In Re Term of Parental Rights as to C.C. and N.N.

NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.
UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL
AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE
ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS
DIVISION ONE

IN RE TERMINATION OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO C.C. and N.N.

No. 1 CA-JV 23-0069
FILED 10-05-2023
AMENDED PER ORDER FILED 10-05-2023

Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County
No. JS20878
The Honorable Julie Ann Mata, Judge

AFFIRMED

COUNSEL

Thomas Vierling Attorney at Law, Phoenix
By Thomas A. Vierling
Counsel for Appellant Mother

Arizona Attorney General’s Office, Phoenix
By Bailey Leo
Counsel for Appellee Department of Child Safety
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MEMORANDUM DECISION

Judge Daniel J. Kiley delivered the decision of the Court, in which Vice
Chief Judge Randall M. Howe and Judge Jennifer M. Perkins joined.

K I L E Y, Judge:

¶1 Teresa N. (“Mother”) appeals the juvenile court’s order
terminating her parental rights to C.C. and N.N. For the following reasons,
we affirm.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶2 Mother, who struggles with mental illness and mental
deficiency, has three children, E.N., born in 2018; C.C., born in 2019; and
N.N., born in 2021. Mother’s involvement with the Department of Child
Safety (“DCS”) began shortly after E.N. was born when she disclosed to her
physician that she was “having command hallucinations to hurt the baby.”
DCS removed E.N. from Mother’s care and placed him with his father,
Aaron C., who then initiated family court proceedings. Although the
outcome of the family court proceedings is not clear from the record,
Mother later reported that she is not “able to have any contact or
relationship with [E.N.]”

¶3 In December 2019, DCS received a report that C.C.’s father
Stephon C. (“Father”) had physically abused Mother in C.C.’s presence and
that Mother was neglecting to feed C.C. About a week later, C.C. was
admitted to the hospital for “poor oral intake, vomiting, a viral infection,
and a [urinary tract infection].” There, a DCS investigator spoke with
Mother, who confirmed that Father had been violent and “choked” her on
various occasions. Mother also disclosed that Father had “snap[ped] and
“yell[ed]” at C.C., threatening to break her arms. When the DCS
investigator asked Mother if C.C. was “behind . . . with her doctor’s visits
or immunizations,” Mother replied that she wasn’t sure. Mother also
reported that she “had been diagnosed with schizophrenia and bipolar
disorder” but that she was not taking medication. At that time, Mother and
C.C. were living at a domestic violence shelter; Mother reported that she
had no family or friends to provide support, claiming that her family
“abuses babies.”

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¶4 DCS removed C.C. from Mother’s care. Because Mother was
unable to identify a family member who could serve as placement, DCS
placed C.C. with a foster mother. Shortly thereafter, the DCS case manager
referred Mother for services, including psychological evaluations,
individual counseling with a domestic-violence component, parent aide
services, parenting classes, and visitation.

¶5 Mother missed some of her scheduled visits with C.C. and
arrived late to others. Although visitation supervisors noted that Mother
“show[ed] love towards” C.C. during visits, they also reported that she
“need[ed] constant guidance when handling and caring for” the child.
Mother had to be repeatedly reminded, for example, to keep one hand on
C.C. when changing her diaper on the changing table so that she could not
roll off and fall to the floor. Mother also exhibited difficulty controlling her
emotions, and, despite being “reminded to practice her ability to self
sooth,” would “scream[]” and “yell[]” when “upset.”

¶6 Dr. Stephanie Leonard conducted a “psychological
evaluation” of Mother in March 2020 “to assess for mental deficiencies or
personality/psychological factors that may impact her ability to adequately
care” for C.C. During the evaluation, Mother reported that she had been
“diagnosed . . . with schizophrenia” but “didn’t need” her prescribed
medication and so “never took” it. Mother also acknowledged, however,
that she hears “voices” and things that she knows “are not real,” adding
that the “voices get worse” when she is “stressed.”

¶7 Dr. Leonard diagnosed Mother with schizophrenia,
“Unspecified Depressive Disorder,” a “mild” intellectual disability, and
mild alcohol and cannabis use disorders “[i]n sustained remission.” She
determined that Mother lacks insight into her limitations and likely has
trouble regulating her emotions and coping with stress. Opining that
Mother’s conditions greatly affect her parenting ability, Dr. Leonard
determined that Mother’s ability to safely parent C.C. in the foreseeable
future was poor. Dr. Leonard recommended that Mother complete a
psychiatric evaluation, “maintain compliance” with her “medication
regimen,” and participate in parent aide services as well as “individual
therapy with at least a master’s level therapist.”

