Helmer v. Padilla

NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.
UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL
AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE
ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS
DIVISION ONE

EMILY HELMER, Plaintiff/Appellee,

v.

FRANCISCO PADILLA, et al., Defendants/Appellants.

No. 1 CA-CV 22-0507
FILED 5-9-2023

Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County
No. CV2022-090805
Hassayampa Justice Court
No. CC2022013477EA
The Honorable Brian Kaiser, Judge Pro Tempore

AFFIRMED

COUNSEL

Evans Dove Nelson Fish & Grier, PLC, Mesa
By Douglas N. Nelson, H. Lee Dove, Trevor J. Fish
Counsel for Plaintiff/Appellee

Law Offices of Kenneth P. Bemis, Phoenix
By Kenneth P. Bemis
Counsel for Defendants/Appellants
 HELMER v. PADILLA, et al.
Decision of the Court

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Judge Angela K. Paton delivered the decision of the Court, in which
Presiding Judge Jennifer M. Perkins and Judge D. Steven Williams joined.

P A T O N, Judge:

¶1 Francisco Padilla and Veronica Hunt (“Occupants”) appeal a
superior court judgment finding them guilty of special/forcible detainer in
favor of Emily Helmer (“Owner”). For the following reasons, we affirm.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶2 We view facts in the light most favorable to affirming the
superior court's ruling. Hammoudeh v. Jada, 222 Ariz. 570, 571, ¶ 2 (App.
2009). Occupants rented a home from Owner for several years. In August
2021, Occupants and Owner signed a one-month lease agreement that
would automatically continue on a month-to-month basis with the same
terms and conditions. The agreement provided that either party could
terminate the agreement by providing thirty days’ notice to the other party
after the initial one-month term ended.

¶3 Owner timely mailed a “Notice of Nonrenewal of Lease
Agreement” by certified mail to Occupants at the home and to their
attorney at his office, informing them that their tenancy would end in
November 2021. The certified mailings were returned to Owner as
unclaimed a few days later. Occupants remained on the property past
November 2021, and attempted to continue paying rent, but Owner refused
to accept the payments and filed a forcible entry and detainer (“FED”)
action in justice court in January 2022.

¶4 The action was transferred to the superior court at Occupants’
request, and the superior court held a hearing on June 14, 2022. Occupants
requested a jury trial, but the court found that they had not set forth a
defense that warranted a trial and issued a signed judgment finding
Occupants guilty of forcible detainer. The court found that Occupants had
wrongfully remained in possession of the property since November 2021
and awarded Owner immediate possession of the property, a writ of
restitution, rent and late fees, willful holdover damages, post-judgment
interest, court costs, and $2,500 in attorneys’ fees. After a hearing, the court

2
 HELMER v. PADILLA, et al.
Decision of the Court

granted the Occupants’ request to stay execution on the judgment and
issuance of the writ of restitution conditioned on the Occupants’ posting of
a supersedeas bond, their continual payment of rent as it became due, and
their prosecution of a promised appeal to its conclusion.

¶5 Plaintiff timely appealed. We have jurisdiction pursuant to
Article Six, Section 9, of the Arizona Constitution, Arizona Revised Statutes
(“A.R.S.”) Sections 12-2101(A)(1), -120.21(A)(1), and -1182(A).

DISCUSSION

¶6 Occupants contend that the superior court erred in its
application of Rules 11(c) and (e) of the Arizona Rules of Eviction Procedure
and Section 12-1176(B) by denying their request for a jury trial before
issuing its FED judgment. They claim the court abused its discretion by
finding no material fact in dispute that would require a jury trial. They also
argue the attorneys’ fees awarded to Owner were excessive.

¶7 Occupants briefly mention they also appeal the court’s
subsequent supersedeas bond ruling. But their briefing contains no
argument or support for this challenge, so they have waived this argument.
See Ariz. R. Civ. App. P. 13(a)(7) (Opening brief must contain contentions
concerning each issue presented for review, with support.); In re Aubuchon,
233 Ariz. 62, 64–65, ¶ 6 (2013) (considering all inadequately supported
arguments waived); Ritchie v. Krasner, 221 Ariz. 288, 305, ¶¶ 61-62 (App.
2009) (same).

I. The superior court did not err when it denied Occupants’ request
for a jury trial.

¶8 Occupants claim they were entitled to a jury trial in the FED
action under Eviction Rule 11 and Section 12-1176(B) because they raised
genuine issues of material fact. A FED action is a statutory proceeding
intended to provide a “summary, speedy and adequate means” for the
person entitled to possession of the property to obtain actual possession.
Heywood v. Ziol, 91 Ariz. 309, 311 (1962). The right of actual possession is
the only issue in a FED action, and “the merits of title shall not be inquired
into.” A.R.S. § 12-1177(A). A person is guilty of forcible detainer if she
willfully holds over any real property after her lease expires and her
landlord demands possession of the property in writing. A.R.S.
§§ 12-1171(3), -1173(1).

¶9 Section 12-1176(B) provides that a defendant in a FED action
may request a jury trial “on appearing and the request shall be granted.”

3
 HELMER v. PADILLA, et al.
Decision of the Court

But Eviction Rule 11(c) only requires a trial in a FED action if the court
determines that “a defense or proper counterclaim may exist.” Further,
even when a party requests a jury trial, Rule 11(e) provides for disposition
of a FED matter by bench trial, motion, or otherwise “in accordance with
[the FED] rules, as appropriate.”

