Garza v. Collinsworth

NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.
UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL
AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE
ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS
DIVISION ONE

In re the Matter of:

KRISTEN MICHELLE GARZA, Petitioner/Appellee,

v.

PAUL ALLEN COLLINSWORTH, Respondent/Appellant.

No. 1 CA-CV 23-0088 FC
FILED 11-28-2023

Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County
No. FC2013-053696
The Honorable Jacki Ireland, Judge Pro Tempore

AFFIRMED

COUNSEL

The Law Office of Carrie M. Wilcox, Phoenix
By Carrie M. Wilcox
Counsel for Petitioner/Appellee

Paul Allen Collinsworth, Chandler
Respondent/Appellant
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MEMORANDUM DECISION

Judge Daniel J. Kiley delivered the decision of the Court, in which Vice
Chief Judge Randall M. Howe and Judge Jennifer M. Perkins joined.

K I L E Y, Judge:

¶1 Paul Collinsworth (“Father”) appeals the superior court’s
order awarding Kristen Garza (“Mother”) final decision-making authority
for their minor child M.G. (the “Child”) and designating Mother as the
Child’s primary residential parent. For the following reasons, we affirm.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

¶2 Father and Mother were never married. After the Child was
born in 2012, the State of Arizona initiated child support proceedings. In
2015, the parties stipulated to an order (the “2015 Stipulated Order”)
awarding them joint legal decision-making authority and designating
Mother as the Child’s primary residential parent.

¶3 Since then, the parties have had a contentious relationship. At
various times, each has gone to court or called the police to accuse the other
of acting inappropriately toward, and wrongfully denying access to, the
Child.

¶4 The Arizona Department of Child Safety (“DCS”) opened an
investigation in 2019 after receiving a report of domestic violence between
Mother’s then-boyfriend “David” (a pseudonym) and her other child,
“Emma” (a pseudonym), who was born in 2007 and is not common to the
parties. DCS’s investigation uncovered additional concerns about Mother’s
alcohol consumption. After initiating dependency proceedings as to Emma,
DCS placed the Child in Father’s care and recommended that he seek an
order in the Family Court case suspending Mother’s parenting time. Father
accordingly filed a petition to modify the 2015 Stipulated Order, asking that
he be awarded sole legal decision-making authority and that Mother’s
parenting time be suspended.

¶5 After an evidentiary hearing in July 2020, the court found that
“Mother has an admitted substance abuse issue with alcohol” and that the
Child “is at risk in Mother’s home due to alleged verbal abuse by” David.
The court left the parties’ existing award of joint legal decision-making

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authority in effect but entered temporary orders barring contact between
David and the Child and requiring that Mother’s parenting time be
supervised pending her participation in substance abuse treatment. The
court also appointed a Best Interests Attorney (the “BIA”) to “investigate
the situation involving the [C]hild” and “represent [her] best interests” in
further proceedings.

¶6 In April 2021, DCS dismissed the dependency as to Emma,
reporting to the BIA that DCS would “no longer” require Mother to
participate in substance abuse treatment because she had “really stepped
up to the plate” and “done everything asked of her.”

¶7 The court set an evidentiary hearing on the petition to modify
the 2015 Stipulated Order and all associated requests for relief on August
31, 2021. Before the hearing, the BIA filed a position statement in which she
reported, inter alia, that Mother “admitted to alcohol addiction” and
“participated in random alcohol testing.” Although Mother “consistently
tested negative,” the BIA cautioned that “three” of her test results indicated
that the “specimen” had been “diluted.” The BIA further stated that,
although Mother adamantly denied any “form of domestic violence in her
home,” the BIA’s interview with the Child indicated otherwise. According
to the BIA, the Child expressed fear of David’s outbursts of anger and
recalled one occasion when he “grabbed her wrist really hard,” causing her
to feel “afraid.” Concluding that, notwithstanding Mother’s denials, “it
appears clear that domestic violence did occur on some level in Mother’s
home,” the BIA recommended that Mother “complete DV counseling.” The
BIA concluded that both parties “have a solid bond” with the Child and
“encouraged” them to address their “great dysfunction in communicating”
by “find[ing] better ways to communicate with one another for [the Child’s]
sake.”

