Pringle v. Mixon

NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.
UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL
AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE
ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS
DIVISION ONE

JOHN SCOTT PRINGLE, Plaintiff/Appellant,

v.

TERONE MIXON, Defendant/Appellee.

No. 1 CA-CV 21-0742
FILED 2-2-2023

Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County
No. CV2018-096687
The Honorable Rodrick J. Coffey, Judge

AFFIRMED

APPEARANCES

Lorona Mead, PLC, Phoenix
By Jess A. Lorona
Counsel for Appellant

Bremer Whyte Brown & O’Meara LLP, Tempe
By Adam P. Campbell, J. William VanDehei
Counsel for Defendant/Appellee
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Decision of the Court

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Judge Jennifer B. Campbell delivered the decision of the Court, in which
Presiding Judge Brian Y. Furuya and Judge Paul J. McMurdie joined.

C A M P B E L L, Judge:

¶1 John Scott Pringle appeals from a judgment in favor of Terone
Mixon following a jury verdict. He challenges several of the superior court’s
pretrial evidentiary rulings and its entry of partial summary judgment in
Mixon’s favor. For the following reasons, we affirm.

BACKGROUND1

¶2 This action arises out of a motor vehicle collision. While
driving a car for a ride-share company during predawn hours, Mixon made
a U-turn before an intersection, turning into a street’s far-right lane directly
in front of Pringle’s oncoming motorcycle. To avoid a collision, Pringle
maneuvered his motorcycle into the adjacent left lane. Once he passed
Mixon’s car, Pringle veered back through the right lane and substantially
decelerated or stopped in the bike lane, near the shoulder of the road.
Moments later, Pringle accelerated, caught up with Mixon’s car, and
matched Mixon’s speed—driving his motorcycle parallel to Mixon’s car.
Though dark out, Mixon initially could see Pringle outside his car’s
passenger window. Soon after, Mixon steered to the right, ostensibly to
make a right-hand turn, and struck the motorcycle with the rear passenger
side of his vehicle, causing Pringle to lose control and crash.

¶3 Though he did not approach Pringle or Pringle’s passenger,
Tamira Hall, after the collision, Mixon stopped and called 9-1-1, and
emergency responders soon arrived at the scene. While medical personnel
attended to Pringle, who was substantially injured, a police officer
interviewed Mixon and Hall. Based on their statements, the responding
officer cited Pringle for the collision.

1 In reviewing a grant of summary judgment, we view the facts and
the reasonable inferences drawn from those facts in the light most favorable
to the non-moving party. State Comp. Fund v. Yellow Cab Co. of Phx., 197 Ariz.
120, 122, ¶ 5 (App. 1999).

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¶4 After a secondary investigation, the State charged Pringle
with driving under the influence based on his intoxication at the time of the
collision. Pringle pled guilty, and as part of the criminal case, Mixon
requested restitution for the property damage to his vehicle and lost wages.
Mixon testified at a restitution hearing, but the superior court denied his
request, concluding that Mixon’s “own actions . . . likely contributed—in
whole or in part—to the resulting collision” and determining that “a civil
forum would better address the amount of causation and damages
attributable to each party.”

¶5 Nearly two years after the collision, Pringle filed a complaint
against Mixon, alleging Mixon negligently caused the collision and
Pringle’s resulting injuries and property damage. Apart from
compensatory damages, Pringle sought punitive damages, alleging that
Mixon’s conduct was “willful, wanton, grossly negligent and reckless.”

¶6 Mixon answered, denying liability and alleging that Pringle
negligently caused the collision. Mixon then moved for partial summary
judgment on punitive damages, arguing Pringle failed to allege facts
sufficient to support a claim that Mixon intentionally or recklessly caused
the collision. After briefing and oral argument, the superior court entered
summary judgment in Mixon’s favor on punitive damages, finding Pringle
failed to present “evidence that would allow a reasonable finder of fact to
find that [Mixon] acted intentionally or sufficiently recklessly when
[Mixon’s] car hit [Pringle’s] motorcycle.”

¶7 Before trial, both parties moved in limine to preclude various
evidence. As relevant to this appeal, Mixon moved in limine to preclude:
(1) both the restitution order and his restitution-hearing testimony from
Pringle’s criminal case; and (2) defense experts’ deposition transcripts,
reports, and affidavits “in unrelated matters.” In response, Pringle: (1)
agreed not to introduce the restitution order as evidence but reserved the
right to present Mixon’s restitution-hearing testimony for impeachment
purposes; and (2) agreed not to introduce the defense experts’ transcripts
and reports as evidence but reserved the right to present the defense
experts’ prior statements for non-collateral impeachment purposes.
Meanwhile, Pringle moved in limine to preclude evidence that he was
intoxicated at the time of the collision and later pled guilty to driving under
the influence.