¶8 DCS referred Mother for all of the services Dr. Leonard
recommended, but Mother struggled to meaningfully participate or
progress in most of them. For example, although DCS referred Mother to
individual counseling with a master’s level therapist, she did not attend any
sessions. At regularly scheduled parenting skills sessions, Mother was

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“distracted,” “seemed to have trouble remembering things” that were
discussed during the sessions, and often failed to engage. After completing
her first round of parenting skills sessions in August 2020, Mother “ha[d]
not shown progress” in developing her parenting abilities. In the discharge
report, the visitation supervisor noted that Mother had an emotional bond
with C.C. but needed substantial guidance in caring for her. Accordingly,
the supervisor recommended additional parent aide services for Mother.

¶9 Consistent with this recommendation, DCS referred Mother
to parent aide services for a second time. Unfortunately, Mother struggled
to attend the skill sessions consistently, often failing to arrive on time or
cancelling at the last minute. In February 2021, the visitation supervisor
reported that Mother’s “protective capacities” had not increased and that
Mother “need[ed] to gain more impulse control in regards to her emotions
and anger.” During her visits with C.C., Mother sometimes struggled to
properly care for C.C. One time, for instance, she had C.C. drink water
directly from a water bottle, which is “not safe” for a child C.C.’s age and
caused her to “choke.” Mother also failed to show up for a number of
scheduled visits with little to no notice to the parent aide, attributing her
last-minute cancellations to varied reasons that included delays in bus
service, a break-in at her apartment, and a “SWAT team kick[ing] her door
in.”

¶10 In March 2021, Mother gave birth to N.N. at home. When
Mother and N.N. were brought to the hospital later that day, Mother
“struggled to provide a clear explanation as to why” she gave birth at home.
Hospital staff had difficulty “following [Mother’s] train of thought and
speech to gather information” from her. Staff later reported that Mother
was “minimizing” her seriously mentally ill (“SMI”) status and
“experiencing underlying delusions.” At one point, Mother reported that
“her 4 year old son,” an apparent reference to E.N., “was dead.” When
asked about psychiatric treatment, Mother stated she had been receiving
treatment but “stopped” because it was “fraudulent.”

¶11 DCS removed N.N. from Mother’s care and, because N.N.’s
paternity has never been determined, placed him with C.C.’s foster mother.

¶12 In May 2021, DCS moved to terminate Mother’s parental
rights under the mental illness/mental deficiency ground as to both
children and the 15-month out-of-home placement ground as to C.C. See
A.R.S. § 8-533(B)(3), (B)(8)(c).

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¶13 Mother had “very minimal contact” with DCS in late 2021 and
the first several months of 2022, and her visitation with the children lapsed.
When Mother began to re-engage in services in May 2022, DCS referred her
for a second psychological evaluation and to the Nurturing Parenting
Program (“NPP”), which provides parenting classes, coaching, and
one-on-one evaluations. Mother reported that she had self-referred to
therapy with a provider called “Mama Bear,” which DCS later learned
provides virtual support group services and parenting classes. DCS
received no information about the frequency or extent of Mother’s
participation with Mama Bear.

¶14 Mother resumed visitation with C.C. and N.N., and the
visitation supervisors reported concerns about her parenting. “[M]any
times,” they reported, a supervisor had to “intervene due to safety
concerns” such as “leaving [N.N.] unattended on the couch” and “not
understanding why this is unsafe.”

¶15 During a psychological evaluation with Dr. James Thal in
May 2022, Mother acknowledged her need for mental health counseling,
describing, for example, visual hallucinations she experienced of “a woman
in a bloody dress.” Mother also admitted that, despite her need for mental
health services, she was not meaningfully participating in any services
apart from visitation. She further stated that her three children had been
removed from her care due to “false reports.” Dr. Thal noted that Mother’s
“thoughts seemed disorganized” and he found it “very difficult” to “elicit
a direct answer” from her. Moreover, Mother “seemed confused about
children’s basic medical and nutritional needs.” When asked, for example,
how often a child should have a dental appointment, Mother responded,
“[t]wice a week.”

