Rynn v. Uhs

NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.
UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL
AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE
ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS
DIVISION ONE

RICHARD RYNN, et al., Plaintiffs/Appellants,

v.

UHS OF PHOENIX, LLC, et al., Defendants/Appellees.

No. 1 CA-CV 23-0392
FILED 07-18-2024

Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County
No. CV2020-094244
The Honorable Peter A. Thompson, Judge

AFFIRMED

COUNSEL

Richard Rynn, Gelliana David-Rynn, Mathew Rynn,
Marcella Rynn, Chandler
Plaintiffs/Appellants

Holden & Armer, PC, Phoenix
By Carolyn Armer, Michael J. Ryan, Nathan S. Ryan
Counsel for Defendant/Appellee UHS of Phoenix, LLC dba Quail Run Behavior
Health

Broening Oberg Woods & Wilson, PC, Phoenix
By Megan E. Gailey, Kelley M. Jancaitis
Counsel for Defendant/Appellee La Frontera Empact-SPC

Cohen Law Firm, Phoenix
By Larry J. Cohen
Counsel for Defendant/Appellee Devereux

Weinberg, Wheeler, Hudgins, Gunn & Dial, LLC, Phoenix
By Jeffrey S. Hunter
Counsel for Defendant/Appellee Aurora Behavioral Healthcare Tempe, LLC

Doyle Hernandez Millam, Phoenix
By William H. Doyle, Brandon D. Millam, Nathan Andrews
Counsel for Defendant/Appellee Day Starz Group Home and Tamla Alexander

Slattery Petersen, PLLC, Phoenix
By Elizabeth A. Petersen, Gabriel O’Quin
Counsel for Defendants/Appellees Maricopa County Special Healthcare District
dba Maricopa Integrated Health Systems and Desert Vista

Arizona Attorney General’s Office, Phoenix
By Rebecca Banes, Stephanie Elliott
Counsel for Defendant/Appellee Department of Child Safety and Department of
Health Services

Burch & Cracchiolo, PA, Phoenix
By Ian Neale, Matthew J. Skelly
Counsel for Defendant/Appellee Maricopa County Unified School District

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Judge Kent E. Cattani delivered the decision of the Court, in which
Presiding Judge Daniel J. Kiley and Judge D. Steven Williams joined.

C A T T A N I, Judge:

¶1 Richard Rynn, Gelliana David-Rynn, and their children
Mathew and Marcella Rynn (collectively, “Rynn”) appeal the superior
court’s judgments dismissing their complaint against the following
Appellees: Day Starz Group Home and Tamla Alexander (collectively,
“Day Starz”); Aurora Behavioral Health (“Aurora”); La Frontera-Empact
SPC (“Empact”); the State of Arizona and the governor, Arizona
Department of Health Services (“DHS”) and its director, and Arizona
Department of Child Safety (“DCS”) and its director (collectively, the “State

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Defendants”); UHS of Phoenix, L.L.C., d/b/a Quail Run Behavioral Health
(“Quail Run”); Devereux; and Maricopa County Special Healthcare District
d/b/a Maricopa Integrated Health System and Desert Vista (collectively,
“the District”). We affirm.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

¶2 This case is Rynn’s second lawsuit arising from treatment
Marcella received from inpatient behavioral health facilities, including
1

treatment rendered during a dependency proceeding while Marcella was
in DCS’s care.2 The dependency proceedings were initiated after Marcella
and her mother voluntarily checked Marcella into a behavioral health
center for mental health treatment. DCS subsequently received reports that
Richard had been interfering with Marcella’s treatment, intended to remove
her from the facility, and threatened to “kill everyone at the hospital,”
including the therapist Richard blamed for contacting DCS. Following
contested dependency proceedings, the superior court adjudicated
Marcella dependent, finding that Richard had failed to provide Marcella
adequate mental health treatment prior to 2017 despite her serious
symptoms, that he attempted to remove her from a treatment facility
despite being warned it was not safe for her to leave, and that he prevented
Marcella from taking appropriate medications. This court affirmed the
superior court’s dependency order in February 2018. Richard R. v. Dep’t of
Child Safety, 2 CA-JV 2017-0165, 2018 WL 718932 (Ariz. App. Feb. 6, 2018)
(mem. decision). The dependency proceedings ended in October 2018, and
Marcella turned 18 the next month.