¶10 We resolved the apparent tension between the statutory
mandate to grant a jury trial at either party’s request with Eviction Rule 11’s
summary disposition absent a jury trial in Montano v. Luff, 250 Ariz. 401
(App. 2020). There, we held that Rule 11(e) (since renumbered from
“11(d)”) is analogous to the rule authorizing summary judgment in civil
cases despite a party’s request for jury trial. Montano, 250 Ariz. at 406, ¶ 16;
see Ariz. R. Civ. P. 56. Just as disposition by summary judgment does not
“deprive a plaintiff of his constitutional rights to a jury trial” when there
are no genuine issues of fact for a jury to consider, summary disposition
under Eviction Rule 11(e) similarly does not violate the statutory right to
trial by jury in FED actions. Montano, 250 Ariz. at 406, ¶ 16 (quoting Cagle
v. Carlson, 146 Ariz. 292, 298 (App. 1985) for constitutionality of summary
judgment).

¶11 Occupants argue that material factual disputes exist as to their
claimed status as “parties with an option to purchase” as opposed to
“tenants,” whether a month-to-month tenancy existed, and whether the
eviction proceeding was “retaliatory to impede the option to purchase.”
Specifically, they contend that an earlier purchase-option agreement from
2016 that was not referenced or discussed in the 2021 lease agreement
controlled the relationship between the parties as to the property. Inquiry
into the existence of and rights flowing from an alleged “option to
purchase,” however, is an inquiry into title forbidden by the FED statutes.
See Taylor v. Stanford, 100 Ariz. 346, 348 (1966) (holding that a plaintiff could
not use a FED action to enforce an alleged purchase contract because
proving its validity would impermissibly focus on title in a “full-blown trial
for specific performance”); A.R.S. § 12-1177(A) (forbidding inquiring into
the merits of title in a FED action). Thus, the only alleged factual dispute
that would require a jury trial would have to involve Occupants’ right to
possession.

¶12 The court considered the parties’ signed month-to-month
lease, as well as evidence that Owner provided adequate notice of that
lease’s termination. Occupants did not dispute the existence of the lease
agreement or challenge the adequacy of notice of its termination. They only
disputed the validity of the lease agreement by alleging they had signed it

4
 HELMER v. PADILLA, et al.
Decision of the Court

under duress, which the court rejected. Occupants raised no alternative
ground for a right to possess the property.

¶13 Even if the lease agreement were invalid, Occupants would
have possessed the property under a statutory month-to-month lease. See
A.R.S. § 33-1314(B)–(D) (providing that in the absence of a written
agreement a residential tenancy exists month-to-month for which the
tenant pays fair rental value). Thus, under either scenario, a month-to-
month tenancy existed and there was no dispute over whether Owner
complied with its notice requirements. See A.R.S. § 33-1375(B)–(C) (notice
requirements for terminating month-to-month tenancy).

¶14 In sum, pursuant to Montano and the Eviction Rules, the
superior court did not abuse its discretion in denying Occupants’ request
for a jury trial. It examined Occupants’ claimed factual disputes and
concluded they related solely to title, not possession, of the property—the
latter of which is the sole subject of a FED action. The superior court’s
denial of Occupants’ request for a jury trial therefore implied a finding of
no material dispute of fact between the parties. See Montano, 250 Ariz. at
406, ¶ 14 (finding implicit determination of no factual defense to a FED
complaint when superior court finds FED matter not subject to jury trial).

II. The superior court did not award excessive attorneys’ fees to
Owner.

¶15 Occupants do not dispute that Owner is entitled to attorneys’
fees if we affirm the judgment but argue that we should reduce the $2,500
in fees awarded to Owner. Eviction Rule 13(f) requires the court to award
“[r]easonable” attorneys’ fees “to the prevailing party if the court
determines that such fees are provided for by statute or in a written
contract.” We review an attorneys’ fees award for an abuse of discretion.
Sunland Dairy LLC v. Milky Way Dairy LLC, 251 Ariz. 64, 70, ¶ 28 (App. 2021).

¶16 The actual billing rate a lawyer charges in a particular matter
is the “beginning point” for determining the reasonableness of a fee because
“in corporate and commercial litigation between fee-paying clients, . . . the
rate charged . . . is the best indication of what is reasonable under the
circumstances of the particular case.” Schweiger v. China Doll Restaurant,
Inc., 138 Ariz. 183, 187–88 (App. 1983). But a court may use a lower rate
when an opposing party sets forth reasons why the actual rate was
unreasonable, id. at 188. That rate may then be applied to hours expended
that “would have been undertaken by a reasonable and prudent lawyer to
advance or protect his client’s interest.” Id. at 188 (citation omitted).

5
 HELMER v. PADILLA, et al.
Decision of the Court

¶17 Here, Owner’s attorney explained on the record that he
charged $350 per hour for work on the FED proceeding and that he had
spent approximately seven hours on it. The superior court found the $2,500
request to be reasonable, limited the award to that amount, and did not
require Owner to file a China Doll affidavit—the production and filing of
which, the court noted, would have entitled Owner to additional fee
recovery from the Occupants. Under these circumstances, the superior
court did not abuse its discretion in awarding Owner $2,500 in attorneys’
fees.

¶18 Owner also requests attorneys’ fees on appeal. We grant
Owner’s reasonable attorneys’ fees on appeal pursuant to
Section 12-1178(A) and, as the prevailing party, her reasonable costs on
appeal upon compliance with Arizona Rule of Civil Appellate Procedure
21(b).

CONCLUSION

¶19 We affirm.

AMY M. WOOD • Clerk of the Court
FILED: AA

6