¶16 After interviewing Mother, conducting some assessments,
and reviewing relevant records, Dr. Thal determined that Mother “suffers
from severe and persisting mental disorders including cognitive deficiency
and severe mental illness.” He concluded that Mother was unstable with
“significant cognitive deficits which . . . make[s] it very difficult for her to
learn, retain, recall, and implement parenting skills and knowledge.” He
noted that Mother’s “grasp of reality is significantly altered at times” and
that, even when psychiatrically stable, she is likely “to be disorganized,
distracted, and preoccupied.” Dr. Thal opined that Mother is not capable of
independently parenting a child and that her prognosis for being able to
safely parent in the near future was poor due to “severe and persisting
mental disorders including cognitive deficiency and severe mental illness.”

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He recommended that she participate in ongoing psychiatric care and take
her prescribed medication consistently.

¶17 Mother’s first NPP referral ended in August 2022; however,
upon her request, the DCS case manager “submitted a renewal for her
NPP.” When Mother expressed dissatisfaction with the newly-assigned
NPP provider, the DCS case manager accommodated Mother’s concerns by
arranging for NPP to assign a different provider. This provider had
difficulty contacting Mother, who did not return phone calls or text
messages and was not home when the provider went to meet her there.
Although the provider was later able to contact Mother by phone for a
parent session, ultimately the NPP referral was closed out due to the lack
of further contact.

¶18 After a trial, the juvenile court issued a lengthy and detailed
ruling finding that DCS had met its burden of establishing grounds for
termination and that termination was in the children’s best interest. The
court therefore terminated Mother’s parental rights to C.C. and N.N.
Mother appealed. This Court has jurisdiction under A.R.S. § 8-235(A).

DISCUSSION

¶19 Mother argues that the court erred by (1) not ordering a
guardianship for the children in lieu of termination, (2) finding that DCS
offered services to her that complied with the Americans with Disabilities
Act (“ADA”), 42 U.S.C. § 12101, and (3) finding termination was in the
children’s best interests.

¶20 A parent’s right to custody and control of his or her child,
though fundamental, is not absolute. Michael J. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec.,
196 Ariz. 246, 248, ¶¶ 11-12 (2000). The parental relationship may be
terminated if the juvenile court finds, by clear and convincing evidence, at
least one statutory ground for termination under A.R.S. § 8-533(B) and
finds, by a preponderance of the evidence, that termination is in the child’s
best interest. Timothy B. v. Dep’t of Child Safety, 252 Ariz. 470, 474, ¶ 13 (2022).
We view evidence in the light most favorable to sustaining the juvenile
court’s findings, Manuel M. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 218 Ariz. 205, 207, ¶ 2
(App. 2008), and we will affirm an order terminating parental rights absent
an abuse of discretion, Mary Lou C. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 207 Ariz. 43,
47, ¶ 8 (App. 2004).

¶21 We will “accept the juvenile court’s findings of fact if
reasonable evidence and inferences support them,” Demetrius L. v. Joshlynn
F., 239 Ariz. 1, 3, ¶ 9 (2016), and we will affirm the court’s legal conclusions

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unless clearly erroneous. Brionna v. Dep’t of Child Safety, ___ Ariz. ___, ___,
¶ 31, 533 P.3d 202, 209-10 (2023).

A. Mother’s Claim Under Arizona’s Parents’ Bill of Rights

¶22 Mother argues that the juvenile court erred by terminating
her parental rights instead of appointing a guardian for the children. In
support of her position, Mother cites Arizona’s Parents’ Bill of Rights,
A.R.S. §§ 1-601 to 1-602, which provides in part that no “governmental
entity” shall “infringe on” parents’ “fundamental right” to “direct” their
children’s upbringing “without demonstrating” a “compelling
governmental interest” of “the highest order” that cannot “otherwise [be]
served by a less restrictive means.” A.R.S. § 1-601. According to Mother,
A.R.S. § 1-601 “mandat[es]” the “use of a less restrictive means” when “the
government seeks to terminate parental rights.” Ordering a guardianship
here, Mother contends, would be a “less restrictive means” than
termination “of providing [C.C. and N.N.] with a stable, permanent, loving
home.”