¶3 Richard and Marcella first sued the State Defendants and
others in January 2018. The lawsuit was removed to federal district court,
and Marcella was dismissed as a plaintiff. Asserting malfeasance relating
to Marcella’s 2017 mental health treatment and involvement with DCS,
Rynn sought damages for interference with the parent–child relationship,
intentional infliction of emotional distress, wrongful imprisonment, and
due process violations. The district court ultimately dismissed the case
with prejudice as to all defendants, including the State Defendants, Quail
Run, and Empact (the “2018 litigation”). See Rynn v. McKay, CV-18-00414-

1 For clarity, we respectfully refer to parties who share a last name by
their first names.

2 The superior court’s dismissal of a third case was recently affirmed
in Rynn v. UHS of Phoenix, LLC, 2 CA-CV 2022-0175, 2023 WL 4173803 (Ariz.
App. June 26, 2023) (mem. decision).

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PHX-JJT, 2018 WL 5807082 (D. Ariz. Nov. 6, 2018) (order dismissing with
prejudice); see also Rynn v. McKay, 793 Fed. Appx. 559 (9th Cir. 2020)
(affirming the dismissal).

¶4 Rynn filed this lawsuit in July 2020 based on the same nucleus
of facts, seeking compensatory and punitive damages and bringing claims
for relief that included defamation, false light, assault and battery,
involuntary treatment, child abuse and neglect, emotional distress,
abduction of child, racketeering, negligence, and sexual abuse. In October
2020, Rynn filed a second amended complaint (“SAC”), which did not
allege new claims but included new parties Aurora, Day Starz Group
Home, Devereux, and others. In November 2020, Rynn filed a motion to
amend the complaint and add additional parties. Rynn re-filed the SAC in
January 2021, including the additional parties.

¶5 In April 2021, the court dismissed the claims against Empact,
Quail Run, and the State Defendants on res judicata and statute of
limitations grounds—as well as on several other grounds for the State
Defendants. In May 2021, the court dismissed the claims against Devereux
due to insufficient process and insufficient service of process. In May and
June of 2021, the court entered Rule 54(b) final judgments for Empact, Quail
Run, the State Defendants, and Devereux.

¶6 Rynn filed a third amended complaint (“TAC”) in May 2021,
without seeking the required permission from the court. See Ariz. R. Civ.
P. 15(a)(2). Rynn alleged the same claims raised in the SAC, but also added
claims for fraud, abuse of process, and breach of contract. In July 2021, the
court granted Rynn permission to file the TAC, noting that it had already
been filed. The court later noted in a September 2021 order that the TAC
did not “revive[]” the claims against the previously dismissed parties for
whom Rule 54(b) judgments had been entered. The TAC added Arizona
Governor Doug Ducey, DHS Director Cara Christ, and DCS Director
Gregory McKay as defendants, but those defendants were never served.

¶7 Rynn filed several motions for leave to file additional
amended complaints between July 2021 and December 2021. The court
rejected all of those motions.

¶8 In March 2022, the superior court stayed the proceedings
pending a ruling by this court on the 54(b) judgments. After this court
affirmed the Rule 54(b) judgments, see David-Rynn v. UHS of Phx., LLC, 1
CA-CV 21-0605, 2022 WL 4242261 (Ariz. App. Sept. 15, 2022) (mem.
decision), cert. denied sub nom. Rynn v. UHS of Phx., LLC, 144 S. Ct. 329 (2023),

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the superior court clarified that the TAC was the operative complaint and
noted that Empact, Quail Run, the State Defendants, and Devereux were no
longer parties.

¶9 In April 2023, the superior court designated the Rynn
plaintiffs as vexatious litigants and ordered that they not file any new
pleading, motion, or other document without authorization from the court.
The court explained that Rynn’s “many and voluminous, repetitive and
redundant filings [] have unreasonably expanded and delayed court
proceedings. They have brought the same causes of action multiple times
against the same defendants without substantial justification.”

¶10 The court subsequently dismissed all claims against all
defendants and directed the defendants to submit proposed forms of
judgment using Rule 54(b) language. The court issued 54(b) judgments for
all defendants, and Rynn timely appealed. We have jurisdiction under
A.R.S. § 12-2101(A)(1).

DISCUSSION

¶11 As a preliminary matter, Appellees contend Rynn abandoned
or waived the issues raised in this appeal by failing to articulate coherent
arguments relevant to the issues. We agree.