¶8 Father and Mother both testified at the August 31 hearing. A
few days later, the court issued orders (the “September 2021 Orders”) that
(1) awarded the parties joint legal decision-making authority but granted
Father “the ability to make the final decision” if the parties “cannot agree”
on an issue “after making a good faith effort to reach an agreement” and
(2) designated Father as the Child’s primary residential parent. The court
rejected Mother’s testimony that the Child and David have a “very close
and positive” relationship, finding that “Mother has minimized [the
Child’s] expressed fear and tension” with David and that Mother was not
“a credible witness as to this issue.” “[A]pplaud[ing]” Mother’s “efforts to
achieve sobriety,” the court nonetheless determined that Mother’s
parenting time should continue to be supervised because she “has not yet

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addressed the concerns for domestic violence in her home.” The court
required Mother to participate in biweekly therapy with a therapist of her
choosing, at which point she would be entitled to exercise unsupervised
parenting time as long as she did not leave the Child unsupervised with
David at any time. Finally, the court ordered that the Child “be enrolled in
forensically-informed play therapy with a qualified child counselor within
30 days.” The court emphasized that, although Father was required to
“make efforts to consult with Mother regarding a therapist for [the Child],”
he was ultimately “responsible for ensuring [the Child] attends weekly
therapy.”

¶9 Roughly three months after the court issued the September
2021 Orders, Father filed another petition to modify (“Father’s Petition to
Modify”) asking the court to reinstate the requirement that Mother’s
parenting time be supervised. In support of his request, Father stated, “I
believe that she is again abusing alcohol and drugs.” Although Arizona
statute restricts the ability of parents to seek modification of legal
decision-making or parenting time orders within one year of their issuance,
see A.R.S. § 25-411(A), the court allowed the petition to modify the
September 2021 Orders to move forward based on Father’s allegation of
Mother’s relapse into substance abuse.

¶10 In March 2022, Father filed a motion for temporary orders
without notice to suspend Mother’s parenting time, alleging that Mother
left the Child alone with David in violation of the existing parenting time
order. The court appointed a Court Appointed Advisor (the “CAA”) to
investigate and make recommendations.

¶11 After interviewing each of the parties and the Child, the CAA
found insufficient justification to require that Mother’s parenting time be
supervised. The CAA expressed concern, however, that Mother was
“minimizing” the alcohol abuse and domestic violence issues that had been
raised during the proceedings. The CAA also addressed Mother’s
complaints that Father “has not consulted with her” about decisions
affecting the Child. Noting that, on one occasion, Father waited until “the
last minute” to inform Mother that he had scheduled a medical
appointment for the Child during Mother’s parenting time, the CAA
opined that Father had “not communicated appropriately” with Mother.

¶12 In April 2022, Mother notified Father that she and David
would be getting married in Las Vegas, Nevada, and she wanted to bring
the Child to the wedding. Noting that he had not been given 30 days’
advance notice of the planned out-of-state travel as required by the

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September 2021 Orders, Father filed what he labeled an “Expedited Request
for Good Cause Shown” asking the court to “forbid[]” Mother “from taking
[the Child] out of the State.” Although the court denied Father’s motion 11
days later, it appears that the wedding took place in the interim without the
Child in attendance.

¶13 On July 21, 2022, Mother filed a cross-petition to modify the
September 2021 Orders, asserting that Father had not complied with them.
She alleged, among other things, that Father was “planning to enroll [the
Child] in a new school” without seeking Mother’s “input” and that he failed
to “enroll[] [the Child] in the Court Ordered forensic play therapy.” Mother
asked the court to award her sole legal decision-making authority and
“physical care . . . and control” of the Child, with Father having “reasonable
parenting time.” Alleging that “Father continuously berates” and
“threatens her,” Mother also asked that Father be ordered “to attend anger
management classes.”

¶14 An evidentiary hearing on the competing petitions to modify
the September 2021 Orders began on August 3, 2022. Before the hearing, the
case was reassigned to a different judicial officer due to the superior court’s
periodic rotation of judicial calendars. Although the transcript of the
August 3 hearing is not included in the appellate record, the minute entry
indicates that Father and the CAA testified on that date. Because the parties
did not complete their presentation of evidence that day, the court
continued the hearing to a later date.

