instead focused on the word
"offering," which "constitutes an act by the insurer calculated to procure
new business, not to merely retain existing enrollees." Therefore, under the
ADOI's interpretation, the companies "elected to discontinue offering all
health insurance" because they stopped offering new policies in the
individual market.

¶11 As a penalty, the ADOI first ordered the companies to
comply with the remaining market exit provisions enumerated in A.R.S. §
20-1380(D)(1-3). Second, the ADOI barred the companies from the Arizona
individual health insurance market for a period of five years "as made clear
by A.R.S. § 20-1380(E)."

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 ENTERPRISE LIFE, et al. v. ADOI
Opinion of the Court

¶12 The companies appealed to the superior court and challenged
the ADOI's interpretation of the statute and corresponding penalties. The
superior court affirmed, concluding that the word "all" in the statute "most
logically refers" to offering new "guaranteed available insurance plans," and
does not include the renewal of existing coverage. Therefore, the superior
court found that the companies triggered the market exit provisions of the
statute and must comply with the ADOI's order. The companies timely
appealed. We have jurisdiction pursuant to A.R.S. § 12-913.

DISCUSSION

¶13 On appeal, the companies challenge the ADOI's
interpretation of A.R.S. § 20-1380 and the resulting order. When an
administrative order is "based on an interpretation of law," this Court
reviews the agency and superior court's interpretation de novo, Saldate v.
Montgomery, 228 Ariz. 495, 498, ¶ 10 (App. 2012), and therefore is "not
bound by the superior court's or the agency's legal conclusions," JHass
Group L.L.C. v. Ariz. Dep't of Fin. Insts., 238 Ariz. 377, 383, ¶ 20 (App. 2015).
Further, in interpreting a statute, the primary goal is to determine and give
effect to the legislature's intent. DeVries v. State, 221 Ariz. 201, 204, ¶ 6 (App.
2009). And "[t]he best indication of legislative intent is the plain language
of the statute." Bither v. Country Mut. Ins. Co., 226 Ariz. 198, 200, ¶ 8 (App.
2010).

¶14 Moreover, "the degree to which [an agency] can exercise any
power depends upon the legislature's grant of authority to the agency."
Facilitec, Inc. v. Hibbs, 206 Ariz. 486, 488, ¶ 10 (2003). Nothing in A.R.S. §
20-1380 authorizes the ADOI to compel an insurer to exit the market.
Instead, the ADOI relies on A.R.S. § 20-142(B), which provides that the
ADOI director "shall have the powers and authority . . . reasonably implied
from the provisions of this title." The issue is therefore whether A.R.S. § 20-
1380 "reasonably implie[s]" that the ADOI can force the companies to cancel
their "grandfathered" and "transitional" policies and completely exit
Arizona's individual insurance market.

¶15 As reflected in its title, the purpose of A.R.S. § 20-1380 is to
provide "guaranteed renewability for all individuals[']" health insurance
coverage. Arizona Senate Fact Sheet, 2000 Reg. Sess. S.B. 1032 (44th Leg., 2nd
Reg. Sess., April 26, 2000). Subsection A enforces this purpose by requiring
insurers to "renew or continue" existing coverage at the individual's
request. A.R.S. § 20-1380(A). An "insurer may nonrenew or discontinue
the health insurance coverage of an individual" only for the specific reasons
enumerated in A.R.S. § 20-1380(B). Relevant here, (B)(3) provides an

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exception when the insurer "has ceased to offer new coverage and has
discontinued all in-force coverage in the market pursuant to subsection D
of this section." A.R.S. § 20-1380(B)(3) (emphasis added). This provision
clarifies that an insurer does not exit the market when it merely "cease[s] to
offer new coverage" and has not "discontinued all in-force coverage."

¶16 Subsection D then provides that for an insurer to avail itself
of the exception to mandatory renewability based on exiting the individual
health insurance market, it must: (1) provide formal notice to the director;
(2) provide timely notice to their existing customers; and (3) discontinue all
individual insurance and not renew any coverage that was offered or sold
in the state. A.R.S. § 20-1380(D).