¶8 After briefing and oral argument, the superior court: (1)
noted, among other things, that the parties stipulated to preclude evidence
of the restitution order and denied Mixon’s request to preclude his

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restitution-hearing testimony, agreeing that the evidence was admissible
for impeachment purposes; (2) denied Mixon’s request to preclude his
defense experts’ prior statements, finding the prior statements admissible
for non-collateral impeachment purposes; and (3) denied Pringle’s request
to preclude evidence of his intoxication and criminal conviction.

¶9 Entering a special verdict, a jury found in favor of Mixon “on
the basis that [Pringle] was under the influence of an intoxicating liquor,
and as a result of that influence, [he] was at least 50% responsible for the
accident that caused his injuries.” The superior court entered final
judgment in favor of Mixon and awarded him his costs and expert fees.
Pringle timely appealed.

DISCUSSION

¶10 To begin with, we note that Pringle failed to cite relevant
supporting authority and present developed arguments for any of his
claims on appeal. By failing to present reviewable arguments, Pringle has
waived these issues. See ARCAP 13(a)(7); see also In re Aubuchon, 233 Ariz.
62, 64–65, ¶ 6 (2013) (“[W]e consider waived those arguments not
supported by adequate explanation, citations to the record, or authority.”);
Polanco v. Indus. Comm’n of Ariz., 214 Ariz. 489, 491, ¶ 6 n.2 (App. 2007)
(noting that an appellant’s failure to develop and support an argument
waives the issue on appeal). Waiver aside, we try to discern and address
Pringle’s contentions.

I. Evidentiary Rulings

¶11 Pringle challenges several of the superior court’s evidentiary
rulings. “We review evidentiary rulings for an abuse of discretion and
generally affirm a [superior] court’s admission or exclusion of evidence
absent a clear abuse or legal error and resulting prejudice.” John C. Lincoln
Hosp. & Health Corp. v. Maricopa County, 208 Ariz. 532, 543, ¶ 33 (App. 2004).
“Prejudice will not be presumed but must be evident from the record.”
Town of Paradise Valley v. Laughlin, 174 Ariz. 484, 487 (App. 1992).

¶12 First, Pringle contends the superior court erred by granting
Mixon’s motions in limine to preclude the evidence from the restitution
hearing and defense experts’ unrelated transcripts, reports, and affidavits.
But the record reflects that the superior court’s rulings precisely tracked the
positions Pringle advanced—that the documents at issue would not be
admitted at trial, but prior statements, from both Mixon and his expert
witnesses, would be admissible for impeachment purposes. Having urged
the superior court to adopt those admissibility parameters, Pringle “may

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not upon appeal assign that action as error.” Caruthers v. Underhill, 235 Ariz.
1, 7, ¶ 23 (App. 2014) (quotation omitted).

¶13 Next, Pringle argues the superior court erred by denying his
motion in limine to preclude evidence of his intoxication at the time of the
collision and his subsequent conviction for driving under the influence.

¶14 Relevant evidence is admissible unless it is precluded by the
federal or state constitutions, an applicable statute, or rule. Ariz. R. Evid.
402. Evidence is relevant if it has “any tendency” to make a fact of
consequence in determining the action “more or less probable than it would
be without the evidence.” Ariz. R. Evid. 401. That said, even relevant
evidence “may be excluded if its probative value is substantially
outweighed by the danger of . . . unfair prejudice[.]” Ariz. R. Evid. 403.

¶15 Applying these rules, evidence of Pringle’s intoxication
tended to prove that his driving contributed to the motor vehicle collision.
Put differently, evidence that Pringle pled guilty to being “impaired to the
slightest degree,” A.R.S. § 28-1381(A)(1), coupled with uncontroverted
expert opinion from Mixon’s toxicology expert about the impaired driving
abilities of intoxicated persons generally, made Mixon’s account―that
Pringle pulled his motorcycle parallel to the car, hit the passenger-side
window with his fist, lost control of his bike, and then struck the car―more
probable. On this record, the superior court did not abuse its discretion by
implicitly finding evidence of Pringle’s intoxication both relevant and more
probative than prejudicial, and denying Pringle’s motion in limine
accordingly.

¶16 Finally, Pringle asserts the superior court erred by admitting
two videos recorded by Mixon’s vehicle’s dash-mounted camera
(dashcam), claiming Mixon edited them to remove incriminating evidence.
Admittedly, Pringle did not object to the admission of the videos at trial.
Pringle waived the issue on appeal by failing to challenge the admissibility
of the videos in the superior court. Odom v. Farmers Ins. Co. of Ariz., 216 Ariz.
530, 535, ¶ 18 (App. 2007) (“[A]rguments raised for the first time on appeal
are untimely and deemed waived.”). Even in the absence of waiver,
Pringle’s contention that the videos were edited to remove three seconds of
footage―“[t]he most important part”―is belied by the record, including his
testimony.

