Davies v. Flury

NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.
UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL
AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE
ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS
DIVISION ONE

RUTH E. DAVIES d/b/a/ SUN CITY PROFESSIONAL BUILDING, an
individual, Plaintiff/Appellee,

v.

VAN FLURY, an individual, d/b/a CONSOLIDATED MOTORS, INC., a
dissolved Arizona corporation, Defendant/Appellant.

No. 1 CA-CV 22-0246
FILED 2-2-2023

Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County
No. CV2022-001848
The Honorable Richard F. Albrecht, Judge Pro Tempore

AFFIRMED

COUNSEL

Jennings Strouss & Salmon PLC, Phoenix
By Jimmie W. Pursell Jr., Dina G. Aouad
Counsel for Plaintiff/Appellee

Van Flury, Sun City
Defendant/Appellant

DAVIES v. FLURY
Decision of the Court

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Judge James B. Morse Jr. delivered the decision of the Court, in which
Presiding Judge Jennifer M. Perkins and Judge Michael J. Brown joined.

M O R S E, Judge:

¶1 Van Flury appeals from the superior court judgment of
forcible detainer and eviction. For the following reasons, we affirm.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

¶2 On April 1, 2019, Flury entered into a two-year lease for office
space in a multi-suite complex owned by Ruth Davies. The parties did not
renew the lease, and it terminated on March 31, 2021.

¶3 Upon expiration of the lease, Flury became a month-to-month
tenant. On November 11, 2021, Davies notified Flury that she was
terminating the month-to-month tenancy and demanded that he vacate the
premises.

¶4 Flury did not vacate the property. Instead, on November 29,
2021, he filed suit in federal court, seeking to quiet title via adverse
possession to eight parking spaces in the lot outside the office complex.

¶5 On February 14, 2022, Davies filed suit in Arizona state court,
seeking to evict Flury from the office complex. Flury moved to dismiss,
claiming the District Court had prior exclusive jurisdiction over the entire
property even though his quiet-title claim only related to the eight parking
spaces. The superior court denied Flury's motion to dismiss the entire
action but declined jurisdiction over the eight parking spaces at issue in the
federal action. Following an evidentiary hearing, the court found Flury
guilty of forcible detainer and evicted him from the rest of Davies' property.

¶6 Flury timely appealed, and we have jurisdiction under A.R.S.
§ 12-2101(A)(1).

DISCUSSION

¶7 Flury claims the superior court erred in denying his motion to
dismiss based on the prior exclusive jurisdiction doctrine. We review the

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DAVIES v. FLURY
Decision of the Court

denial of a motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction de novo.
State ex rel. Montgomery v. Mathis, 231 Ariz. 103, 109, ¶ 18 (App. 2012).

¶8 Under the prior exclusive jurisdiction doctrine, once a court
exercises in rem jurisdiction over a res, a second court is barred from
asserting in rem jurisdiction over the same res. Marshall v. Marshall, 547
U.S. 293, 311 (2006). Courts must honor prior exclusive jurisdiction
because, when an action is in rem, "the effect is to draw to the federal court
the possession or control, actual or potential, of the res, and the exercise by
the state court of jurisdiction over the same res necessarily impairs, and
may defeat, the jurisdiction of the federal court already attached." Chapman
v. Deutsche Bank Nat'l Tr. Co., 651 F.3d 1039, 1043 (9th Cir. 2011) (quoting
Kline v. Burke Constr. Co., 260 U.S. 226, 229 (1922)).

¶9 But prior exclusive jurisdiction does not apply when two
actions seek to determine the rights of the same parties to two different
pieces of property. See id. at 1044 (noting that the doctrine attaches when
parallel proceedings seek to determine interests in specific property or
where the parties' interest in that property serve as the basis of jurisdiction).
Flury's federal complaint sought to quiet title only as to eight parking
spaces in the community lot outside of the building. The superior court
excluded that property from its ruling. Accordingly, there was no potential
for conflict, and the superior court did not err in denying Flury's motion to
dismiss.

¶10 Because Davies is the prevailing party in this action, we grant
her request for reasonable attorney fees and costs upon compliance with
ARCAP 21.

CONCLUSION

¶11 For the above-stated reasons, we affirm the decision of the
superior court and award Davies her reasonable attorney fees and costs on
appeal.

AMY M. WOOD • Clerk of the Court
FILED: AA

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