Jp Morgan v. Johnson

NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.
UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL
AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE
ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS
DIVISION ONE

JP MORGAN CHASE BANK, Plaintiff/Appellee,

v.

JOHLEN and MELISSA JOHNSON, Defendants/Appellants.

No. 1 CA-CV 19-0369
FILED 4-23-2020

Appeal from the Superior Court in Mohave County
No. L8015CV201907011
The Honorable Eric Gordon, Judge

AFFIRMED

COUNSEL

Greenburg Traurig, LLP, Phoenix
By Nicole M. Goodwin, Matthew P. Hoxsie
Counsel for Plaintiff/Appellee

Melissa Johnson, Bullhead City
Defendant/Appellant’
 JP MORGAN v. JOHNSON
Decision of the Court

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Judge Kent E. Cattani delivered the decision of the Court, in which
Presiding Judge Paul J. McMurdie and Judge Jennifer B. Campbell joined.

C A T T A N I, Judge:

¶1 Melissa Johnson appeals from the superior court’s judgment
finding her and her husband guilty of forcible detainer and awarding
JPMorgan Chase Bank, National Association (“Chase”) immediate and
exclusive possession of a residence in Bullhead, Arizona. For reasons that
follow, we affirm.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

¶2 In January 2019, Chase purchased the Johnsons’ residence at
a trustee’s sale and promptly recorded the trustee’s deed. Early the next
month, Chase mailed the Johnsons a notice to vacate and posted the notice
to their front door. The Johnsons did not leave, and Chase filed this forcible
detainer action.

¶3 The Johnsons answered the complaint and, as relevant here,
offered as an affirmative defense that Chase “[was] not the beneficiary, or
the Grantee and the Trustees Deed is void and the sale must be set aside.”
Chase then moved for judgment on the pleadings, which the Johnsons
opposed on the basis that the trustee’s sale was void.

¶4 Relying on Chase’s superior right to possession under the
trustee’s deed, the superior court found Johnson and her husband guilty of
forcible detainer and entered judgment in favor of Chase for immediate
possession of the property. Johnson appealed.

DISCUSSION

¶5 Johnson agrees that Chase purchased the property for over
$60,000 at a trustee’s sale in January 2019. Her sole argument attacks the
validity of the trustee’s sale: “[Chase] and the trustee are one in the same
and additionally they are both beneficiary, and substituted trustee,
therefore the Trustees Deed is void and the sale must be set aside because
this trustee lacked authority to conduct the sale.”

2
 JP MORGAN v. JOHNSON
Decision of the Court

¶6 But this argument addresses the merits of title and thus is
beyond the scope of a forcible detainer action. See A.R.S. § 12-1177(A) (“On
the trial of an action of . . . forcible detainer, the only issue shall be the right
of actual possession and the merits of title shall not be inquired into.”); see
also Curtis v. Morris, 186 Ariz. 534, 534 (1996). Moreover, any challenge to
the trustee’s sale must be pursued before the sale has been completed; the
trustor may not challenge the completed sale based on pre-sale objections.
See A.R.S. § 33-811(C); BT Capital, LLC v. TD Serv. Co. of Ariz., 229 Ariz. 299,
301, ¶ 11 (2012). The trustee’s deed raised a presumption that the sale
comported with statutory requirements, see A.R.S. § 33-811(B), and Johnson
has offered no basis to overcome either this presumption or waiver under
§ 33-811(C). Accordingly, we affirm the forcible detainer judgment.

CONCLUSION

¶7 Chase requests an award of attorney’s fees and costs on
appeal as a sanction under A.R.S. § 12-349 and ARCAP 25. In an exercise
of our discretion, we decline Chase’s request for attorney’s fees. As the
successful party, however, Chase is entitled to an award of costs on appeal
upon compliance with ARCAP 21. The forcible detainer judgment is
affirmed.

AMY M. WOOD • Clerk of the Court
FILED: AA

3