¶15 On August 13, 2022, Mother tested positive for alcohol. After
receiving the test results, Father filed what he labeled a “motion to dismiss”
in which he asked that Mother “be placed back on supervised visits” or, at
a “minimum,” that she be required to “start all over with testing.”
Meanwhile, Mother filed a notice attributing her positive test result to
“having her hair dyed,” asserting that “[t]he dye used to color [her] hair
had alcohol in the product.”

¶16 The continued hearing took place on December 5, 2022. At the
hearing, Father expressed concerns about the “consistency” of Mother’s
alcohol testing but did not ask that Mother’s parenting time be supervised
or otherwise restricted. On the contrary, when the court asked him, “[W]hat
kind of order do you want for parenting time?”, Father testified, “I would
like things to stay the way they are.” On cross-examination, Father
admitted that he had not enrolled the Child in the “forensically-informed
play therapy” required by the September 2021 Orders but testified that he
took the Child to see a counselor through Terros on a weekly basis.

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¶17 Mother then presented her case-in-chief. Among other things,
Mother testified that (1) the Child and David have a good relationship,
(2) Mother participated in biweekly domestic violence counseling, and
(3) she is sober. To support her testimony on these points, Mother presented
exhibits that include documentation from her physician reflecting that her
“[a]lcohol dependence” is “in remission” and a letter from her therapist
confirming her completion of an assessment and participation in
“bi-weekly individual counseling session[s].” Mother also testified that
Father is unwilling to co-parent with her, asserting, for example, that Father
did not consult with her before transferring the Child to a new school.
Mother supported her testimony on this point with copies of messages
exchanged by the parties on a co-parenting app called “OurFamilyWizard.”
Father then cross-examined Mother.

¶18 After the hearing, the superior court issued a lengthy and
detailed order on December 21, 2022 (the “December 2022 Orders”), setting
forth its findings “that Mother has successfully engaged in alcohol testing
and individual therapy” and that the court had “no concerns” about the
Child being “left . . . unsupervised” in David’s care. The court further found
that Father “used his ‘final say’ improperly” when he “move[d] the [C]hild
to a new school without having a good faith discussion with Mother first,”
which, the court noted, “is a violation of their current orders.” The court
also faulted Father for refusing to let Mother bring the Child along when
she and David got married in Las Vegas. The court therefore reaffirmed the
prior award of joint legal decision-making authority to the parties but
awarded Mother final decision-making authority. The court further
designated Mother as the Child’s primary residential parent, with Father
having parenting time on alternate weekends during the school year, on an
alternate weekly basis in the summer, and on holidays according to a
detailed schedule.

¶19 Father filed a timely notice of appeal, and we have jurisdiction
under A.R.S. § 12-2101(A)(1).

DISCUSSION

¶20 Mother devotes much of her answering brief to detailing the
myriad of ways in which Father’s opening brief fails to comply with the
Arizona Rules of Civil Appellate Procedure. Although Father’s brief does,
indeed, leave much to be desired—it does not, for example, include a single
record citation—we disagree with Mother’s contention that “Father’s brief
wholly fails to give this Court a basis for considering the relief requested.”
We decline Mother’s invitation to summarily dismiss this appeal. See

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Clemens v. Clark, 101 Ariz. 413, 414 (1966) (an appellate court may, in its
discretion, entertain a deficient brief on its merits).

¶21 We review the superior court’s legal decision-making and
parenting-time orders for an abuse of discretion. Engstrom v. McCarthy, 243
Ariz. 469, 471, ¶ 4 (App. 2018). An abuse of discretion occurs when the court
commits an error of law in reaching a discretionary decision or when the
record does not support the court’s decision. Id. This Court “views the
evidence in the light most favorable to upholding the superior court’s
orders and will affirm findings if reasonable evidence supports them.”
Smith v. Smith, 253 Ariz. 43, 45, ¶ 9 (App. 2022).