¶23 Mother failed to properly preserve this argument, however,
by not raising it with the juvenile court. Although Mother elicited testimony
at trial about whether DCS had explored the possibility of establishing a
guardianship for the children, she never invoked the Parents’ Bill of Rights
or otherwise argued that DCS is statutorily mandated to establish a
guardianship as a less restrictive alternative to termination. By failing to
present this argument to the juvenile court, Mother waived it. See Kimu P.
v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 218 Ariz. 39, 44, ¶ 19 n.3 (App. 2008) (noting that
arguments “not raised in the juvenile court” are waived on appeal).

¶24 Even if she had properly preserved the argument, Mother’s
contention that the Parents’ Bill of Rights limits the court’s authority to
terminate parental rights overlooks A.R.S. § 1-602(B), which provides that
“[t]his section does not prohibit a court from issuing an order that is
otherwise allowed by law.” Section 1-602(B) makes clear that nothing in the
Parents’ Bill of Rights restricts courts’ authority to terminate parental rights
under A.R.S. § 8-533(B).

¶25 Further, no guardianship motion was ever filed, and Mother
did not request a case plan of guardianship. The juvenile court lacked
authority to order a guardianship that no party had requested. See Ariz.
Dep’t of Econ. Sec. v. Stanford, 234 Ariz. 477, 480, ¶ 14 (App. 2014) (finding
that juvenile court could not initiate guardianship “in the absence of a
statutorily compliant motion by a party to the proceedings”). Mother is

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therefore entitled to no relief on her belated claim that the Parents’ Bill of
Rights required the court to order a guardianship in lieu of termination.

B. Mother’s ADA Claim

¶26 Noting that DCS has an obligation to provide appropriate
reunification services, Mother next asserts that the juvenile court erred in
finding that DCS’s reunification efforts satisfied its obligation under the
ADA to reasonably accommodate her disabilities.

¶27 Mother did not properly present her ADA claim because she
did not raise it until trial. Waiting until trial to challenge the adequacy of
DCS’s reunification efforts deprived the juvenile court and DCS of the
opportunity to take timely steps to address and perhaps resolve her
concerns. See Shawanee S. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 234 Ariz. 174, 179, ¶ 18
(App. 2014).

¶28 The juvenile court addressed Mother’s ADA claim on the
merits, however, and DCS does not argue waiver on appeal. We therefore
address Mother’s ADA claim on the merits as well.

¶29 With limited exceptions, Arizona law requires DCS to make
reasonable efforts to provide reunification services after removing a child
from the parent’s care. See A.R.S. § 8-846(A). Parental rights cannot be
terminated on either of the grounds alleged here unless DCS had made a
diligent effort to provide appropriate reunification services. See A.R.S.
§ 8-533(B)(8); see also James H. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 210 Ariz. 1, 2, ¶ 8
(App. 2005) (noting that termination under A.R.S. § 8-533(B)(3) will “be
upheld only if . . . the [mental health] condition either was not amenable to
rehabilitative efforts or that such efforts had been provided but had proven
unsuccessful”). Under the ADA and its implementing regulations, public
entities have an affirmative duty to make “reasonable modifications in
policies, practices, or procedures when the modifications are necessary to
avoid discrimination on the basis of disability, unless . . . the modifications
would fundamentally alter the nature of the service” provided. 28 C.F.R.
§ 35.130(b)(7)(i). The obligations imposed by Arizona statute and the ADA
are coextensive; as this court has held, “Arizona’s statutory requirement
that DCS make reasonable efforts to provide reunification services satisfies
the ADA’s reasonable accommodation requirement.” Jessica P. v. Dep’t of
Child Safety, 251 Ariz. 34, 39, ¶ 15 (App. 2021); see also Vanessa H. v. Ariz.
Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 215 Ariz. 252, 256, ¶¶ 19-20 (App. 2007) (“We view
reasonable accommodations as a component of making ‘reasonable
efforts’” to “preserve the parent-child relationship.”).

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¶30 To satisfy its obligation to make diligent efforts to provide
appropriate reunification services, DCS must provide the parent with the
time and opportunity to participate in programs designed to help her
become an effective parent. Maricopa Cnty. Juv. Action No. JS-501904, 180
Ariz. 348, 353 (App. 1994). DCS is not, however, required to “provide every
conceivable service,” “ensure that a parent participates” in services, id., or
“undertake rehabilitative measures that are futile,” see Mary Ellen C. v. Ariz.
Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 193 Ariz. 185, 192, ¶ 34 (App. 1999).

