Reynolds v. Walker

NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.
UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL
AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE
ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS
DIVISION ONE

In re the Marriage of:

MITCHELL GENE REYNOLDS, Petitioner/Appellee,

v.

TAMARA LYNN WALKER, Respondent/Appellant.

No. 1 CA-CV 22-0711 FC
FILED 8-22-2023

Appeal from the Superior Court in Yavapai County
No. P1300DO202200152
The Honorable Cele Hancock, Judge

AFFIRMED IN PART; REMANDED IN PART

APPEARANCES

Mitchell Gene Reynolds, Prescott Valley
Petitioner/Appellee

Tamara Lynn Walker, Prescott Valley
Respondent/Appellant
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Decision of the Court

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Presiding Judge D. Steven Williams delivered the Court’s decision, in
which Judge Samuel A. Thumma and Judge Paul J. McMurdie joined.

W I L L I A M S, Judge:

¶1 Tamara Walker (“Wife”) appeals two provisions of the
superior court’s divorce decree: (1) the denial of her request for spousal
maintenance and (2) the division of community debt. For the following
reasons, we affirm the denial of spousal maintenance but remand the issue
of a specific debt to allow the court to assign the remaining debt equitably
between the parties.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY1

¶2 Wife and Mitchell Reynolds (“Husband”) married in 2007 and
divorced in 2022 (though they had been together for more than four
decades, have adult children together, and grandchildren). During the
marriage, Husband was the primary breadwinner—working construction
as a self-employed subcontractor installing marble. Wife worked for the
State of Arizona for about a decade until she qualified for and began
receiving Social Security Disability Insurance (“SSDI”) benefits in 2012.

¶3 Before trial, the superior court awarded Wife temporary
spousal maintenance of $600.00 monthly. Two months later, Husband was
diagnosed with Parkinson’s disease and stopped working.

¶4 At trial, Husband opposed Wife’s request for continued
spousal maintenance, testifying that the Parkinson’s disease prevented him
from working as a marble installer. Husband said that he “want[ed] to
work” and had applied for a job driving “RVs back and forth” but had not
yet heard back. He also testified that Wife was “as capable [of working] as
[him],” just “in a different field” like “computer work” because Wife had
“been doing a lot of computer work with [Husband’s] accounts.”

1 Though Father did not file an answering brief, in our discretion we decline

to regard this as a concession of error. Thompson v. Thompson, 217 Ariz. 524,
526, ¶ 6 n.1 (App. 2008)

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¶5 Wife testified that, besides her SSDI benefits, she earned $100
weekly babysitting her grandkids. With the grandkids starting back at
school, however, Wife wasn’t sure how her income might change. When
asked by the court whether she could work part-time, Wife stated, “I don’t
think so. I really don’t.” Later in the trial, the court pressed the issue, and
Wife responded, “I mean, I—I could probably try.” As for Husband’s ability
to work with his recent Parkinson’s diagnosis, Wife testified that “with
[Husband’s] experience on his job that he could get a—like a supervisor
. . . project manager [position or] something like that.”

¶6 The superior court found that Wife was eligible for spousal
maintenance under A.R.S. § 25-319(A)(1) (lacking “sufficient property . . .
to provide for” her “reasonable needs”) but decided against any award
because of Husband’s “Parkinson’s disease, which will preclude him from
earning income in the marketplace,” and because “Wife has earning ability
sufficient to support herself.”

¶7 As for community debt, the court determined it was
“unclear” which debts were incurred during the marriage and, therefore,
treated all debts as community debt. The court chose not to divide the
delinquent debts that had gone to collections. But of the remaining
community debts, the court ordered that “both parties are equally
responsible” and that Wife provide Husband with all necessary
information for him “to pay one-half the payments . . . each month until the
debt[s] [are] paid off.”

¶8 Wife timely appealed. We have jurisdiction under Article 6,
Section 9, of the Arizona Constitution and A.R.S. §§ 12-120.21(A)(1) and
-2101(A)(1).

DISCUSSION

I. Spousal Maintenance

¶9 We review the superior court’s denial of spousal maintenance
for an abuse of discretion and will affirm the decision if reasonable evidence
supports it. Helland v. Helland, 236 Ariz. 197, 202, ¶ 22 (App. 2014).