A. The Court’s Findings of Fact Are Supported by Reasonable
Evidence.

¶22 Father challenges the factual findings set forth in the
December 2022 Orders, arguing, inter alia, that the court “erred in
determining that [Mother] was a credible witness and had fully addressed
her substance abuse issues.”

¶23 On its face, Father’s argument is an invitation to re-weigh the
evidence and second guess the court’s determination of witness credibility.
Because this Court “defer[s] to the superior court’s factual findings unless
they are clearly erroneous,” Brucklier v. Brucklier, 253 Ariz. 579, 582, ¶ 10
(App. 2022), we decline Father’s invitation to re-weigh the credibility of
Mother’s testimony, see Pugh v. Cook, 153 Ariz. 246, 247 (App. 1987) (“An
appellate court will not weigh the evidence” or “judge the credibility of the
witnesses,” as those are “matter[s] within the province of the trier of fact.”);
Hurd v. Hurd, 223 Ariz. 48, 52, ¶ 16 (App. 2009) (“Our duty on review does
not include re-weighing conflicting evidence” or judging “the credibility of
the witnesses.”).

¶24 In a similar vein, Father complains that the court “ignored”
the fact “that Mother had previously been deemed to be untruthful and
suspect in her testimony and had actively misrepresented material
evidence at prior hearings.” Father’s argument on this point appears to
refer to the prior judge’s finding, as set forth in the September 2021 Orders,
that Mother’s testimony about the Child’s positive relationship with David
was not “credible.”

¶25 The record refutes Father’s claim that the court “ignored” the
September 2021 Orders; the court expressly discussed them in the
December 2022 Orders. To the extent that Father suggests that the court’s

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adverse determination of Mother’s credibility when she testified in August
2021 was somehow entitled to a binding or preclusive effect in evidentiary
proceedings that took place in 2022, he cites no authority for this
suggestion, and we are aware of none.

¶26 Father also complains that the court “ignored” other
“material evidence” such as Mother’s history of alcoholism and “the CAA’s
and BIA’s written opinions” about her “consumption of alcohol.”

¶27 Again, the record does not support Father’s assertions. The
exhibits admitted at the hearing that began in August 2022 and concluded
in December 2022 include the CAA reports and Mother’s medical records
that address her alcohol dependence. Unless it affirmatively appears to the
contrary, we assume that the court fully considered all admitted evidence
before issuing its decision. See Fuentes v. Fuentes, 209 Ariz. 51, 55, ¶ 18 (App.
2004) (as amended). Further, the CAA testified at the hearing and each side
had an opportunity to cross-examine her. The record does not indicate that
Father ever directed the court’s attention to the position statement that the
BIA filed in August 2021.

¶28 The court discussed Mother’s history of alcohol abuse
extensively in the December 2022 Orders. The court’s determinations that,
notwithstanding her “history of alcohol abuse,” Mother “obtained
treatment,” “successfully engaged in alcohol testing,” and “demonstrated
sobriety” are supported by reasonable evidence in the record. The mere fact
that the record includes evidence from which conflicting inferences could
be drawn about Mother’s credibility and sobriety does not establish that the
court failed to consider the evidence before it. See In re the Marriage of Zirpel,
2 CA-CV 16-0089, 2017 WL 1075416, at *7, ¶¶ 31-32 (Ariz. App. Mar. 22,
2017) (mem. decision) (rejecting appellant’s claim that trial court “ignored
her testimony,” reasoning that “we presume the trial court considered all
admitted evidence” and “do not reweigh conflicting evidence”).

¶29 Father also argues that the court improperly “discounted
previous alleged domestic violence in Mother’s home without finding that
good cause existed to consider an earlier period.” To the extent that this
rather confusing statement is intended to assert that the court gave
insufficient weight to the evidence of past domestic violence in Mother’s
home, it is for the superior court, not this Court, to determine the weight to
be given to the evidence. See In re Estate of Pouser, 193 Ariz. 574, 579, ¶ 13
(1999) (“In reviewing a trial court’s findings of fact, we do not reweigh
conflicting evidence or redetermine the preponderance of the evidence.”).

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The court’s conclusions about domestic violence are supported by its
factual findings, and the record reasonably supports its factual findings.