¶31 Mother asks us to “conduct a de novo review” of the court’s
resolution of her ADA claim, asserting that the court’s determination arises
out of its “interpretation and application of statutes.” Mother’s argument,
however, amounts to a challenge to the court’s determination that DCS
satisfied its obligation to provide appropriate reunification services. We
review such a determination deferentially, not de novo, and we will affirm
if supported by reasonable evidence. See JS-501904, 180 Ariz. at 353.

¶32 Mother argues that DCS failed to adequately accommodate
her disability by failing to “hold any staffings with Mother to identify how
to accommodate her needs.” Similarly, she faults DCS for “requesting
Mother to self-refer for services” instead of arranging services for her.

¶33 Contrary to Mother’s argument, the record shows that DCS
ensured that she received the services that Drs. Leonard and Thal
recommended to address her mental health issues and help her become an
effective parent. Indeed, Mother received a multitude of services over
two-and-a-half years designed to address her cognitive deficiencies and
mental illness. Although DCS initially asked Mother to self-refer for
counseling, DCS ultimately referred her directly to a master’s level
therapist. Mother did not, however, attend those counseling sessions.
Further, the DCS case manager assisted Mother in obtaining SMI services
by scheduling an intake session with Southwest Network and providing a
taxi referral to transport Mother to her intake session. Although Mother
failed to show up for the initial intake session, she attended a rescheduled
intake session and was assigned an SMI case manager who arranged for
Mother to participate in individual therapy. Several months later, Mother’s
DCS case manager followed up by contacting Southwest Network to verify
that Mother was, in fact, attending her scheduled appointments.

¶34 The case manager also met with Mother in person “to discuss
what [DCS] was looking for in terms of her mental health services and what
[DCS] w[as] asking her to participate in, and asked if she would need
assistance in locating either a facility to do those services or assistance in

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referring herself and to set up an appointment.” However, Mother
represented that “she was already participating in [services provided by]
Lifewell,” “did not wish to go elsewhere,” and “did not need any
assistance.” When Mother complained about her NPP provider, the DCS
case manager arranged for a new one to be assigned. And when that
provider struggled to reach Mother by phone, DCS helped facilitate contact.
The record refutes Mother’s suggestion that DCS left her to fend for herself
instead of assisting her in obtaining access to services.

¶35 Mother further argues that DCS failed to meet its ADA
obligations by “not individualizing the services” offered to accommodate
her “low reading and comprehension levels” and her difficulty “retain[ing]
information long-term.” The record does not support this contention.
Instead, the evidence shows that Mother’s evaluating psychologists were
aware of her limitations when recommending services for her and that DCS
followed their recommendations. The evidence also shows that DCS alerted
Mother’s service providers of her disabilities. Mother’s DCS case manager
provided Mother’s therapist, for example, with a copy of her psychological
evaluation.

¶36 Likewise, the DCS case worker spoke with Mother’s NPP
program providers about her disabilities, and they “adapted their teaching
styles to . . . accommodate her as best as they were able to.” The
practitioners later reported, for example, that they would readdress
subjects with Mother if she did not initially understand them. The
practitioners also sent Mother text messages to remind her of scheduled
sessions and the items she was required to bring (i.e., diapers and
age-appropriate food) and worked with DCS to facilitate sessions at
Mother’s home.

¶37 Mother did not testify at trial, and so presented no evidence
that DCS or any service provider failed to accommodate her disabilities.
The absence of any testimony or other evidence of any specific inadequacy
in any of her services also supports the court’s determination that DCS
complied with its obligation to provide appropriate reunification services.
See Melissa W. v. Dep’t of Child Safety, 238 Ariz. 115, 117, ¶ 6 (App. 2015)
(observing that “drawing a negative inference” from a parent’s failure to
testify at a termination trial is “particularly appropriate”).