¶17 The ADOI argues that when an insurer ceases to offer new
coverage in the market, A.R.S. § 20-1380 gives the agency the authority to
force an insurer to discontinue all in-force coverage pursuant to subsections
B and D outlined above, and then revoke the insurers ability to do business
in the state for a period of five years pursuant to subsection E.1 But A.R.S.
§ 20-1380 does not authorize such action. The statute provides a checklist
of what must be done when the insurer decides to discontinue both new
and existing coverage. The legislature deployed permissive words ("elect"
and "may") to authorize the insurer, not the ADOI, to make that decision.
Beyond that, the statute protects renewability of coverage and does not
expressly authorize the ADOI to force an insurer to discontinue in-force
coverage. Therefore, subsections B and D establish a limited mechanism by
which the insurer may choose to avoid guaranteed renewability under
subsection A. They do not support the ADOI's proposition that an insurer's
decision not to offer new coverage triggers the mandatory discontinuation
of existing coverage.

¶18 The ADOI also argues that its authority to force an insurer to
discontinue in-force coverage and completely exit the market is "reasonably
implied" in the statute because otherwise an insurer will never act to
comply with subsection D. This ignores both the text and purpose of the
statute. If an insurer does not perform all the prerequisites of subsection D,
then despite the insurer's preference to cancel existing coverages, an
individual insured can enforce his or her right to renew an existing policy

1 The ADOI only sought to force non-renewal of the existing
coverages. The ADOI has not asserted that A.R.S. § 20-1380 provides
express or implied authority to require the companies to continue to offer
the previously offered new policies in order to renew the existing coverage
policies.

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 ENTERPRISE LIFE, et al. v. ADOI
Opinion of the Court

pursuant to A.R.S. § 20-1380(A). Thus, the statute provides its own
incentive for an insurer to comply with subsection D without the ADOI's
intervention.

¶19 Rather than protecting existing insureds by providing
guaranteed renewability of their health insurance coverage, the ADOI's
order subverts the plain language of A.R.S. § 20-1380 and accomplishes
precisely the opposite result—forcing the termination of an individual's
insurance coverage against the wishes of both the insurer and the insured.
In the end, the ADOI’s claim of statutory authority fails because ADOI is
seeking to accomplish what an insurer is forbidden from doing under
subsection A. A.R.S. § 20-1380 provides for guaranteed renewability of
existing coverage and does not "reasonably imply" that the ADOI can force
an insurer to terminate or non-renew existing coverage simply because the
insurer ceases to offer new coverage.

¶20 The ADOI further contends that if we do not adopt its
interpretation of A.R.S. § 20-1380, insurers will be able to remain in the
market without offering new policies. As a result, the ADOI argues that
other insurers would stop offering new insurance policies, causing severe
harm to the Arizona market. At bottom, the ADOI once again misinterprets
A.R.S. § 20-1380 as a sword for the agency to wield, when its purpose is to
shield the individual insured against loss of insurance coverage.

¶21 Finally, the ADOI contends this interpretation of the statute
leaves the agency unable to enforce the five-year market ban provision of
A.R.S. § 20-1380(E). Not so. The statute only provides that the ADOI wait
until the prerequisites of subsection D have been met before enforcing
subsection E as a deterrent to an insurer electing to non-renew existing
coverages by exiting the market.

¶22 More broadly, the ADOI's arguments ignore the separation of
powers. The "scope of an agency's power is measured by statute and may
not be expanded by agency fiat." Cochise County v. Ariz. Health Care Cost
Containment Sys., 170 Ariz. 443, 445 (App. 1991). "[A]ny excursion" beyond
what is granted by the legislature "is treated as an usurpation of
constitutional powers vested only in the major branch of government."
Hibbs, 206 Ariz. at 488, ¶ 10 (quoting Cochise Cty. v. Kirschner, 171 Ariz. 258,
261-62 (App. 1992)). If the ADOI is concerned that insurers will not offer
new policies in Arizona unless the ADOI is empowered to force insurers to
cancel existing "grandfathered" and "transitional" policies, then it should
ask the legislature to grant it such power. The ADOI's order, and the well-

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 ENTERPRISE LIFE, et al. v. ADOI
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established principle that an agency's power is dependent on a grant of
statutory authority, cannot coexist.

¶23 Because the companies have not performed the actions set
forth in A.R.S. § 20-1380(D), the companies' insureds retain the protections
of A.R.S. § 20-1380(A) against termination of their insurance. Further,
neither the plain language of the statute, nor the implied authority derived
therefrom, provide the ADOI with authority to force the companies to
terminate existing coverages and take further steps to exit the market.
Therefore, the ADOI's order requiring the companies to do so is contrary to
law and must be vacated.

CONCLUSION

¶24 We vacate the ADOI's order against the companies.

AMY M. WOOD • Clerk of the Court
FILED: AA

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