¶30 Father makes additional factual assertions for which he cites
no record evidence, such as, for example, his claims about Mother’s alleged
“history of arrests” and “prescription drug abuse[]” as well as an occasion
on some unspecified date when Mother purportedly “passed out on a
lounge chair poolside at her residence.” Because Father cites nothing in the
record to support these assertions, they entitle Father to no relief. See Sholes
v. Fernando, 228 Ariz. 455, 457, ¶ 2 n.2 (App. 2011) (appellate court may
disregard facts not supported with appropriate citations to the record).

¶31 Finally, Father argues that the court’s finding that he
transferred the Child to a new school without consulting Mother “was in
error,” complaining that the court “refused to elicit or accept [his]
testimony” about “the discussions” he had with Mother about “the
proposed changed in schools” prior to the transfer.

¶32 At the continued hearing, Father testified that he had spoken
with Mother “numerous times” about the Child’s transfer to a new school
before he enrolled her. He admitted, however, that he had no documentary
evidence to support his claim. In her testimony, Mother denied that Father
consulted with her before transferring the Child to a different school.
Because the court had the opportunity to observe the witness testimony
firsthand, we must defer to the court’s decision to accept Mother’s
testimony that Father made the decision to change the Child’s school
unilaterally and to reject Father’s contrary testimony. See Pugh, 153 Ariz. at
247. Moreover, Mother supported her testimony with a copy of the parties’
exchange on the OurFamilyWizard app in which, in response to Mother’s
complaint that she lacked information about the Child’s new school, Father
replied, “I advised you 8 weeks [before the change] about the school.”
Father’s contemporaneous statement that he “advised” Mother of the new
school supports the court’s finding that, instead of consulting with Mother
as required, Father made the decision unilaterally and then informed
Mother of his decision.

¶33 In essence, each of Father’s arguments challenges the weight
and credibility of the evidence the court relied upon in making its ruling.
But the fact that evidence might reasonably support other findings does not
establish an abuse of discretion. See also Gutierrez v. Gutierrez, 193 Ariz. 343,
347, ¶ 13 (App. 1998) (“The evidence in this case was conflicting. We will
defer to the trial court’s determination of witnesses’ credibility and the

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weight to give conflicting evidence.”). We reject Father’s challenges to the
findings of fact in the December 2022 Orders.

B. The Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion in Finding the Material
Change in Circumstances Necessary to Justify Modifying the
September 2021 Orders.

¶34 Father next argues that the court erred in finding the
“material change in circumstances affecting the welfare” of the Child
necessary to justify “a change in physical custody.” According to Father,
the evidence presented was “insufficient” to prove the “detrimental change
in [the Child’s] life” required to justify modifying the September 2021
Orders.

¶35 Since Father is the one who initially sought modification of
the September 2021 Orders, he is not entitled to complain on appeal that the
court did, in fact, modify those orders. “[O]ne who deliberately leads the
court to take certain action may not upon appeal assign that action as error.”
Caruthers v. Underhill, 235 Ariz. 1, 7, ¶ 23 (App. 2014) (citation omitted).

¶36 In his opening brief, Father denies that he sought
modification of the September 2021 Orders, stating that he filed Father’s
Petition to Modify merely to obtain “clarification” of the September 2021
Orders. Father’s claim that he merely sought to clarify, not modify, the
existing orders is simply untrue. Alleging that Mother “is again abusing
alcohol and drugs,” Father’s Petition to Modify expressly asked that Mother
be “placed back on supervised visitations.”

¶37 The court has “broad discretion to decide whether a change
of circumstances” warrants a modification of legal decision-making
authority and parenting time. See Backstrand v. Backstrand, 250 Ariz. 339,
343, ¶ 14 (App. 2020). We perceive no abuse of that discretion here. After
considering the evidence both sides presented, the court determined that
Mother had successfully addressed her issues with substance abuse and
domestic violence. The court did not abuse its discretion in modifying the
September 2021 Orders after finding that the circumstances that prompted
those orders had been resolved. See id. at 344, ¶ 17 (“The superior court may
find a material change of circumstances when the change has caused the
original decree to serve its purpose no longer.”). Further, the court found a
material change in circumstances arose after entry of the September 2021
Orders because Father failed to comply with his obligation to consult with
Mother in good faith before making decisions affecting the Child. A party’s
unwillingness or inability to co-parent in good faith may justify the