¶17 During his deposition, Mixon explained that his dashcam
records in “two-minute clips.” At the scene of the collision, Mixon showed
the dashcam footage of the incident―comprised of two two-minute

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videos―to a responding officer. Pringle, in turn, testified at his deposition
that three seconds were “missing” from the videos, as reflected on the
videos’ timestamps. When asked whether he recalled what happened
during the gap between the videos, Pringle repeatedly testified that Mixon
held a cell phone outside his window, presumably to record Pringle’s
activities. He also stated that the video failed to show Mixon driving on his
right side, slowing down, and then moving to his left side. Contrary to his
argument on appeal, Pringle did not testify that the time gap failed to
record an important act showing Mixon’s gross negligence or recklessness.
In fact, Pringle explained that the videos failed to capture Mixon’s
“aggressiveness” because of the dark conditions and the vehicles’ speed,
expressly denying that the purported failure was attributable to the
“missing three seconds.” In sum, Pringle failed to cite, and our review of
the record has not revealed, any evidence to support his contention that
Mixon “altered” or “suppressed” video evidence. On this record, the
superior court did not abuse its discretion by admitting Mixon’s two dash-
cam videos.2

II. Summary Judgment Ruling on Punitive Damages

¶18 Pringle next challenges the superior court’s partial summary
judgment ruling in favor of Mixon on Pringle’s claim for punitive damages.
As outlined in his brief, Pringle argues that the “missing” three seconds
from the dashcam videos showed Mixon intentionally “swerving and
hitting Pringle two separate times.”

¶19 We review de novo the superior court’s application of the law.
State Comp. Fund, 197 Ariz. at 122, ¶ 5; see also Ariz. R. Civ. P. 56(a) (“The
court shall grant summary judgment if the moving party shows that there
is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the moving party is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”). We will affirm the entry of
summary judgment “if the evidence produced in support of the defense or

2 To the extent Pringle challenges the superior court’s admission of a
redacted police officer body-camera video, the record reflects that Pringle,
not Mixon, sought those redactions. Accordingly, Pringle may not
challenge those redactions on appeal. Caruthers, 235 Ariz. at 7, ¶ 23; see also
State v. Logan, 200 Ariz. 564, 565, ¶ 9 (2001) (“If an error is invited, we do
not consider whether the alleged error is fundamental, for doing so would
run counter to the purposes of the invited error doctrine.”).

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claim has so little probative value that no reasonable person could find for
its proponent.” State Comp. Fund, 197 Ariz. at 122, ¶ 5.

¶20 To establish a claim for punitive damages, “a plaintiff must
prove by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant’s conduct was
undertaken with an evil mind.” Tritschler v. Allstate Ins. Co., 213 Ariz. 505,
517, ¶ 38 (App. 2006) (internal quotation omitted). “An evil mind can be
found either when the defendant intended to injure the plaintiff or when
the defendant consciously pursued a course of conduct knowing that it
created a substantial risk of significant harm to others.” Id. (internal
quotation omitted). “This standard is met by evidence of a defendant’s
conscious and deliberate disregard of the interests and rights of others.” Id.
(internal quotation omitted).

¶21 As discussed, Pringle’s deposition testimony contradicts his
appellate claim that a “missing” portion of the dashcam videos showed
Mixon intentionally swerving his car into the motorcycle. And Pringle cites
no other evidence to support a claim for punitive damages. Given Pringle’s
framing of the issue on appeal, we conclude the superior court did not err
by granting partial summary judgment in favor of Mixon on the claim for
punitive damages.

CONCLUSION

¶22 For all these reasons, we affirm. Mixon requests an award of
his attorneys’ fees and costs on appeal under A.R.S. § 12-349(A) (mandating
an award of attorney’s fees if a party brings a claim “without substantial
justification”) and ARCAP 25 (authorizing a sanction of attorney’s fees and
costs for a frivolous appeal).3 On this record, and in consideration of the
A.R.S. § 12-350 factors, we conclude both that Pringle brought this appeal
without substantial justification―having requested several rulings he now
challenges on appeal and offering no evidence to support his contention

3 Alternatively, Mixon requests that the court sanction Pringle by
dismissing the appeal. In our discretion, we deny this request.

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that Mixon edited the dashcam videos to remove incriminating
evidence―and that the appeal is frivolous. As a result, we award Mixon his
reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs upon compliance with ARCAP 21.

AMY M. WOOD • Clerk of the Court
FILED: AA

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