Laney v. Springerville

NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.
UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL
AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE
ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS
DIVISION ONE

STEPHENIE LANEY, Plaintiff/Appellant,

v.

TOWN OF SPRINGERVILLE TOWN COUNCIL; COUNCILMAN
RICHARD DAVID; COUNCILMAN DOUGLAS HENDERSON;
COUNCILMAN ROBERT MACKENZIE; COUNCILMAN DON
SCOTT; MAYOR PHIL HANSON, JR.; TOWN MANAGER
CHRISTOPHER COLLOPY; and ZONING ADMINISTRATOR
MICHAEL LARISH, Defendants/Appellees.

No. 1 CA-CV 23-0019
FILED 11-7-2023

Appeal from the Superior Court in Apache County
No. S0100CV202200142
The Honorable Garrett L. Whiting, Judge Pro Tempore

APPEAL DISMISSED

COUNSEL

Stephenie Laney, Springerville
Plaintiff/Appellant

Sims Mackin, Phoenix
By Kristin M. Mackin
Counsel for Defendants/Appellees
 LANEY v. SPRINGERVILLE, et al.
Decision of the Court

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Judge Michael S. Catlett delivered the decision of the Court, in which
Presiding Judge David D. Weinzweig and Judge Maria Elena Cruz joined.

C A T L E T T, Judge:

¶1 Stephenie Laney (“Laney”) appeals the superior court’s
dismissal of her complaint against the Town of Springerville Town Council
and others (collectively, the “Council”). Because the superior court
dismissed Laney’s complaint without prejudice, we lack jurisdiction and
dismiss this appeal.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶2 Laney filed a complaint in the superior court alleging that, in
2021, the Council voted on whether to re-zone certain property. The vote
ended in a tie. Nine months later, the Council voted again. The re-zoning
measure passed. Laney alleged this second vote violated town ordinances
in various ways.

¶3 The Council asked the superior court to dismiss Laney’s
complaint for lack of standing and failure to serve a notice of claim. Laney
responded, arguing the Council’s motion “focus[ed] on the nuisance to the
property not the lack of proper procedures being questioned.” The superior
court agreed with the Council and dismissed the complaint. But in so
doing, the superior court did not indicate whether the dismissal was with
(or without) prejudice or include language required to make the order final.
Laney still appealed.

¶4 Realizing the dismissal order lacked finality language, this
Court stayed the appeal for the superior court to enter a new order
containing that language. And anticipating that finality language may still
be insufficient to vest appellate jurisdiction, this Court warned that it “does
not express an opinion on whether . . . the order is substantively
appealable.” The superior court entered a new dismissal order containing
finality language but making clear that the dismissal was without prejudice.
This Court then lifted the stay.

2
 LANEY v. SPRINGERVILLE, et al.
Decision of the Court

DISCUSSION

¶5 Although the Council does not challenge our jurisdiction, “we
are obligated to examine our jurisdiction over an appeal” and to dismiss
when we lack jurisdiction. Kool Radiators, Inc. v. Evans, 229 Ariz. 532, 534
¶ 8 (App. 2012) (alterations and citation omitted). “The general rule is that
an appeal lies only from a final judgment.” Davis v. Cessna Aircraft Corp., 168 Ariz. 301, 304 (App. 1991); see also A.R.S. § 12-2101. A complaint
dismissed “without prejudice” is not a “final, appealable order.” Kool
Radiators, Inc., 229 Ariz. at 534 ¶ 8. Rule 54(c) finality language “does not
render an otherwise non-appealable order or judgment appealable as a final
judgment.” Brumett v. MGA Home Healthcare, L.L.C., 240 Ariz. 420, 426 ¶ 6
(App. 2016).

¶6 There is one potential exception to the general rule: this Court
has jurisdiction when a dismissal without prejudice “in effect determines
the action and prevents judgment from which an appeal might be taken.”
A.R.S. § 12-2101(A)(3). The superior court did not deny Laney leave to
amend her complaint. See Robert Schalkenbach Found. v. Lincoln Found., Inc.,
208 Ariz. 176, 179–80 ¶¶ 6, 13 (App. 2004) (finding jurisdiction when the
trial court dismissed without prejudice but refused to grant leave to
amend). And we cannot independently conclude that Laney’s legal claims
are time-barred or that the superior court’s order would otherwise prevent
a future appealable judgment. See Osuna v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 214 Ariz.
286, 290 ¶ 11 n.4 (App. 2007) (declining to adopt a rule that jurisdiction vests
in dismissal without prejudice when claims are otherwise time barred
because the statute of limitations is not jurisdictional, can be waived, and
the court would be “rais[ing] an affirmative defense on a defendant’s
behalf”); McMurray v. Dream Catcher USA, Inc., 220 Ariz. 71, 74 ¶ 4 (App.
2009) (dismissing appeal when appellants did “not argue the statute of
limitations barred the refiling of any of the claims”).

CONCLUSION

¶7 We dismiss this appeal for lack of jurisdiction.

AMY M. WOOD • Clerk of the Court
FILED: AA

3