¶10 A court may award maintenance to either spouse after
following a two-step process. First, the court must determine whether the
requesting spouse is eligible for an award by analyzing five eligibility
factors listed in A.R.S. § 25-319(A). The court considers each factor as it
applies to the spouse requesting maintenance. In Re Marriage of Cotter and
Podhorez, 245 Ariz. 82, 85, ¶ 7 (App. 2018). If the court determines the

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requesting spouse is eligible for maintenance, the court then considers the
factors in A.R.S. § 25-319(B) to determine whether the spouse is entitled to
an award, including the amount and duration of the award. Id.; see also
Sherman v. Sherman, 241 Ariz. 110, 114, ¶ 17 (App. 2016); Helland, 236 Ariz.
at 203, ¶ 28. The court need not consider every factor under A.R.S.
§ 25-319(B), but neglecting to consider relevant factors can constitute an
abuse of discretion. Rainwater v. Rainwater, 177 Ariz. 500, 502 (App. 1993).

¶11 Here, the court determined that Wife was eligible for spousal
maintenance under A.R.S. § 25-319(A)(1) because she lacked sufficient
property, including property apportioned to her, to provide for her
reasonable needs. The court also, apparently, considered Father’s eligibility
for an award because the court found that “there is little property to be
divided between [both] parties” and that “[n]either party ha[d] any
property that would provide any passive income to either of them to assist
in providing for their reasonable needs.” Record evidence supports the
court’s finding as to both parties.

¶12 Despite Wife’s eligibility for spousal maintenance, the court
determined Wife was not entitled to an award. And while the court made
no express findings under A.R.S. § 25-319(B), it impliedly considered at
least some factors it was required to when it found (1) that Husband’s
Parkinsons’ disease “preclude[d] [him] from earning his previous salary,”
from continuing “in his current profession,” or even “from earning income
in the marketplace,” and (2) that “Wife ha[d] earning ability sufficient to
support herself.” The court impliedly considered at least the following
factors under A.R.S. § 25-319(B): subsection (B)(4) directing courts to
consider the “ability of the spouse from whom maintenance is sought to
meet that spouse’s needs while meeting those of the spouse seeking
maintenance”; subsection (B)(5) considering the “comparative financial
resources of the spouses, including their comparative earning abilities in
the labor market”; and subsection (B)(9) considering the “financial
resources of the party seeking maintenance, including marital property
apportioned to that spouse, and that spouse’s ability to meet that spouse’s
own needs independently.”

¶13 Husband and Wife presented conflicting evidence on these
factors, and the superior court seemingly found Husband more credible.
Because “[w]e defer to the superior court’s ‘determination of witnesses’
credibility and the weight to give conflicting evidence,” Nia v. Nia, 242 Ariz.
419, 423-24, ¶ 14 (App. 2017), on this record, Wife has not shown that the
court abused its discretion.

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II. Community Debts

¶14 Wife also argues that the superior court erred in dividing
community debts. Any debt obtained by one spouse during marriage is
presumed to be community debt. Hammett v, Hammett, 247 Ariz. 556, 562,
¶ 29 (App. 2019). We review the division of community debts for an abuse
of discretion. Id. at 559, ¶ 13. A court abuses its discretion when its findings
lack support from evidence in the record. Brucklier v. Brucklier, 253 Ariz. 579,
582, ¶ 10 (App. 2022).

¶15 Wife specifically challenges the court’s determination that a
debt from the West Yavapai Guidance Clinic (“WYGC”) was in collections
and, consequently, not assigned to either party by the court. At trial, Wife
testified she incurred the WYGC debt in 2018 and stated that she was still
making payments at the time of trial. No contrary evidence was presented.
Thus, nothing in the record supports the court’s determination that this
debt was in collections. To the contrary, the only evidence presented was
that the monthly debt payments were current and that the debt was
incurred during the marriage. The court should have equitably assigned the
debt to one or both parties. Failing to do so constituted an abuse of
discretion. We therefore remand the matter to the superior court to treat the
WYGC debt as a community debt and assign the remaining obligation
between the parties equitably.

CONCLUSION

¶16 We affirm the superior court’s denial of spousal maintenance.
We remand the issue of the WYGC debt to allow the court to assign the
remaining debt equitably between the parties.

AMY M. WOOD • Clerk of the Court
FILED: AA

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