¶38 Reasonable evidence in the record shows that DCS and its
providers accommodated Mother’s disabilities. In any event, DCS need not
provide “every conceivable service” or services that are futile, JS-501904,
180 Ariz. at 353, and, as the juvenile court noted, Dr. Thal testified that

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Mother’s prospects for being able to parent independently “are very poor.”
Dr. Thal’s testimony, uncontroverted by any other expert testimony, makes
clear that no additional reunification services would have been effective.
See Vanessa H., 215 Ariz. at 256, ¶ 20 (affirming termination order in view
of “abundant evidence” that “no amount of ‘reasonable efforts’ in
providing services would have enabled [mother] to function as a minimally
adequate parent”). We therefore reject Mother’s ADA claim. And because
Mother raises no other challenge to the court’s finding of grounds for
termination under A.R.S. § 8-533(B)(3) and (B)(8), we affirm the court’s
determination that DCS met its burden of establishing grounds for
termination.

C. Mother’s Challenge to “Best Interests” Determination

¶39 Mother also challenges the juvenile court’s finding that
termination was in the children’s best interests.

¶40 Once the court finds at least one statutory ground for
termination, “the interests of the parent and child diverge,” and the court
must balance the parent’s “interest in the care and custody of his or her
child . . . against the independent and often adverse interests of the child in
a safe and stable home life.” Kent K. v. Bobby M., 210 Ariz. 279, 286, ¶ 35
(2005). “[A] determination of the child’s best interest must include a finding
as to how the child would benefit from a severance or be harmed by the
continuation of the relationship.” Maricopa Cnty. Juv. Action No. JS-500274,
167 Ariz. 1, 5 (1990) (emphasis omitted). Courts “must consider the totality
of the circumstances existing at the time of the severance determination,
including the child’s adoptability and the parent’s rehabilitation.” Alma S.
v. Dep’t of Child Safety, 245 Ariz. 146, 148, ¶ 1 (2018).

¶41 The court may find that a child would benefit from
termination if an adoption plan exists, if the child is adoptable, see id. at
150-51, ¶¶ 13-14, or if the child “would benefit psychologically from the
stability an adoption would provide,” JS-501904, 180 Ariz. at 352.
Conversely, the court may find that a child would be harmed by the
continuation of the parent-child relationship “where there is clear and
convincing evidence of parental unfitness which has not been remedied
notwithstanding the provision of services by [DCS] and which
detrimentally affects the child’s well-being.” Pima Cnty. Juv. Action No.
S-2460, 162 Ariz. 156, 158 (App. 1989).

¶42 Here, the court found that the children are bonded to their
foster mother, who provided them with a loving and nurturing home and

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wished to adopt them. The court found that adoption would provide C.C.
and N.N. with “stability and permanency” while “allow[ing] [the siblings]
to remain together.” Allowing the siblings to maintain their relationship,
the court correctly noted, “supports a best interest finding.” See Audra T. v.
Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 194 Ariz. 376, 378, ¶ 6 (App. 1998) (affirming
termination based in part on evidence that foster family was “committed to
adopting” both siblings, who were “very close”). The court also found that
maintaining the parent-child relationship would be detrimental to the
children because Mother, “while doing her best, is unable to care for the
children or provide stability and basic needs.” Reasonable evidence
supports these findings.

¶43 Mother does not dispute the court’s findings about the
benefits that the children would derive from termination and adoption by
their foster mother. Mother argues, however, that the court erred in
“fail[ing] to consider or address the terms of” Arizona’s Parents’ Bill of
Rights “when deciding that a termination would be preferable to a
guardianship.” Because Mother waived this argument by failing to present
it before or at trial, we will not consider it. In any event, because even a
permanent guardianship is revocable, see A.R.S. § 8-873(C), a guardianship
would not provide the children with the stability and permanency they
would receive from termination and adoption.

¶44 Noting that she “participated in some services” in an “effort
to reunify with the children,” Mother asserts that the court “did not give
sufficient weight to [her] reunification efforts.” But this Court will not
reweigh the evidence presented at trial. See Jesus M. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ.
Sec., 203 Ariz. 278, 282, ¶ 12 (App. 2002). The court expressly considered
Mother’s reunification efforts and found them insufficient to offset the
benefits the children would derive from adoption by their foster mother.
Reasonable evidence supports this finding, which we therefore affirm. See
Demetrius L., 239 Ariz. at 3, ¶ 9.

CONCLUSION

¶45 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm.

AMY M. WOOD • Clerk of the Court
FILED: JT
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