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modification of existing legal decision-making and parenting time orders.
See Gonzalez-Gunter v. Gunter, 249 Ariz. 489, 492, ¶ 15 (App. 2020) (affirming
modification of parenting time orders to reduce father’s parenting time
based on court’s findings, inter alia, “that the [parents] had difficulty
communicating” and that father “took the children out of state without [the
mother’s] permission”). The court’s findings, which are supported by
reasonable evidence, are sufficient to establish the requisite material change
justifying modification of the September 2021 Orders.

C. The Superior Court Did Not Violate Father’s Right to
Procedural Due Process.

¶38 Father argues that the court violated his right to procedural
due process by failing to give him “equal time” at the hearing to present his
evidence and by denying him the opportunity to fully examine the
witnesses by “cut[ting] his time short.”

¶39 “The touchstone of due process under both the Arizona and
federal constitutions is fundamental fairness.” Backstrand, 250 Ariz. at 346,
¶ 29 (citation omitted). A parent contesting modification has a due process
right “to be heard at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.” Volk
v. Brame, 235 Ariz. 462, 468, ¶¶ 19–20 (App. 2014) (citation omitted). “But
the due-process right to an adequate opportunity to be heard must be
balanced against the superior court’s broad discretion to impose reasonable
time limits on proceedings and control the management of its docket.”
Backstrand, 250 Ariz. at 346, ¶ 29; see also Ariz. R. Fam. Law. P. 22(a); Ariz.
R. Evid. 611(a). Whether the superior court afforded Father due process
“presents a question of law we review de novo.” Backstrand, 250 Ariz. at 346,
¶ 28. “We will reverse only if the complaining party suffers prejudice as a
result of the error.” Walsh v. Walsh, 230 Ariz. 486, 494, ¶ 24 (App. 2012)
(citation omitted).

¶40 Father cites to nothing in the record to support his claim that
he was denied sufficient time to present his case. Father has not provided a
transcript of the first portion of the evidentiary hearing that was held on
August 3, so we presume the missing transcript would support the court’s
decision. See Baker v. Baker, 183 Ariz. 70, 73 (App. 1995) (“A party is
responsible for making certain the record on appeal contains all transcripts
or other documents necessary for us to consider the issues raised on
appeal,” and “[w]hen a party fails to include necessary items, we assume
they would support the court’s findings and conclusions.”). The transcript
of the continued hearing on December 5 shows that Father was given the
opportunity to testify that day. In his briefing on appeal, Father does not

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identify any testimony or other evidence that he was unable to present due
to unduly restrictive time constraints.

¶41 Father’s complaint that the court “cut . . . short” his time to
“fully examine the witnesses” is unavailing as well. The transcript of the
continued hearing on December 5 reflects that Father asked the CAA
several questions on cross-examination and then stated that he had no
further questions. When the court offered him the opportunity to
cross-examine Mother, he proceeded to do so at some length. After asking
Mother about matters such as her alcohol consumption, her participation in
court-ordered testing and parenting classes, and alleged domestic violence
in her home, Father began a line of inquiry into an event “[a] couple weeks
ago” at the Child’s new school. Mother described the event as a “medieval
fair,” at which point Father disputed her answer, characterizing the event
as a “talent show.” Only when he became argumentative, insisting that
“[Mother] knows it was a talent show,” did the court cut him off and bring
an end to his cross-examination. As the court correctly stated when
terminating Father’s cross-examination, “whether [the event] was a talent
show or a medieval fair” was not “relevant.” Because due process does not
require the court to “indulge inefficient use of time by parties,” Backstrand,
250 Ariz. at 347, ¶ 29 (citation omitted), the court did not violate Father’s
due process rights by terminating his cross-examination once he moved to
a line of questioning that could not possibly have any bearing on the court’s
resolution of the disputed issues.