¶12 “This court has a responsibility to see that [litigants] conform
to an acceptable, minimal level of competency and performance.” Ramos v.
Nichols, 252 Ariz. 519, 522, ¶ 8 (App. 2022) (citation omitted). Rynn does
not meet this standard. Although Rynn’s opening brief asserts “fraud,”
“lies,” and “violations of parental rights,” it fails to present substantive
arguments with supporting reasons or citations to the record or case law.
See ARCAP 13(a)(7)(A). The deficiencies in Rynn’s briefing warrant
denying relief. J.W. v. Dep’t of Child Safety, 252 Ariz. 184, 188, ¶ 11 (App.
2021) (concluding a “lack of proper and meaningful argument alone”
warrants denial of relief on appeal); Schabel v. Deer Valley Unified Sch. Dist.
No. 97, 186 Ariz. 161, 167 (App. 1996) (noting that arguments not clearly
raised in a party’s appellate brief are waived on appeal).

¶13 Waiver notwithstanding, Rynn’s arguments also fail on the
merits based on claim preclusion and on Rynn’s failure to support claims
with specific facts or arguments warranting relief.

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I. Claim Preclusion.

¶14 Claim preclusion bars Rynn’s claims against Empact, the State
Defendants, Quail Run, Devereux, and the District. This court’s 2022
decision rejected Rynn’s appeal from dismissal of the SAC based on claim
preclusion resulting from Rynn’s first lawsuit in federal court. David-Rynn,
1 CA-CV 21-0605, at *3, ¶ 18. This court applied claim preclusion because
the prior federal litigation “(1) involved the same ‘claim’ or cause of action
as the later suit, (2) reached a final judgment on the merits, and (3) involved
identical parties or privies.” Id. at *2, ¶ 10 (citing Mpoyo v. Litton Electro-
Optical Sys., 430 F.3d 985, 987 (9th Cir. 2005)).

¶15 Rynn’s TAC is similarly barred by claim preclusion. Rynn
argues that the previous judgments are not preclusive due to “new
evidence discovered in year 2022,” asserting that the “new evidence” shows
deficiencies in the underlying dependency action in 2017. But the
underlying dependency action was already affirmed on appeal, as were
Rynn’s federal and state court lawsuits relating to the dependency. See
Richard R., 2 CA-JV 2017-0165, at *2, ¶ 7; Richard R. v. Dep’t of Child Safety, 2
CA-JV 2021-0141, 2022 WL 1087332, at *2, ¶ 6 (Ariz. App. Apr. 12, 2022).
Moreover, claim preclusion

bars relitigation of all grounds of recovery that were asserted,
or could have been asserted, in a previous action between the
parties, where the previous action was resolved on the merits.
It is immaterial whether the claims asserted subsequent to the
judgment were actually pursued in the action that led to the
judgment; rather the relevant inquiry is whether they could have
been brought.

Howell v. Hodap, 221 Ariz. 543, 547, ¶ 20 (quoting United States ex rel. Barajas
v. Northrop Corp., 147 F.3d 905, 909 (9th Cir. 1998)). Rynn does not proffer a
reasoned basis why the alleged new evidence could not have been
discovered or asserted in the previous proceedings; thus, Rynn has not
overcome claim preclusion. Accordingly, we affirm the superior court’s
order dismissing Rynn’s claims against Empact, the State Defendants, Quail
Run, Devereux, and the District.

II. Remaining Defendants.

¶16 Rynn also appeals the superior court’s dismissals as to Day
Starz and Aurora. Under ARCAP 13, an appellant must articulate how the
court erred and provide supporting reasons for the arguments on appeal.
ARCAP 13(a)(7)(A). Here, however, Rynn has not alleged any act by any

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of these defendants which, if true, establishes a basis for liability. Nor has
Rynn provided any reasoning as to how the court erred by dismissing these
defendants. Without specific arguments or facts alleged as to these
defendants, Rynn has waived his claims against them. See J.W., 252 Ariz. at
188, ¶ 11. Therefore, we affirm the superior court’s order dismissing Rynn’s
claims against Day Starz and Aurora.

III. Attorney’s Fees and Costs on Appeal.

¶17 Appellees (other than the State Defendants) argue this appeal
is frivolous and ask that we award attorney’s fees as a sanction under
ARCAP 25. They note that the current appeal “is just the latest example of
Rynn’s unwillingness to accept judicial rulings” and “has been pursued
without substantial justification.” Notwithstanding Rynn’s history of
repetitive litigation, we decline to impose sanctions under ARCAP 25. See
Ariz. Tax Rsch. Ass’n v. Dep’t of Revenue, 163 Ariz. 255, 257–58 (1989) (noting
that sanctions under ARCAP 25 are discretionary). However, as the
successful parties, Appellees are entitled to their costs on appeal upon
compliance with ARCAP 21. See A.R.S. §§ 12-341, -342.

CONCLUSION

¶18 We affirm.

AMY M. WOOD • Clerk of the Court
FILED: AGFV

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