¶42 In any case, if Father was of the view that he had not been
given enough time to present his case, he should have said so at the hearing
and made an offer of proof of the evidence that he was purportedly unable
to present. See Gamboa v. Metzler, 223 Ariz. 399, 402-03 ¶¶ 12, 16-18 (App.
2010) (rejecting appellant’s claim that “the trial court violated his due
process rights” by allowing insufficient time for cross-examination in part
because “he did not request additional time” or “make an offer of proof”).
He did not. In his briefing on appeal, he does not identify any evidence he
was unable to present or establish how he was prejudiced by his inability
to present it. Because, “to merit reversal, a party must show they incurred
some harm as a result of a court’s time limitations,” id. at 402, ¶ 17 (cleaned
up), Father’s failure to identify any prejudice he suffered as a result of time
constraints at the hearing is fatal to this claim.

¶43 Father makes a number of other assertions that appear to
challenge the court’s impartiality. Father asserts, for example, that the court
“scoffed at him” when he asked “questions about procedure.” He cites to
nothing in the record to support this assertion. A review of the transcript of

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the continued hearing on December 5 does not support this claim, and, as
noted above, Father has not provided us with the transcript of the August
3 proceedings. Father is entitled to no relief on this unsupported claim.

¶44 Likewise, Father complains that the court “completely
disregarded Mother’s medical records” and “police records of incidents at
Mother’s home.” The record indicates that certain medical records and a
police report were admitted in evidence, and we find no basis for Father’s
assertion that the court failed to consider them. See Fuentes, 209 Ariz. at 55,
¶ 18 (noting that trial court “is presumed to have . . . fully considered”
relevant testimony and evidence “prior to issuing its decision”). To the
extent Father complains that the court gave these exhibits insufficient
weight, we will not “reweigh conflicting evidence” on appeal. See Estate of
Pouser, 193 Ariz. at 579, ¶ 13.

¶45 Father complains that he asked the court to “check the docket
history in this case to confirm that he had completed the domestic relations
education program provision of A.R.S. § 25-352” but the court did not do
so. The transcript of the continued hearing on December 5 does not support
Father’s claim that he asked the court to check the docket to confirm that he
had, in fact, filed a certificate that he had completed the class. In any event,
the court did not sanction Father for failing to complete the class and so his
argument, even if true, entitles him to no relief.

¶46 Similarly, Father asserts that “Mother had not completed the
domestic relations education program and was not held accountable for her
noncompliance.” In the December 2022 Orders, the court found that neither
party “completed the Parent Education Program requirements of A.R.S.
25-352 and/or presented proof of completion as required” and ordered
them both to do so. Father does not explain what else the court should have
done to hold Mother “accountable” for not completing the class. Since he
has failed to meaningfully develop this argument, we decline to consider it
further. See Davis v. Davis, 230 Ariz. 333, 338, ¶ 26 n.9 (App. 2012) (holding
that appellant “waived . . . claim on appeal by failing to elaborate on his
argument or support it with citation to legal authority”).

¶47 Finally, Father faults the court, in conclusory terms, for not
giving him “[l]atitude” at the hearing since he was “a Pro Se party” while
Mother was “represented by counsel.” Father’s argument is contrary to the
well-established principle that “a party who conducts a case without an
attorney is entitled to no more consideration from the court than a party
represented by counsel, and is held to the same standards expected of a
lawyer.” See Kelly v. NationsBanc Mortg. Corp., 199 Ariz. 284, 287, ¶ 16 (App.

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 GARZA v. COLLINSWORTH
Decision of the Court

2000) (as amended). Moreover, Father does not identify any particular
“latitude” that he believes he should have been given. He does not, for
example, identify any evidence that he was unable to present due to his
unfamiliarity with applicable evidentiary or procedural rules. In the
absence of any showing of prejudice, his due process claim necessarily fails.
See State v. Dunlap, 187 Ariz. 441, 450 (App. 1996) (“[P]roof of prejudice is
generally a necessary . . . element of a due process claim.”) (citation
omitted).

CONCLUSION

¶48 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm.

¶49 Mother requests attorney’s fees and costs pursuant to A.R.S.
§ 25-324 and ARCAP 21, citing Father’s unreasonable positions on appeal.
In our discretion, we grant Mother’s request for an award of reasonable fees
and costs.

AMY M. WOOD • Clerk of the Court
FILED: AA

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